

EXPEDITION
AGAINST THE
HASANZAI AND AKAZAI TRIBES

OF THE
BLACK MOUNTAIN

BY A FORCE UNDER THE COMMAND OF
MAJOR-GENERAL W. K. ELLES, C.B.,


IN
1891.

COMPILED IN THE INTELLIGENCE BRANCH,

BY

CAPTAIN A. H. MASON, D.S.O.,

LATE DEPUTY ASSISTANT QUARTER MASTER GENERAL FOR INTELLIGENCE, HAZARA FIELD FORCE, 1891.



SIMLA:
PRINTED AT THE GOVERNMENT CENTRAL PRINTING OFFICE.

1894.


Class No

355-889483
A/42E

SIMLA :

PRINTED AT THE GOVERNMENT CENTRAL PRINTING OFFICE.

M 548603
MUZ E-1




PREFACE.

THE following account of the operations against the Hasanzai and Akazai tribes of the Black Mountain in 1891 is compiled from official sources. The history of the expedition against the Black Mountain tribes in 1888 has already been written in this office, and the present report continues the account of our dealings with these tribes from the termination of the 1888 expedition.

INTELLIGENCE BRANCH; }
The 12th February 1894. }

A. H. M.

G. H. M.-M.



Class No



CONTENTS.

	PAGE.
Events on the Hazara border subsequent to the expedition of 1888	I
Decision of Government to send a small force to march in a peaceable manner along the crest of the Black Mountain in the autumn of 1890	<i>ib.</i>
Report of Brigadier-General Sir J. McQueen showing how the Government decision was carried out	2
Reasons given for the hostile attitude assumed by the tribes	4
Decision of the Governor-General in Council to despatch an expedition against the Hasanzai and Akazai clans	<i>ib.</i>
Scheme for the proposed expedition submitted to the Government of India under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief	5
Government General Order notifying the composition of the force	9
Orders regarding the political control of the expedition	<i>ib.</i>
Notices issued to the neighbouring clans	10
Force concentrated at Darband and Oghi on the 10th March	<i>ib.</i>
Attitude of the Bunerwals and Mada Khel	11
Movement of 500 men of the Northumberland Fusiliers to Hoti Mardan sanctioned	<i>ib.</i>
Advance of the field force in two columns on the 12th March. Plan of operations	<i>ib.</i>
Occupation of Pailam and Kotkai without opposition	12
Reconnaissance to the Palosi plain on the 13th. Villages found deserted	<i>ib.</i>
Occupation of Tilli without opposition on the 13th	13
Reconnaissance party from Towara to Makranai and towards Ril on the 14th fired on	<i>ib.</i>
Reconnaissance party from Towara to Palosi plain on the 15th fired on	<i>ib.</i>
Change in plan of operations	<i>ib.</i>
Bridge over the Indus at Kotkai completed on the 16th March	14
Notice issued to the Hasanzai and Akazai clans on the 16th March	<i>ib.</i>
Attack on the outpost of Ghazikot on the morning of the 19th March	15
Attack on Kanar on the night of the 19th	17
Movement of the River Column to Pirzada Bela on the 20th	<i>ib.</i>
Occupation of Palosi by the River Column on the 21st	<i>ib.</i>
Occupation of Ril and Abu by the Tilli Column on the same date	<i>ib.</i>
Letters received from the Chagarzai <i>jirga</i>	18
Large numbers of armed men with standards seen near Baio on the 22nd	19
Occupation of Seri on same date without opposition by Brigadier-General Hammond	<i>ib.</i>
Flying bridge established at Bakrai on the 23rd	<i>ib.</i>
Action of Diliarai on the 23rd. Lieutenant-Colonel Gaselee's report	<i>ib.</i>
Return of Brigadier-General Hammond's column to Tilli after destroying Seri on the 23rd	21
Arrival of Brigadier-General Hammond's column at Palosi from Tilli on the 24th	<i>ib.</i>
Political situation on the 24th March	22
Action of Darbanai on the 25th March	<i>ib.</i>

	PAGE.
Reserve Brigade ordered from Rawal Pindi to Haripur	23
Action of Surmal on the 27th March	24
Continued increase of armed gathering at Baio	25
Owing to threatening attitude of Buner, 9th Bengal Lancers and 22nd Bengal Infantry ordered from Naoshera to Mardan	<i>ib.</i>
Concentration of the Reserve Brigade at Darband on the 31st March	27
Correspondence with Akhundzada Mian Gul	<i>ib.</i>
Orders of Government solicited by the General Officer Commanding as to action to be taken	<i>ib.</i>
Mian Gul reported to have arrived at Baio on the 1st April	28
Further correspondence with Mian Gul	<i>ib.</i>
The <i>lashkar</i> at Baio was reported to be dispersing on the 4th April	31
The troops of the 3rd or Reserve Brigade marched on the 7th from Darband for Kohat	32
Baio found to be deserted	<i>ib.</i>
Troops withdrawn to the left bank of the Indus	<i>ib.</i>
Arrangements made on the 12th April for the change of base from Darband to Oghi	34
Divisional head-quarters moved from Ril to Seri	<i>ib.</i>
Bridge-of-boats at Kotkai dismantled on the 15th April	35
Withdrawal of the Northumberland Fusiliers and 9th Bengal Lancers to Naoshera from Mardan on the 15th April	36
The whole Akazai country visited on the 24th April by a combined movement from Seri and Kan	37
Opening of the Panji Gali-Bandi road between Seri and Oghi	38
Arrival of <i>jirgas</i> of Hasanzai and Akazai at Seri on the 24th May	40
Road from Seri to Oghi <i>via</i> Kain Gali completed on the 25th May	41
Agreement made with the Hasanzai and Akazai on the 29th May	<i>ib.</i>
<i>Jirgas</i> addressed by the General Officer Commanding	<i>ib.</i>
Telegram of congratulation from the Commander-in-Chief on the successful termination of the expedition	<i>ib.</i>
Arrival of <i>jirga</i> of Mada Khel at Seri on the 3rd June and acceptance of terms of agreement proposed	<i>ib.</i>
Farewell order of Major-General Elles, C.B.	42
Agreement made with the Pariari Saiads on the 13th June	43
The field force broken up on the 16th June	<i>ib.</i>
Government General Order published relative to the above operations	44
Acknowledgment of Secretary of State for India of despatches and Government General Order	45
Grant of India medal with clasp for "Hazara, 1891," to all employed in expedition	<i>ib.</i>
Events subsequent to the withdrawal of the main portion of the Hazara Field Force in June 1891 until the final evacuation of the Black Mountain at the end of November 1891	46

APPENDICES.

APP.

I.— <i>Parwana</i> addressed to Hasanzai and Akazai, dated 29th January 1891.	
Issued 30th January 1891	i
II.—Statement of mule transport required for Hazara Expedition, 1891	ii
III.—Details of commands and staff	iv

APP.	PAGE.
IV.—Punjab Gazette Notification, dated 10th February 1891, warning the public against crossing the frontier into the territories of the Hasanzai and Akazai clans	vi
V.— <i>Parwana</i> addressed to the Chagarzai, Deshis, Swatis of Thakot, and Pariariwals, dated 3rd March 1891	vii
VI.— <i>Parwana</i> addressed to the Mada Khel, dated 3rd March 1891	viii
VII.—Return of strength, Hazara Field Force, 10th March 1891	ix
VIII.—Government General Orders Nos. 354 and 951 of 1891 granting Order of Merit to a native officer, three non-commissioned officers, and a member of the Subordinate Medical Service	x
IX.—Government General Order No. 952 granting the Order of Merit to a native non-commissioned officer	xi
X.—Distribution of Hazara Field Force on the 1st April 1891	xii
XI.—Statement showing the strength and distribution of the Hazara Field Force on 1st May 1891	xiii
XII.—Agreement made by the Hasanzai and Akazai with the British Government at Seri, dated 29th May 1891	xv
XIII.—Statement showing the strength and distribution of the Hazara Field Force on the 1st June 1891	xviii
XIV.—Agreement made by the Mada Khel with the British Government at Seri, dated 3rd June 1891	xx
XV.—Agreement made by the Saiads and Chagarzai of Pariari with the British Government at Oghi, dated 12th June 1891	xxii
XVI.—Staff of force retained for the occupation of the Black Mountain on the termination of the Hazara expedition	xxiii
XVII.—Despatch of Major-General W. K. Elles, c.B., on the operations of the Hazara Field Force, 1891	xxiv
XVIII.—Return of ammunition expended during the operations of the Hazara Field Force, 1891	xxxiv
XIX.—Points brought to notice by Brigadier-General R. F. Williamson, Commanding 1st Brigade, Hazara Field Force, 1891	xxxv
XX.—Report of Mr. F. D. Cunningham, c.I.E., C.S., Chief Political Officer, Hazara Field Force, 1891	xxxvii
XXI.—Report on the Engineering operations, Hazara Field Force, 1891, by Major W. L. Greenstreet, Commanding Royal Engineer, dated 23rd May 1891	1
XXII.—Report on Bridging operations, Hazara Field Force, 1891, by Major P. T. Buston, Royal Engineers	lx
XXIII.—Notes on the Coolie Corps, by Captain H. E. S. Abbott, Field Engineer, Hazara Field Force, 1891	lxvii
XXIV.—Report on the Signalling operations, Hazara Field Force, 1891, by Captain E. O. F. Hamilton, Superintendent of Army Signalling, dated 1st May 1891	lxviii
XXV.—Report on the Medical Department, Hazara Field Force, 1891, by Deputy Surgeon-General A. F. Bradshaw, M.S., Principal Medical Officer, dated 8th June 1891	lxxi
XXVI.—Report on the Commissariat Department, Hazara Field Force, 1891, by Captain H. F. Lyons-Montgomery, Chief Commissariat Officer, dated 15th May 1891	lxxiii
XXVII.—Report on the Transport Department, Hazara Field Force, 1891, by Lieutenant J. W. G. Tulloch, Divisional Transport Officer, dated 9th May 1891	lxxvii

APP.	PAGE.
XXVIII.—Statement showing the number of animals attached to the Hazara Field Force, 1891	lxxx
XXIX.—Report on the Survey operations, Hazara Field Force, 1891, by Captain R. A. Wahab, R.E., Survey Officer, dated 1st June 1891	lxxxi
XXX.—Report on the Veterinary Department, Hazara Field Force, 1891, by Inspecting Veterinary-Surgeon W. R. Hagger, Army Veterinary Department, dated 1st May 1891	lxxxiii
XXXI.—Report on the Telegraph operations, Hazara Field Force, 1891, by Mr. R. C. Barker, C.I.E., dated 21st May 1891	lxxxv
XXXII.—Report on the Postal operations, Hazara Field Force, 1891, by Mr. W. T. Van Someren, Superintendent, Postal Department, dated 11th May 1891	lxxxviii
XXXIII.—Report on the operations of Hazara Field Force subsequent to the 17th June 1891 by Brigadier-General A. G. Hammond, v.c., c.b., d.s.o., a.d.c., dated 1st December 1891	xc

LIST OF MAPS AND SKETCHES.

Map to illustrate operations of Hazara Expedition, 1891.	<i>In pocket.</i>
	To face page.
Bridge-of-boats over the Indus at Kotkai	12
Rough sketch of the village of Ghazikot to illustrate the affair of the 18th March 1891	14
Rough plan of the bivouac at Palosi (Fig. 1). Sketch shewing position of picquets round Palosi (Fig. 2)	16
Sketch to illustrate the action of Diliarai on the 23rd March 1891	18
View looking due south from below the picquet hill near Diliarai	20
Rough sketches of boats used in bridging operations	lxvi
Map illustrating the signalling operations of the Hazara Field Force, 1891	lxx

M 611

EXPEDITION
AGAINST THE
HASANZAI AND AKAZAI TRIBES
OF THE
BLACK MOUNTAIN

BY A FORCE UNDER THE COMMAND OF
MAJOR-GENERAL W. K. ELLES, C.B.,

IN
1891.

During the year subsequent to the Hazara expedition of 1888 affairs on the Agror border remained quiet. By the removal of the Khan of Agror a salutary warning had been given to other *Khans* within our frontier whose intrigues and machinations had been the fertile cause of trouble with the clans on this border. Police control over Agror was strengthened, and several criminals who had fled from justice in past years were arrested, brought to trial, and punished.

Among the terms of the agreements executed by the Hasanzai and Akazai clans after the expedition of 1888 was one by which they bound themselves not to molest officials of Government or troops visiting the crest of the Black Mountain. The object of this condition was to assert our jurisdiction up to the watershed which was the boundary of British territory. After the submission of the tribes and withdrawal of the troops at the end of 1888, the Government of India took into consideration measures to secure control for the future over these clans and to give easy access to their country. Among these measures the Supreme Government in March 1890 ordered the construction of several roads leading from Agror up to the crest of the range, and at the same time called for the opinion of the Punjab Government whether, in order to reap the full benefit of

Decision of Government to send a small force to march in a peaceable manner along the crest of the Black Mountain in the autumn of 1890.

these roads, troops should not use them and visit the border periodically. After some correspondence it was decided to send a small force to make a route march in a peaceable manner along the crest of the Black Mountain during the autumn of 1890.

In the meanwhile, as the roads near the crest could not be safely made without the co-operation of the neighbouring clans, the Hasanzais, Akazais, and Pariari Saiads were invited to send in their *jirgas* to arrange for the peaceable completion of the work on the upper slopes of the mountain. They replied objecting to the construction of the roads and refusing or evading the invitation; and when they were subsequently ordered to send in deputations to accompany troops on their march along the crest, and were warned at the same time that

opposition would be severely punished, they returned evasive replies. The column detailed to march along the crest was placed under the command of Brigadier-General Sir J. W. McQueen, K.C.B., A.D.C., commanding the Punjab Frontier Force, to whom the object of the operation was notified in the following terms by the Quarter Master General in India in a telegram dated the 10th October 1890:—

His Excellency wishes to impress on you that the operations this autumn are merely intended to prove our right under the treaty to march along the crest, and are not intended to develop under any circumstances into a large expedition. Should the tribes oppose the promenade this autumn, you should not push forward, but, having clearly put upon the tribes the odium of not having carried out their obligations, reserve their punishment for an expedition in the spring, which they will be told will be sent against them.

The following report by Brigadier-General Sir John McQueen, addressed to the Quarter Master General in India, and dated the 29th October 1890, shows how he carried out these instructions:—

Report of Brigadier-General Sir John McQueen showing how the Government decision was carried out.

I have the honour to report, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that the troops marginally noted marched from Abbottabad on the 17th October 1890, arriving at Oghi on the 19th *idem*, on which date I also proceeded to Oghi and took over command of the column from Colonel J. M. Sym, C.B., 1-5th Gurkhas.

No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery.
500 rifles, 4th Sikh Infantry.
350 rifles, 1-5th Gurkhas.
350 rifles, 2-5th Gurkhas.

2. Rain began to fall on the afternoon of the 19th, and continued without intermission for 29 hours, falling on the Black Mountain crest in the form of snow and preventing any advance taking place on the date originally intended.

3. The information received up to this time showed the ultimate attitude of the tribes to be doubtful. Hashim Ali Khan, the chief of the Khan Khel section of the Hasanzais and titular head of the clan, was known to be making every effort to raise a large combination of the tribes to oppose the march; but the attitude of the Hasanzai as a whole was still uncertain, and depended, we were informed, on the result of a *jirga* of the whole tribe about to be held at Seri.

4. Up to the 20th no tribes had sent in their *jirgas*, and the replies to his summonses received by Mr. Cunningham, C.I.E., the Deputy Commissioner, had been of an evasive nature, protesting against the march of the troops and the construction of roads along our border. The Akazai had refused to send in a *jirga*, but had replied that if Government desired to march its troops along its border, it was no concern of theirs and would not be opposed by them. The Pariari Saiads and the Pariari Chagarzais had also sent evasive answers; and this state of uncertainty continued until the 21st of October. Such information as had been received through spies and messengers all tended to show that opposition, and possibly organised opposition, was to be expected.

5. On the 21st October the weather cleared slightly, and on the morning of this day I sent out two reconnoitring parties—one up the Barchar spur, and one up the Sambalbut spur. The former party were caught in a violent hailstorm and dense cloud when above the village of Barchar, which prevented their seeing anything towards the crest; but they were informed by the villagers that there was a picquet of about 50 men (Akazai) on the crest above Bampur Gali, where the Barchar spur joins the main range. The Sambalbut party reported that there was a picquet of about 30 men above the village of Sambalbut, *i.e.*, a long way within British territory, and another picquet, said to number about 60 men, was reported to be at the Karra rocks above Tilla. On this same day the Nawab of Amb arrived in camp and reported that at the tribal conference held at Seri the Hasanzai had finally thrown in their lot with Hashim Ali, saying that they did not wish to oppose

Class No

Government, but they would not act against Hashim Ali, the head of the clan, as he would denounce them as "kafirs." The *Nawab* further stated that from this it might be assumed as certain that the Hasanzai had joined Hashim Ali, and that if they did not send away their families, a gathering of from 1,000 to 1,500 men might be expected; while if they did send away their families, this number might be considerably increased. The Deputy Commissioner, in reporting this information, stated that though he should have thought this unlikely, still the *Nawab* was not an alarmist, was in a position to have accurate information, and what he said must be seriously considered.

6. Very heavy rain fell again on the night of the 21st, still further postponing any movement of the troops. On the 22nd the Pariari *jirga* (considered by the Deputy Commissioner a fairly representative one) came into camp, and Mr. Cunningham reported that while they were with us no opposition need be expected from that quarter. Other information received on this date went to confirm the rumours of hostile gatherings of Hasanzai, Khan Khel, and Akazai; standards were reported to be at several villages on the far side of the hill. Mr. Cunningham also reported that there were 60 men at the Karra rocks and about 120 about Nimal and Kain Gali, but the main body would, of course, not come up to the crest in the rain and snow until our troops were seen to be actually on the move up from below. On this day I formed my plan of operations. Owing to the weather, which had made movements impossible hitherto, and the limited time at my disposal, I abandoned the idea of passing three nights on the hill as originally intended, and determined to ascend by the Barchar spur and push forward right and left from the crest towards Chitabat and Nimal with small columns, retaining about half the force as a reserve at Bampur Gali. In this choice I was guided by the following considerations:—

Firstly.—That the attitude of Hashim Ali and his intention to oppose us seemed fully established, and if I advanced by the thickly-wooded Sambalbut spur, it would be his policy to draw us on towards the crest without opposition, and then harass our retirement from the dense woods at either side. By ascending Barchar, which is not a wooded spur, this contingency would be avoided, and if the crest line were gained without opposition, I should not be more than a mile and a half from Nimal, the key of the Hasanzai position, and the intervening ground is for the most part wooded only on the crest and further slope of the hill.

Secondly.—The Akazai were still hesitating whether to send in their *jirga*, and were they to do so, no opposition need be anticipated in the Chitabat direction, the Pariari Saiad and Pariari Chagarzai *jirga* being already in our camp.

7. Accordingly on the 23rd October I advanced with the force marginally noted up the Barchar spur, and bivouacked above the village of Barchar, our picquets being about a mile below the crest. Heavy firing was opened on the bivouac about 9 P.M., and continued with intervals until 12; but, owing to our position on the reverse of the slope, we had no casualties except one transport mule wounded. Our men had orders not to return the fire unless actually attacked, or if they could actually see any one close to them, and only 11 shots were fired in all, one of which killed one of the enemy (a Khan Khel). It subsequently appeared that the party which came down and fired into camp consisted of some 30 or 40 Khan Khel and Akazai, led by Sikandar Khan, Hashim Ali's brother.

8. On the morning of the 24th two Pariari Saiad messengers, who had been sent by the Deputy Commissioner to warn the Akazai against opposing us, returned with the information that the Akazai had finally joined Hashim Ali, and they were determined to oppose our advance. At daylight our picquets had been pushed some distance further up the spur, and large numbers of tribesmen were now visible on the crest, while others were momentarily arriving to join them. Under these circumstances, in consultation with the Deputy Commissioner, I determined to withdraw our troops, as we considered that

the intention of the Hasanzai, Khan Khel, and Akazai tribes to oppose us had been so fully established that nothing further was to be gained by continuing the advance, and that such being the case I was bound by my orders to retire and avoid further collision. The troops were accordingly leisurely withdrawn in fighting formation, but no attempt was made to follow us up, the tribesmen no doubt hesitating to follow us down a naked spur with every chance of their sustaining heavy loss in doing so.

9. Previous to retiring, in accordance with the instructions conveyed in Quarter Master General's No. 6886-A. of the 15th October 1890 and previous telegrams, letters were sent by the Deputy Commissioner to the Hasanzai, Khan Khel, and Akazai headmen, telling them that they had failed to carry out their treaty obligations:—

Firstly, by refusing to send in their *jirgas*.

Secondly, by establishing picquets of armed men in our territory.

Thirdly, by firing upon our troops bivouacked in our own territory, and gathering to oppose our march along the crest line.

That it was not convenient to punish them now, and, in accordance with the orders of Government, the troops would now be withdrawn, but they would assuredly be severely punished for their contumacy in the spring.

The order to retire was not given until it was seen that the messengers had reached the tribal position. The troops are now returning to Abbottabad.

The hostility of the Khan Khel and of the nearest section of the Akazai had thus been put beyond doubt, and the Hasanzai and the rest of the Akazai were committed to responsibility for their acts. The attitude assumed by these tribes so soon after the expedition of 1888 may seem strange, and Mr. Cunningham, the Deputy Commissioner, gives the following reasons to account for it:—

Reasons given for the hostile attitude assumed by the tribes.

- (1) They disliked and resented the idea of roads being made which would render their country more easy of access.
- (2) They did not believe in the threat of punishment made to them by order of Government.
- (3) The intrigues of the Khan of Agror and his partisans in Agror and Mansera.

In consequence of the opposition offered to our troops, it was decided by the Governor-General in Council to despatch a force into the Hasanzai and Akazai territories, and the Commander-in-Chief was called upon to submit proposals for carrying out the necessary operations.

Decision of the Governor-General in Council to despatch an expedition against the Hasanzai and Akazai clans.

The objects of the expedition were stated in the Government letter* to be, first, to carry out the purpose for which the movement of troops had been made in October, namely—to assert our right to move along the crest of the Black Mountain without molestation; and next, and more particularly, to inflict punishment on the tribes concerned for the hostility practised on that occasion. The occupation of the country to be entered was to be prolonged until the tribes concerned had made complete submission and had carried out whatever conditions had been imposed upon them. The whole of the Hasanzai and Akazai clans were held to be responsible for the hostility displayed towards our troops.

As regards the strength of the force to be employed, it was laid down that this should be strong enough to bear down all opposition and to prevent the

* No. 3328-B., dated 12th December 1890, from the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Quarter Master General in India.

possibility of a check, and it was also necessary to provide against the liability that the Chagarzais and Hindustani fanatics, with possibly some Bunerwals and small parties from other trans-Indus tribes, might join the Black Mountain clans against whom the expedition was specially directed.

Orders were at the same time given for the immediate construction of posts at Sambalbut and Jal Gali, and for making mule roads to Sambalbut and Barchar. The survey of a road to connect the recently constructed Oghi-Darband road with Pabal Gali was also ordered.

In consequence of the experience gained during the 1838 expedition, it was decided that the advance should be made only by the Indus line. The reasons which led to this decision were that the large villages and most valuable lands of the Hasanzai and Akazai clans are situated along the Indus, or at no great distance from it, and could be easily reached by an advance up the left bank of the river or parallel to it; while, on the other hand, the ascent of the mountain from the east and south-east is difficult; that the crest line is our boundary, and for some way down the western side there are no villages or property the destruction of which would be much felt; moreover, that in the forest which clothes the upper part of the mountain the conditions of fighting are in favour of an active enemy well acquainted with the ground, while the superior armament and discipline of our troops might be partially neutralized. It was accordingly decided that while Oghi should be occupied by a small force, this should be merely placed there as a precautionary measure, and not in view to an advance from that side of the Black Mountain, except as far as the occupation of Pabal Gali and Tilli.

It was decided by the Government of India that the expedition should take place whether or no the tribes in the meanwhile offered submission; and the Punjab Government was authorized to inform the tribes of this decision, and also that the Government of India demanded their unconditional submission, and that, if they submitted, not only would Government be disposed to treat them leniently, but would undertake to settle all outstanding cases by tribal *jirga* in accordance with the custom of the country, and would be prepared to discuss with them in the same fashion the future management of their country. The Deputy Commissioner of Hazara was directed to make a communication to this effect to the headmen of the tribes, and this was accordingly done on the 30th January (see Appendix I).

On the 6th January the following scheme for the proposed expedition, prepared by the Quarter Master General under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, was submitted to the Government of India:—

Scheme for the proposed expedition submitted to the Government of India under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

Formation.—The expeditionary force will consist of the following troops:—

Cavalry	2 squadrons, native.*
Royal Artillery	3 mountain batteries (2 British and 1 native).†
Bengal Sappers and Miners	1 company.
Infantry	2 battalions, British.
"	6 " native.
"	1 battalion of pioneers.
Khaibar Rifles‡	300 bayonets.

* The head-quarters of the regiment will not accompany these two squadrons.

† This includes three guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery remaining at Abbottabad.

‡ They had volunteered for this service.

Of the above troops, a force consisting of one squadron of native cavalry, one native infantry battalion, and three mountain guns (native) will occupy Oghi.

Abbottabad to be held by a native infantry battalion and three mountain guns (British).

A brigade will further be held in immediate readiness to take the field from Rawal Pindi.

All infantry battalions will move into the field 600 strong.

2. *Concentration.*—Concentration to take place by the 1st March at Darband, the occupation of Oghi conforming with the move to Darband.

3. *General object.*—The objects of the expedition will be, first, to carry out the purpose for which the movement of troops was made last October—namely, to assert our right to move along the crest of the Black Mountain without molestation; and next, and more particularly, to inflict punishment on the tribes concerned for the hostility practised on that occasion. The occupation of the country to be entered will be prolonged until the tribes concerned have made complete submission and have carried out whatever conditions may be imposed upon them.

The whole of the Hasanzai and Akazai clans are held to be responsible for the hostility displayed towards the force in October last.

4. *Operations.*—To accomplish the above object, the force will advance from Darband into the enemy's country in two columns, one moving *viâ* Biradar and Pailam to Tilli, and the other along the river route *viâ* Kotkai and Kanar.

Further movements are left to the General Officer Commanding.

5. *Details of commands, staff, etc.*

* * * * *

6. *Equipment.*—In order to admit of the final advance into the enemy's country being made with the troops as lightly equipped as possible, some modification in the Field Service Equipment Tables of 1888 will be necessitated.

Clothing.—The summer scale of clothing, with the addition of one blanket, for British and native troops and followers, as laid down in the Field Service Manual, Commissariat, will be issued.

The extra field service clothing (summer scale) for the corps comprising the brigade to be held in readiness at Rawal Pindi will be in commissariat charge at that station ready for immediate issue :—

Ammunition.

Ammunition per man	...	70 rounds in pouch.
		30 „ on mules with corps.
		100 rounds at base.
		—
Total	...	200 „ in regimental charge.
		—

Artillery reserve ammunition in full.

<i>Kits.</i>			
British officers, staff $\frac{1}{2}$ mule.
British officers, regimental 3 to a mule, 40 lbs. each; the remaining 40 lbs. for mess, servants, etc.
Warrant officers	40 lbs. each.
Staff sergeants	20 „ „
British non-commissioned officers and men.	16 „ „
Native non-commissioned officers and men.	16 „ „
Cooking pots, British	1 mule per company.
Cooking pots, native	$\frac{1}{2}$ „ „
Followers	10 lbs. each.

The following items will not be taken beyond the base at Darband :—

Treasure chest.
 Quarter-Master's stores.
 Regimental office books.
 Tents for all ranks.

To meet the difficulty experienced in obtaining water under the special conditions anticipated, a reserve of 40 *pakhals* will be at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding, who will communicate his distribution to the Chief Commissariat Officer.

The above scale of equipment will be reduced at the discretion of the General Officer Commanding as he may consider necessary.

Entrenching tools.—Light entrenching tools will not be taken, but arrangements will be made by the Commanding Royal Engineer for the supply of such additional tools of the heavier pattern as may be required.

A large supply of bill-hooks or *dratis* will be required, and these, as well as the felling axes, will be ground in the arsenal before being issued.

The Director-General of Ordnance will authorise the issue of any engineer or ordnance stores from the Rawal Pindi arsenal on the requisition of the General Officer Commanding the force.

7. *Supplies.*—Five days' supplies and two days' grain for all animals is the least amount to accompany the columns.

Including the above, thirty days' supplies will be collected at Darband for the troops concentrating there. At Oghi there will be supplies for fifteen days for the corps occupying Oghi and for the Abbottabad garrison.

Ten days' supplies will be held in readiness at Rawal Pindi in case the brigade is required to move.

The above supplies to be in position by the 1st March.

All ration supplies to be free issues at and beyond Darband and beyond Oghi. Biscuit will be issued instead of bread when necessary.

8. *Transport.*—Corps will rendezvous on the field service scale laid down in the Field Service Equipment Tables, 1888, *vis.*, with tents, regulation

number of followers, etc. All equipment and supplies accompanying the troops beyond Darband will be carried on mules.

A statement showing the details of the mule transport required is given in the Appendix.* The total is 3,150.

The General Officer Commanding and the Commissary-General-in-Chief will arrange with the Punjab Government for the collection of such boats as may be required, whether for purely military movements or for transport and commissariat purposes.

9. *Medical*.—Half a British and two-and-a-quarter native field hospitals will be allotted to the whole force. This does not include the brigade in reserve at Rawal Pindi.

Mule transport for half a British and one native field hospital is, however, sufficient.

The General Officer Commanding will take forward from Darband such medical establishments only as he may consider necessary.

A section of a field hospital will be established at Hassan Abdal, where the sick and wounded returning from the front can be temporarily accommodated.

In order to reduce the amount of transport as far as practicable, the Principal Medical Officer should be authorized to leave behind such medical, ordnance, and commissariat field hospital stores as he may consider unnecessary for the object in view. Similarly, he should be empowered to take any special medicines and medical comforts he may require. Riding mules or ponies with country cloth saddles and broad stirrups should be substituted for ambulance *tongas*, and half the proportion of *dandis* should be of the Bareilly pattern, and Low-moor jackets for field stretchers should be supplied, if such be available. Six bearers per *dandi* are essential.

Followers to be treated in native field hospitals, and all followers to be furnished with a waterproof sheet.

10. *Communications*.—Telegraph lines will be erected from Abbottabad to Oghi and from Haripur to Darband, and heliographic communication will be arranged for by the General Officer Commanding from regimental equipment, supplemented, if necessary, by the Ordnance Department.

Post Office.—Temporary field post offices will be established at Abbottabad, Oghi, Haripur, and Darband under arrangements made by the Director-General of the Post Office of India.

11. *Maps*.—Maps will be issued to every officer with the force and to all corps taking part in the expedition.

This scheme was generally approved by the Government of India on the 15th January, subject to the following modifications:—

(a) It was considered preferable that the supplies to be collected at Oghi should be for 30 days instead of 15 as proposed.

* See Appendix II.

(b) It was suggested that the 10 days' supplies for the Rawal Pindi reserve should be placed at Abbottabad, as there might be difficulty in moving them up from Rawal Pindi if required for the Reserve Brigade or for the troops in advance.

(c) The Government of India decided that all ration supplies beyond Abbottabad (instead of beyond Oghi as proposed) should be free issues.

The following Government General Order (No. 45, dated the 16th January 1891) was published notifying the composition of the force :—

Government General Order notifying the composition of the force.

The Governor-General in Council has been pleased to sanction the despatch of a force as detailed below for operations in the Black Mountain, Hazara. The force will be designated the "Hazara Field Force," and will concentrate at Darband and Oghi by the 1st March :—

Left or River Column.

No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery (three guns).
 No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery (three guns).
 2nd Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders.
 Head-quarters and wing, 32nd (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry (Pioneers).
 37th (Dogra) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
 Infantry of the Corps of Guides.
 4th Sikh Infantry.

Right or Tilli Column.

No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
 1st Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
 11th Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
 Wing of 32nd (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry (Pioneers).
 2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkha Regiment.
 Khaibar Rifles.

Divisional Troops.

11th Bengal Lancers (one squadron).
 No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

To occupy Oghi.

11th Bengal Lancers (one squadron).
 No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery (three guns).
 28th (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

To hold Abbottabad.

No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery (three guns).
 1st Battalion, 5th Gurkha Regiment.

Reserve Brigade at Rawal Pindi.

11th Bengal Lancers (one squadron).
 1st Battalion, King's Royal Rifle Corps.
 19th (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
 27th (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

The details of the commands and staff were also given, and these as finally sanctioned will be found in Appendix III.

Full political authority was conferred on the General Officer Commanding the expeditionary force, and Mr. F. D. Cunningham, C.I.E., C.S., was appointed Chief Political Officer under his orders. The Government of India ruled that during the continuance of

Orders regarding the political control of the expedition.

the expedition all instructions for the General Officer Commanding would be issued by the Government of India in the Military Department, and that officer would be responsible for carrying out, subject to these instructions, the political objects of the expedition. This procedure was subsequently found to be inconvenient, and the system was adopted of direct communication between the General Officer Commanding and the Foreign Department on all matters with which that Department was primarily concerned.

On the 10th February a notification was published by the Punjab Government (see Appendix IV) warning the public against crossing the frontier of the Hasanzai and Akazai clans and the clans adjoining them on the Indus river.

The concentration of the force had, as notified above, been ordered to take place by the 1st March, but owing to bad weather the despatch of the expedition was postponed to the 10th March.

Early in March notices (see Appendix V) were issued, under the orders of the Government of India, to the following clans: Chagarzai, Deshis, Swatis of Thakot, and Pariari Saiads, informing them that our troops would move within their limits, wherever thought fit, in a friendly manner, but that on the first display of hostility they would be treated as enemies. The Mada Khel were addressed in similar terms; but, in consequence of their connection with the Hasanzai and Akazai, they were told in addition that they would be held responsible to join in compelling the submission of Hashim Ali Khan or in any arrangement which Government might approve regarding the Khanship of Seri (see Appendix VI).

On the 8th March the General Officer Commanding arrived at Darband

Force concentrated at Darband and Oghi on the 10th March.

10th March.

*AT DARBAND.

River Column—

- No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery (3 guns).
- No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery (3 guns).
- 2nd Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders.
- Guides Infantry.
- 4th Sikh Infantry.
- Head-quarters and wing, 32nd Bengal Infantry (Pioneers).
- 37th Bengal Infantry (Dogras).

Tilli Column—

- No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
- 1st Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
- 11th Bengal Infantry.
- Wing, 32nd Bengal Infantry (Pioneers).
- 2-5th Gurkha Regiment.
- Khaibar Rifles.

Divisional Troops—

- 11th Bengal Lancers (one squadron).
- No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

AT Oghi.

- 11th Bengal Lancers (one squadron).
- No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery (3 guns).
- 28th Bengal Infantry.

from Oghi, and on the 10th the whole force, consisting of the troops as per margin,* was concentrated preparatory to its advance. The River and Tilli Columns, afterwards designated the 1st and 2nd Brigades, were commanded respectively by Brigadier-Generals R. F. Williamson and A. G. Hammond, V.C., D.S.O., A.D.C.

The detailed return of the troops is given in Appendix VII. The divisional troops were attached to the River Column.

There was also with the force a Coolie Corps, 200 strong, for road-making, under the charge of Lieutenant Birdwood, R.E.

11th March.

On the 11th March Major-General Elles reported that the force was assembled and ready to advance on the following day. In the meanwhile good roads had been completed on the Tilli line to near the frontier and on the

river line to Bela, and Phaldar and Bela were both occupied by our troops, the telegraph line being completed to these points. On the 11th the boats for a bridge which had been brought up from Attock arrived at Bela. On the same date four days' supplies for the right column had been collected at Phaldar, and four days' for the left column at Bela. A few shots had been fired from the opposite side of the river at working parties, but beyond this there were no signs of opposition.

The news received of the intentions of the tribes was conflicting, but it was reported that the Hasanzai and Akazai were both pressing Hashim Ali Khan, the nominal chief of both clans, to submit and join them in a deputation to the British authorities. On the 10th March it was notified to the Hasanzais that if they remained peaceably in their villages when the force advanced into their country, they would not be injured in person and their villages would be protected from harm. The terms of submission would be made known after the country had been occupied.

On the 11th March a Bunerwal *jirga* arrived at Amb, and a native official Attitude of the Bunerwals and Mada Khel. Ibrahim Khan, *Khan Bahadur*, was sent by the General to assure them that the Government had no quarrel with them, and no intention of interfering with them or their country. A Mada Khel *jirga*, which had also gone to Amb, were at the same time informed that we had no quarrel with them if they behaved peaceably and offered no opposition to our troops or permitted others to attempt hostility from their country, and that their *jirga* would be received at Kanar or at some convenient place in the Hasanzai country.

Movement of 500 men of the Northumberland Fusiliers to Hoti Mardan sanctioned. In view of the attitude of the Bunerwals, General Elles suggested that pressure might be brought to bear on the tribe from the Peshawar side, and more especially as it was reported that the Bunerwals only wanted a plausible excuse for abstention from hostility. The Commander-in-Chief supported this proposal, which was sanctioned on the 12th March, and on the 16th 500 men of the Northumberland Fusiliers were moved from Naoshera to Hoti Mardan.

Rain fell during the afternoon of the 11th and during the night following, but the weather cleared on the 12th, and the advance was carried out as proposed. The plan of operations proposed by Major-General Elles was, after the occupation of Kanar and Tilli as directed, to push forward both columns; the left column to occupy the lower Hasanzai country on both banks and the Diliarai peninsula of the Akazai country, and the right column to pass through the middle levels of the mountain by Ril and Kungar and occupy the Khan Khel country. Thereafter the two columns to work up and down on the north of the Shal Nala through the Akazai country till they met. On a junction being effected, the occupation of the whole country of the two tribes would be completed. As regards punishment, the Hasanzais who had submitted were in the event of their return to their villages to be mulcted in one-fourth of their standing crops. In other cases the troops would subsist on the country as far as their requirements could be met until submission took place.

12th March.

On the morning of the 12th March the Tilli Column marched from Darband at 8 A.M., and the River Column (accompanied by the General Officer Commanding and the divisional head-quarters) at 8-30 A.M.

Occupation of Pailam and Kotkai without opposition.

The former occupied Pailam and the latter Kotkai without opposition. There was some desultory firing at the River Column from the opposite side of the Indus from a point where the Hasanzai and Mada Khel boundaries meet; and when the boats were coming up the river, shots were fired from this point at the boats' escort. A company of the Guides was crossed over the river and dislodged the men who were firing without any casualties on our side. Villages along the river bank passed *en route* were found deserted, and all property and grain had been carried off.

The River Column bivouacked for the night at Towara on the site where the action of Kotkai had been fought in 1888.

A few shots were fired after the arrival of the column from the right bank of the Indus opposite Kotkai, but without doing any damage; and two companies of the Guides were sent across the river to bivouac for the night on the right bank to protect the advanced division of the boats which had arrived nearly opposite camp from annoyance from the right bank. The rear division of boats remained above the rapids of Bela escorted by the 4th Sikhs and three guns of the Derajat Mountain Battery. The telegraph and post offices were opened at Towara on the afternoon of the 12th, and signalling by flag and lamp was carried on with the Tilli Column.


Brigadier-General Hammond reported that the road beyond the frontier was very bad, and that little trace of the road made in 1888 remained. After improving the route he proposed to advance to Tilli on the following day.

13th March.

At daybreak on the morning of the 13th the two companies of the Guides on the right bank moved to take up fresh ground, and found the village of Nadrai occupied. A brisk fire was opened by the enemy and the Guides rushed the village, which was carried with a loss to the enemy of three killed and three

Reconnaissance to the Palosi plain on the 13th. Villages found deserted.

wounded, there being no casualties on our side. At 9 A.M. a reconnoitring force under Brigadier-General Williamson, consisting of a half battalion of the Seaforth Highlanders and a half battalion of the Guides, left camp, crossed to the right bank of the river at the Marer ferry, and proceeded to Doshkand, and thence to the Palosi plain, visiting Garhi, Nawekili, and Palosi, which were found deserted. Maidan, the Hindustani settlement which had been destroyed in 1888, was found still in ruins. At 10 A.M. Major-General Elles with two companies of the Guides proceeded along the right bank of the river as far as the village of Garhi, where the reconnoitring force under Brigadier-General Williamson was met. Under cover of this movement the road between Kotkai and Kanar was examined, and it was ascertained that it could not be made practicable until the evening of the following day, and it was therefore decided that the column should remain at Towara. In the meanwhile road-making between Towara and Kanar was being carried on by the 32nd Pioneers under Colonel Sir B. P. Bromhead, C.B. All the villages visited during the day (except Nadrai, which had been fired by the Guides after its capture) were left untouched. On this date the boats were all collected at Kotkai.



BRIDGE OF BOATS OVER
INDUS AT KOTKAI.
(Looking South.)

Copied from a drawing by Captain F. C.
D. A. A. G., H. P.

Cl

The column under Brigadier-General Hammond, after making the road practicable, advanced from Pailam to Tilli without opposition. The *Saiads* of Tilli came to meet the column, and were directed to bring in wood and grass.

Occupation of Tilli without opposition on the 13th.

On the 14th March a company of the 4th Sikhs (accompanied by the Chief Commissariat Officer) visited Palosi plain. A gathering of armed men was observed on a neighbouring hill.

A reconnaissance party, consisting of two companies of the 4th Sikhs, accompanied by the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence, proceeded to Makranai *via* Kanar to near Ril, where they were fired upon, one sepoy being struck by a bullet in the thigh. The party returned *via* Kanar, having been out ten hours.

Reconnaissance party from Towara to Makranai and towards Ril on the 14th fired on.

The construction of the bridge-of-boats at a site about a quarter of a mile above Kotkai was commenced, and the road was marked out thence to Bakrai ferry.

The right column remained halted at Tilli. Brigadier-General Hammond reported that he had great difficulty in making the road up to Tilli, as the road constructed in 1888 had disappeared. Great difficulties were also experienced at Tilli on account of forage. The *kasil* was so low as to be unfit to cut, and would only give a small amount of grazing, and grass was also scarce.

On the 15th a reconnaissance party, consisting of the troops as per margin,* 15th March. proceeded to the Palosi plain for the purpose of selecting ground for a bivouac and also to ascertain the nature of the gathering reported at the western end of the plain. On nearing Palosi the party was fired on from both sides of the river. The Guides were sent to drive the enemy out of upper Palosi, which they did, killing one man of the enemy. The reconnaissance was pushed about a mile beyond the ruins of Maidan, and a considerable gathering of armed men was to be seen on both sides of the river on the surrounding hills. The party then returned to Towara.

Reconnaissance party from Towara to Palosi plain on the 15th fired on.

*Seaforth Highlanders, 2 companies.
Guides Infantry, 1 company.
37th Bengal Infantry (Dogras), 1 company.

A detachment of the 4th Sikhs proceeding along the left bank of the river from Kanar surprised the enemy under the cliffs beyond Ghazikot, and inflicted some loss on them. Major-General Elles on this day ascended the spur from Kotkai to meet Brigadier-General Hammond from Tilli by appointment, and returned *via* Kunarai and Kanar.

The telegraph line had been completed to the latter place and an office opened there, and the village was now occupied by a wing of the 32nd Pioneers.

Brigadier-General Hammond's column remained halted at Tilli, and the construction of the road on to Ril was continued. As a result of his interview with General Hammond, the General Officer Commanding telegraphed to the Quarter Master General:—

Change in plan of operations.

I find that the difficulty in supporting the transport of the Tilli Column at that level is very great at this early time of the year. Fodder would either have to be taken up from this or brought in from Phaldar. The crops at Tilli are only just above ground. Seri was reported under snow. I therefore decided on the spot to make other dispositions for

the present; first, to open out Tilli-Kanar road; second, to establish permanent posts at Tilli, Ril, and Makranai; third, to bring down Tilli Column with all its transport to join River Column at Palosi; fourth, to establish one advanced depôt at Kotkai and supply the whole force from this. The circuit round upper posts will be completed by a track from Makranai to Kanar, which can be made practicable for laden mules. Before transferring his brigade to Palosi, General Hammond will probably make a flying advance to Seri, stay one night, and blow up any defences there. As for this, I am now awaiting his report.

I expect to have all the above dispositions completed in four days at latest. As to the future, I intend right column to operate *viâ* Bakrai upwards through Akazai country, and left column through trans-Indus Hasanzai.

On the afternoon of the 15th a severe thunderstorm broke and heavy rain fell till nightfall.

During the 14th and 15th reports were received by the Chief Political Officer of armed men and flags crossing over the Baio range to Kanar and Kamach, and on the 15th it was reported that the aged Maulvi Abdulla, the leader of the Hindustani fanatics, had reached Kamach. He was said to have written to Buner to ask them to join in a holy war, and they were stated to have replied that, if Mian Gul of Swat went, they would join. The Akazai were reported to be moving all their cattle and goods across the river by ferries at Bimbal and Bilianai.

16th March.

On the 16th Kanar was strengthened by a wing of the 4th Sikhs to facilitate work on the road to Tilli from Kanar. The bridge over the Indus at Kotkai was completed on the 16th March. The bridge was completed (see accompanying sketch), span 110 yards, with easy approaches; and a camel road to Palosi opened out. The road from Tilli to Ril was also made practicable for laden mules. A few shots were fired at the covering party on this road, but without effect.

Orders were issued for the River Column with the divisional staff to move to Palosi on the following day.

As the Hasanzais and Akazais were reported to be anxious to submit and re-occupy their villages, the following notice, under the orders of the General Officer Commanding, was issued on the 16th March to these clans:—

Be it known to you that you have permission to return to your homes, and if you occupy your villages peaceably with your families and cattle, you will not be harmed and your villages will not be burned or destroyed; but one quarter of your crops will be taken for the supplies of the army as the Government demand, and you will be expected to bring in firewood and grass.

Villages found empty will be liable to lose all their crops, and their timber and wood work will be taken if wanted.

This order does not apply to Hashim Ali Khan and his family, whose surrender is demanded by Government.


Notice was at the same time sent to the Hasanzai and Akazai that if they wished to send in their *jirgas*, they would be received at Palosi, provided they were complete *jirgas*.

On this day (the 16th) a *havildar* of the 3rd Sikhs, who had been sent to Thakot in disguise by the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence, returned. He reported that he found 70 Hindustanis in Didal and a number of Chagarzai collected in Kamach. As he went up the river past Kabalgram into Chakesar, he found all the clans arming and about to move southwards.

ROUGH SKETCH
OF THE
VILLAGE OF GHAZIKOT.

To illustrate the affair of 18th March 1891.

Scale approximate 16 Inches = 1 Mile.



Cla

He met Maulvi Abdulla with over 100 Hindustanis and 30 mules and 2 guns marching towards Didal. He also reported that Hashim Ali Khan of Seri had been travelling about exciting the people, and had then gone off to Swat to ask Mian Gul to join and lead a holy war. He reported a small gathering, 400 men or so, in villages about Darbanai, Surmal, &c.; but it appeared that the clans were assembling for the most part in the trans-Indus Chagarzai country.

On the 17th heavy rain fell all day. The order for the move of the River Column to Palosi was therefore cancelled. The troops were fairly dry under waterproof shelter. Little progress could be made in road-making, and all movement at Tilli was impossible. Fresh snow was reported to have fallen on Abu. 17th March.

On the night of the 17th heavy rain continued, increasing in violence on the morning of the 18th, and all moves were impossible owing to the state of the ground. During the day the weather somewhat improved, and work proceeded on the Kanar-Tilli road, which was made practicable for laden mules. 18th March.

The rain had done much damage to the Pailam-Tilli road, and had made it very difficult for laden animals. It was therefore decided to send all supplies for the right column from Kotkai. Orders were given for all the transport of the River Column to be employed on the following day in clearing out the depôt of supplies which had been formed at Phaldar, and in consequence the River Column was to remain halted at Towara until the 20th.

The spare boats which had been left at Darband were ordered up to Kotkai.

The Right Column remained halted at Tilli. The road beyond Ril, and between that place and Kungar, was reported to have been purposely destroyed below the Abu cliffs, and a small party of Hashim Ali's adherents (the same that fired on Captain Mason's escort near Ril on the 14th) were still there to oppose any advance.

Early on the morning of the 19th the outpost at Ghazikot was attacked. 19th March.

Attack on the outpost of Ghazikot on the morning of the 19th March. This outpost, which was about $\frac{3}{4}$ mile in front of Kanar, was held by a company of the 4th Sikhs (the Dogra company) under Subadar Dheru, and consisted of two native officers and 67 rifles.

On the evening of the 18th some shots were fired by the enemy at the picquet in advance of the village from the front and right flank. The picquet returned the fire, and then all became quiet. At about 3 A. M. on the 19th the *havildar* in charge of this picquet reported to Subadar Dheru that the enemy were collecting in force in a *nala* to his front. When they arrived close enough to be seen, the picquet fired four volleys at them. Then the swordsmen of the enemy, with shouts, rushed past the right of the picquet straight for the *masjid* in the corner of the village (see accompanying sketch).

The enemy being in this way in rear of the picquet, the latter retired and joined the main body of the company, which was bivouacked in rear of the village just below the *masjid*. A hot fire was then commenced on both sides, the enemy firing from the roofs of the houses and charging with swords out of the *masjid*. At about 3-20 A. M. reinforcements, consisting of a company of the 4th Sikhs under Lieutenant Maconchy, followed by a second company of the same regiment under Lieutenant Manning, arrived on the scene. Closely following on these, under Colonel Sir B. Bromhead, C.B., came two companies of the 32nd Pioneers.

At that time a very hot fire was going on, the enemy being in the *masjid* and on the roofs of the houses. Half a company of the 4th Sikhs under

Lieutenant Maconchy rushed through the centre of the village and occupied the right front of it. In getting through the narrow street, Lieutenant Maconchy and three sepoy were wounded. Colonel Sir B. Bromhead with the Pioneers joined this party, having swept round the right flank of the village. A company of the 4th Sikhs at the same time went round the left flank.

Under orders of Colonel Bromhead, all firing was then stopped, and orders given to rely on sword and bayonet only. By that time the main body of the enemy had evidently retired, but "ghazis" kept creeping from various places, firing and using their knives in the dark.

At about 4-30 A.M. Surgeons Grainger and Macnab came up to attend to the wounded, and whilst doing so several "ghazis" were found hiding under cover of the waterproof sheets in the bivouac, and were killed as they tried to escape. When day broke the Pioneers and 4th Sikhs cleared the village, and Captain De Brath, with one company of Pioneers, advanced about a mile along the path on the left bank of the river in the track of the enemy's line of retreat, which was clearly defined by blood on the pathway and rocks. On arriving at the far side of the spur, four men were seen crossing to the right bank on a raft, and about 80 men returning to Bakrai at the mouth of the Shal Nala. The ravines and caves in the vicinity of Ghazikot were searched, but no more of the enemy were discovered.

All the dead were found inside the village or within the bivouac to its immediate rear, but numerous traces of blood were observed between the village and the river on ground in front of that held by the front picquet.

Lieutenant Maconchy brought to notice the gallant behaviour of Subadar Dheru, who kept cool throughout the whole affair, and with his own hand killed several of the fanatics. Jemadar Darshenu fought bravely, but after killing three men with his own hand his sword broke, and he was cut down and killed.

The Officer Commanding the 4th Sikhs recommended Subadar Dheru for the Order of Merit; also Havildar Waziru, Naik Ganesha Singh, and Lance-Naik Alam Khan for the same distinction for the gallantry they displayed on this occasion. They all subsequently received the 3rd Class of the Order as well as Senior Hospital Assistant Ahmadulla Khan (see Appendix VIII).

Major-General Elles brought to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief the good service of Lieutenant Maconchy on this occasion.

The number and loss of the enemy, who were reported to have consisted almost entirely of Hindustani fanatics, could not be estimated, but they left 25 bodies in and near the village. Of these 22 were Hindustanis, 2 were Pathans, and the remaining body was that of a Hindu *baniyah*, who had been for some days previously at Kanar, and was probably made to act as guide to the attacking party. Our casualties were 4 killed and 21 wounded.

At 9 A. M. Major-General Elles proceeded to Ghazikot, where he was met by Colonel Sir B. Bromhead. He visited the wounded and also commended Subadar Dheru for his gallantry.

A party consisting of three companies of the Guides and one company of the Seaforth Highlanders, under Major Battye of the former corps, proceeded to the Palosi plain and visited the whole of the villages there. The ground traversed

ROUGH PLAN OF THE BIVOOUAC AT PALOSI.

Fig. 1.





Fig. 2.



REFERENCE

A, D, E } Picquets held by Seaforths.


F, K } Picquets held by Guides.

G Picquet held by Guides during day time, no longer a night picquet.

M Picquet formerly held by British Regt, now withdrawn, as 170 Khaibar Rifles are at Garhi.

H Bakrai held by Detachment.

B Rock Picquet 40 men IInd B.I.



C



was the same as on the 15th, but on this day not a shot was fired, although men were seen on the heights around.

The hamlet of Pirzada opposite Kanar was occupied by a wing of the 4th Sikhs, and the bridge head by a wing of the 37th Dogras. Four guns of No. 9 Mountain Battery moved from Tilli to Kanar, and the communications of the Tilli Column with Darband were transferred to the river route *via* Kanar.

On this date (19th) the Commissioner of Peshawar telegraphed to the Punjab Government that there was undoubtedly some disturbance among the Bunerwals, but he deprecated any warning being sent to the tribe to abstain from interference unless the Government were prepared to enter Buner in the event of such warning being disregarded.

During the night of the 19th there was some firing at Kanar, and two companies of the Guides were sent from Towara to reinforce the detachment there. Two companies of the Seaforth Highlanders were also sent to reinforce the wing of the 37th Dogras at the bridge head. It appeared that at one time the enemy got possession of some houses in the village of Kanar, but were driven out. They were Hashim Ali's adherents with a few Akazais, and came down from Makranai. The enemy lost three killed, and our casualties were three sepoy of the 32nd Pioneers wounded and one mule-driver found dead in a ravine to the south of the village.

The River Column, accompanied by divisional head-quarters, moved at 20th March. 9-30 A.M. on the 20th from Towara to Pirzada Bela. Movement of the River Column to Pirzada Bela on the 20th. Owing to the Right Column not being able to occupy Ril and Makranai as had been intended, the River Column was halted at Pirzada instead of going on to Palosi. The enemy was seen in considerable numbers on the surrounding hills, and Bakrai and Makranai were shelled from Pirzada Bela, where they were seen collected.

The 11th Bengal Infantry was brought down from Tilli by the new Tilli-Kanar road, and having crossed by ferry from Kanar joined the River Column at Pirzada Bela. Four guns of No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, also joined this column from Kanar. The transfer of the right line of communication to the river was completed on this day. The weather had now cleared.

On the 21st the River Column, accompanied by Major-General Elles and 21st March. the divisional staff, marched from Pirzada Bela to Palosi. Here the force bivouacked, and a defensive position was formed so as to include the village (see Fig. 1 in the accompanying sketch). A few shots were fired from the left bank of the river on the arrival of the troops. Later in the day a reconnaissance was made in the direction of Mang-an and met with no opposition, except a few shots from the hills on the left and from the opposite bank of the river. In the afternoon a collection of armed men was seen on the Diliarai hill; but this was dispersed by a few rounds from the guns.

On this day the Right Column occupied Ril, with 400 men holding Abu. Occupation of Ril and Abu by the Tilli Column on the same date. There was some slight opposition to the Khaibaris who crowned the heights, and one man was wounded. On the previous night the bivouac at Tilli had been fired into, and two men of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers had been wounded. A road from Kanar to Makranai was commenced on this day.

On the 19th a letter had been received by Mr. Cunningham from Kudrat Khan (Chagarzai) and Muhammad Aban Khan (Akhund Khel) purporting to be from the whole *jirga* of the Chagarzai to the following effect :—

We are faithful to the peace which we made with the British Government on Machai, and have committed no hostility and done no harm in your country, but have stayed at home like the whole Yusafzai clan. Some months ago you wrote that Government was going to punish the Hasanzai, so we held our peace (*i.e.*, did not interfere). If any one has gone out against you, he is not one of us. You should keep peace towards us as we do to you.

To this letter, under orders of the General Officer Commanding, the following reply was sent on the 21st :—

Your letter expressing your desire to remain at peace with the British Government has been received, and, in reply, you are informed that Government has no quarrel with you; but a few days ago a band of the Hindustanis settled in your country attacked a picquet of our troops. If you wish for peace and friendship, and desire that you should not be interfered with, you must prevent all hostile incursions from your country and dismiss all armed bodies of men on your border. You can send in your *maliks* and headmen to pay a friendly visit. But it is clear that while you harbour in your country enemies of Government, or permit armed bands to assemble on your border, it is impossible for the British Government to consider you friendly as it wishes to do.

22nd March.

On the 22nd a reply was received from the Chagarzai headmen, of which the following is a translation :—

We have received your letter and understood it, and we write to say that about a month and-a-half ago we heard about your sending an army; but we relied on the ancient peace between Government and us, and when your letter * came to Kabalgram we stayed quietly at home without fear. Then Shahdad brought a message † (letter) to demand a right-of-way through our land to Thakot by force. That alarmed us and the chiefs of this country, because no king in old days ever demanded, nor have you ever thus demanded, a right-of-way for an army. We thought perhaps the intention is to seize our country. Consequently we (Chagarzai) and Azi Khel and Babuzai (Chakesar) and the Makuzai and the people of Kana and Ghorband, and the Bahlol Khel and Firozai, have all armed, most have collected, and others are coming. If you maintain the former peace with us, you should withdraw your army; then we, too, shall be able to disperse our gatherings and keep the Hindustanis in control. But while you are stationed on our border, even if we try to dismiss these clans, as it is in Yaghistan they will not attend to us.



If any one has gone out to fire at you, it is contrary to our wish; but as men from your own country come and join the Hindustanis, if you are not able to stop them, how can we control them?

Hashim Ali Khan is not in our country. We do not know where he has gone. Kindly send a reply. We have appended our seals to authenticate the letter.

* The letter referred to was a *parwana* to the Chagarzai, which simply informed them that an expedition would be sent against the Hasanzai and Akazai. If they, the Chagarzai, interfered in opposition to Government, they would be liable to punishment.

† Shahdad Khan (Chagarzai) was a constable in the Hazara Police and was a nephew of Kudrat Khan (Basi Khel), one of the principal Chagarzai *maliks*. He was employed as a go-between by Mr. Cunningham. The letter here referred to was the notice sent to the Chagarzai at the same time as the Thakotis and others announcing that we had no quarrel with them, but, if necessary and if thought fit, troops might march through their territory (see Appendix V).

Scale 2 Inches = 1 Mile.



REFERENCE

- o—
- A Position selected for picquet.
- B Point from which final advance on Diliari was made

■ PALOSI

(Sd.) R. S. WAHAB, Capt., R.E.,
24th March 1891.

Some *maliks* of the Hasanzai (exclusive of the Khan Khel section) came into camp this day (the 22nd) to ask about their return with their families to the river villages. It was reported that some Buner standards had joined the enemy, and large numbers of armed men with standards were seen during the day on the spur to the north-east of Baio, but they did not attempt to move down towards Palosi.

Brigadier-General Hammond, leaving detachments at Ril and Makranai, advanced to Seri, which he occupied without opposition.

A road along the left bank of the Indus from Kanar to Bakrai was commenced.

On the 23rd the defences at Palosi were improved and completed. Tele-23rd March. phonic communication was opened with the picquet on the hill to the south-west of the bivouac. A knoll to the east of Palosi was also occupied by a picquet, and here two guns were placed so as to command the left bank of the river. A water picquet was posted at the Ghazikot ferry during the day time, but withdrawn at night.

On this date a flying bridge was established at Bakrai under cover of the 4th Sikhs, who were sent across the river and occupied Bakrai. This led to a large gathering of the enemy on the Diliarai heights, which rapidly increased in numbers, and, displaying four standards, the enemy advanced down the spur of the hill towards the picquet of the 4th Sikhs. As the enemy's attitude became threatening, the picquets of the 4th Sikhs were advanced up the hill, and seeing this the General Officer Commanding ordered a wing of the Guides across the river to Bakrai as a support. To explain what followed, the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Gaselee, commanding the 4th Sikhs, is given *in extenso* :—

I have the honour to report that, in accordance with instructions received the previous day, I moved the battalion under my command on the 23rd instant from Pirzada and Kanar on Bakrai to cover the making of a flying bridge over the Indus at that place.

2. By 11 A. M. Bakrai and ridge above was occupied by companies of 4th Sikhs, and at about 12 noon I proceeded myself to see their position and select a suitable place for a strong night picquet.

3. The hill from Bakrai to Diliarai rises up very rapidly (see accompanying sketch), and I found it difficult to select a spot which was not commanded by a higher one within easy range. However, at about 12-30 I reached a plateau which seemed to be suitable, and ordered a breastwork to be built for two companies. I then went myself to reconnoitre the village of Diliarai with a small party. A few shots were fired at us by a picquet of the enemy; but they soon cleared off, and we went into the village. After a short time I returned to the picquet, arriving there at about 1-45 P. M. The breastwork was being rapidly made and brushwood cleared away, a covering party being posted some 200 yards in advance to protect the working party.

4. At about 3 P. M. a few of the enemy began to collect on a ridge about 500 yards or so from the picquet, but above it, and a desultory fire was opened upon the covering party and working party. One of the men of the working party was slightly wounded.

5. At this period I had to return to Bakrai, and left Lieutenant R. Harman, with Lieutenant F. H. Taylor, in command of two companies, 4th Sikhs, *viz.*, B (a Sikh company) and D (Pathan company).

6. At about 4-30 P. M., finding the enemy collecting in considerable numbers, Lieutenant Harman decided to drive them off. This he did with great dash, ably assisted by Lieutenant F. H. Taylor, upon whom the command devolved when Lieutenant Harman was unfortunately wounded by a sword cut. Besides Lieutenant Harman, one non-commissioned officer and two men were wounded in this attack.

7. By 5-30 P. M. the enemy had been completely driven off the Diliarai hill and spurs, and Lieutenant Taylor getting his men in hand was commencing his arrangements for falling back on the breastwork preparatory to bivouacking for the night. At this period one company of the Guides arrived under Lieutenant MacHutchin, of which a half company joined Lieutenant Taylor, and a half company was placed in the breastwork; this was followed very shortly by another company of the Guides under Lieutenant Codrington.

8. At about 6 P. M., just before Lieutenant Codrington arrived with his company, I took over command and directed Lieutenant MacHutchin to proceed to take command at the breastwork, where he had his company of the Guides and one company of the 4th Sikhs which I had brought with me from Bakrai and left in reserve at the breastwork.

9. The remaining troops, *viz.*, one company Guides and two companies 4th Sikhs, I disposed on successive ridges and knolls to withdraw to the breastwork.

10. However, directly the advanced detachment, a half company of D Company, 4th Sikhs, under Lieutenant Taylor, commenced to withdraw, the enemy, according to Pathan custom, began to collect quickly and press upon them. Lieutenant Taylor then moved to a ridge which afforded a good defensive position and cover. I directed him to hold on to it, and brought up the supports to the same ridge.

11. At about 6-45 P. M. this was the position of affairs on our side, and the enemy had collected in considerable numbers on the cultivated ridges about Diliarai on ground which commanded our position. There seemed to me to be about 50 or 60 men armed with firearms and about 200 swordsmen. However, they were evidently receiving reinforcements, and I thought that if we did not turn them out we should have some difficulty in holding our own at night. I accordingly decided to attack them and remain in Diliarai. I posted one company of the 4th Sikhs under Subadar Lehna Singh to keep down the fire from the crest by volleys, and advanced with the remaining two companies, *viz.*, one company of the Guides under Lieutenant Codrington and one company of the 4th Sikhs. My advance was further assisted by a few shells which were fired from Palosi camp.

12. The enemy did not await our attack, but evacuated the plateau and village, which we at once occupied and held with three companies, 4th Sikhs, the two companies of the Guides returning to Palosi by my order.


13. I beg leave to mention that I received valuable assistance from the following officers:—

Lieutenant F. H. Taylor, 3rd Sikhs, attached to 4th Sikhs.
 „ H. W. Codrington, Queen's Own Corps of Guides.
 Subadar Lehna Singh, 4th Sikhs.
 Jemadar Mir Hassan „

I also consider that Lieutenant R. Harman, 4th Sikhs, showed a correct appreciation of his situation when he decided to drive the enemy off at first, and he led the attack with gallantry until he was wounded by a swordsman who met him.

14. In conclusion, I beg to recommend for the distinction of the Order of Merit No. 3561, Naik Abdul Ahmad, 4th Sikh Infantry, who displayed great personal gallantry in leading on his section during Lieutenant Harman's advance, when he engaged in single combat with two fanatics, one of whom he killed, but was wounded by the second, a big powerful man, who almost overpowered him.*

* Naik Abdul Ahmad subsequently received the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit (see Appendix IX).



VIEW LOOKING DUE SOUTH FROM BELOW PICQUET HILL NEAR DILIARI.

Copied from a sketch drawn by Captain F. C. CARTER,
D. A. A. G., Hazara Field Force, 1891.

No. 417-I, 94.

In this affair, besides Lieutenant Harman, four sepoy of the 4th Sikhs were wounded. The enemy owned to having lost 12 killed and 16 wounded. Two of the bodies left on the ground were Hindustanis; the others were Chagarzais.

Brigadier-General Williamson, in reporting this action, states:—

The affair reflects the highest credit on the soldierly ability displayed by Lieutenant-Colonel Gaselee.

Major-General Elles supported this recommendation and brought Colonel Gaselsee's name, as well as the fine regiment he commanded, to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief.

On the right bank the armed bodies of the enemy near Baio were on this date more threatening, but the picquets of the Guides pushed the enemy back, and Lieutenant MacLean with a small body of five men succeeded in disposing of eight of the enemy.

Return of Brigadier-General Hammond's column to Tilli after destroying Seri on the 23rd.

Brigadier-General Hammond this day blew up and burnt Seri and returned to Tilli.

A reconnaissance party proceeded up the Khappa Nala with a view to examining an alignment of a road from Bakrai to Makranai. During the day the roads from Kanar to Bakrai and from Kanar to Makranai made good progress.

Arrival of Brigadier-General Hammond's column at Palosi from Tilli on the 24th.

*No. 9 Mountain Battery, R.A. (2 guns).
1st Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
Half Battalion, 2-5th Gurkha Regiment.
Khaibar Rifles.

On the 24th Brigadier-General Hammond with the 24th March troops as per margin* marched from Tilli to Palosi, leaving a detachment of the 1-5th Gurkhas at Tilli, and also a detachment of that regiment and the left wing of the 32nd Pioneers at Ril and Makranai. *Rigai*

On arrival at Palosi the Khaibar Rifles were sent across the river to Bakrai, while the remainder of the troops joined the River Column at Palosi.

The head-quarters of the 11th Bengal Infantry with two companies proceeded to the head of the flying bridge below Bakrai. This bridge was now working well, and there were in addition three ferry boats in use.

Two companies of the 11th Bengal Infantry proceeded to the bridge head at Kotkai on the right bank. The head-quarters wing of the 32nd Pioneers was ordered up from Kanar to the bridge at Bakrai, and bivouacked on the right bank, the Sappers and Miners also moving to Bakrai for employment on the road towards Darbanai.

The occupation of the Diliarai heights at nightfall on the 23rd by the 4th Sikhs had been followed by the retirement of the enemy, and no attempt had been made on the picquets during the night. On the morning of the 24th ground to the north-west was occupied up to a point† overlooking Didal and Kamach on the right bank of the Indus, and three guns of No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery were sent from Palosi to join the 4th Sikhs. A movement southwards along the Indus valley from Kamach and Didal was observed, about ten standards crossing to Darbanai and the same number proceeding towards

† The view looking south from a spot below this point is given in the accompanying sketch.

Karnar and Baio. Standards and armed men were to be seen all day near the latter place.

On this date the General Officer Commanding reported that the political situation was as follows :—

Political situation on the 24th March.

The lower Hasanzai, including all the clans except the Khan Khel, had submitted. They had offered no opposition to our advance, and they were anxious to be allowed to return to their villages. The Akazai would probably submit on the occupation of Darbanai, but were intimidated by *mullas* and others from Chagarzai territory. With regard to the Chagarzai themselves, their country was overrun by a horde of *mullas*, *talibs*, and such like from Kohistan, Batkul, Kana, Ghorband, Chakesar, etc.; and they were unable, even if they were willing, to maintain a peaceable attitude. The Bunerwals, who had been for some days at Baio, appeared to be maintaining a watchful attitude, but there was up to this time no general gathering of the tribe. Mr. Cunningham reported, from information received by him, that the armed gathering at Baio was composed of men brought there by Mulla Faizi of Bajkatta in upper Buner and the Akhund Khel of Kuria in the Chamla valley.

A letter was received from the Chagarzai headmen on this date to the following effect :—

We have been at peace from of old; we have (now) restrained the Hindustanis and our own clan; strangers have attacked you; we have done you no harm, and we wrote to you, but got no answer. You should send a letter and say what you want. We have done you no harm; it rests with you. The brethren of the men killed have come to us and made submission to us. Please give us the corpses and send them to us. This will be a kindness.

In spite of this denial, there was no doubt that the Chagarzai were concerned in the affair at Diliarai as evidenced by some of their clansmen being among the killed.

On the night of the 24th a few shots were fired into the picquets near Bakrai, but without doing any harm.

25th March.

On the morning of the 25th the force as per margin* under Brigadier-General Hammond advanced up the Shal Nala, covered by the 4th Sikhs and the three guns of No. 2 (Derajat)

Action of Darbanai on the 25th March.

Mountain Battery on the Diliarai spur. The objective of the movement was

*No. 9 Mountain Battery, R. A. (4 guns).
1st Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers.

11th Bengal Infantry (head-quarters and two companies).

2nd Gurkha Regiment (head-quarters and wing).
Khaibar Rifles.

Darbanai, a village situated on a knoll jutting out from the main spur into the Indus valley. It is about 1,500 feet above the Indus and is a most commanding position, dominating the course of the river northwards as well as the northern slopes of the main spur, and the whole of the right bank of

the Indus from below Didal to above Kamach. A *kotal* on the same level as the village connects the Diliarai heights with the upper portion of the spur. The track up the Shal Nala was a most difficult one, but at 1 P. M. Brigadier-General Hammond was in possession of the *kotal*. Before attacking, however, he waited for his guns which had ascended the bed of the *nala* through a very rough track, and had some 600 feet to mount to the *kotal*. The guns with Colonel Gaselee were in position on his left. On the arrival of the guns of No. 9 Mountain Battery, Brigadier-General Hammond ordered an advance. The enemy opened fire from the village and from the spur above Ledh. The Khaibar

Rifles under Lieutenant Barton (General Hammond's Orderly Officer) ascended the hill on the right, the Gurkhas advanced on the left, and the Royal Welsh Fusiliers and the 11th Bengal Infantry in the centre. The enemy abandoned the village before it was reached, and made off down the slope of the hill towards lower Surmal, the Royal Welsh Fusiliers following them closely. Lieutenant Doughty of that regiment was here severely wounded in the knee. The Khaibar Rifles meanwhile had cleared the hills on the right for a long distance, doing a hard day's work. On arrival at Darbanai the guns of No. 9 Mountain Battery shelled Surmal and the ferry below it as some of the enemy were crossing, and also the large village of Kamach on the right bank in which armed men were congregated. The guns of the Derajat Mountain Battery at the same time shelled the village of Didal also on the right bank.

The troops under Brigadier-General Hammond bivouacked for the night in and about Darbanai. Our losses during the day had been only one man of the Khaibaris wounded, besides Lieutenant Doughty. The enemy's losses were estimated at about forty.

The satisfaction of the Commander-in-Chief in India at the successful occupation of Darbanai and His Excellency's approval of the operation were subsequently conveyed to the troops employed.

On this date the Government of India, on the recommendation of the Reserve Brigade ordered from Rawal Pindi to Haripur. Commander-in-Chief, approved of the Reserve Brigade of the Hazara Field Force being moved from Rawal Pindi to Haripur, and of the appointment of Brigadier-General Sir W.S. A. Lockhart, K.C.B., C.S.I., to command it.

On the 26th, in the early morning, an attempt was made on the picquet to 26th March. the south-west of Palosi bivouac by about 30 of the enemy, who fired a few shots, but withdrew on being fired on by the picquet. With this exception and a few shots at Darbanai, the night passed quietly. All night torches were seen moving upwards on the hill-sides to the west of Palosi in the direction of Baio from Karnar, indicating a general move towards that point. During the 26th the road up the Shal Nala to Darbanai was pushed on and made easy for mule traffic. At Darbanai a sepoy of the 11th Bengal Infantry, who strayed from camp, was attacked and wounded by sword cuts. The water-supply at Darbanai, which was brought by a channel from a ravine about a mile distant and 800 or 900 feet above the village, having been cut by the enemy, Brigadier-General Hammond sent word to the village of upper Surmal, where a number of armed men were collected, that if the firing into camp did not cease, and the water was not turned on, he would attack and destroy their village.

On this date the following letter to the Chagarzai headmen was despatched by order of the General Officer Commanding:—

Your letter to which you say you received no reply was answered yesterday by my guns from Diliarai and Darbanai. The British Government is not accustomed to receive demands for the withdrawal of its forces. You now write in a proper tone requesting the bodies of your people killed at Diliarai. You shall have them, and may send a party without arms, not exceeding 20, accompanied by a white flag, to that village. I enclose a letter which the party can present to the Officer Commanding at Diliarai, who will have orders to receive them. As to the rest of the last letter, your conduct is conclusive proof

that you have made war against my troops. Your conduct will be reported to the Government of India for their orders. Meanwhile, as British troops do not make war against women and children, your villages will not be fired into if your people go about peacefully; but if you suffer armed bands to collect or shots are fired at any of my posts, I shall hold you responsible and make your country uninhabitable.

A telegram was this day received from the Commissioner of Peshawar to the effect that reports received from Hoti Mardan stated that Mian Gul, the son of the late Akhund of Swat, and Hashim Ali Khan of Seri were in Buner trying to get aid from the Bunerwals.

27th March.

On the 27th, as the enemy in the neighbourhood of Darbanai had taken no notice of the warning sent to them, and a force had collected at lower Surmal in a threatening attitude, Brigadier-General Hammond, having posted No. 9 Mountain Battery in a position commanding the village, advanced down the spur towards it, sending the Khaibar Rifles up the hills on the right. The enemy almost at once opened fire, severely wounding a private of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers. The guns of No. 9 Mountain Battery were ordered to open fire on Surmal and the enemy on the spurs above it, and the 2-5th Gurkhas were directed to make a flanking movement to the right; whilst the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, with the 11th Bengal Infantry in reserve, dropped down into the *nala*, and then ascended on the other side. There were 400 or 500 of the enemy in and about the village, but they had almost perfect cover from the guns under the brow of the spur. The Gurkhas and Royal Welsh Fusiliers arrived about the same time, and the enemy at once bolted under a tremendous fire from both these regiments. As orders had been received not to advance further than necessary into Chagarzai territory, the troops were not allowed to go further than the ferry, and only two houses in lower Surmal were burnt as a warning to the Chagarzais. The Khaibar Rifles and a company of the Gurkhas which had gone up the hill had in the meanwhile met and dispersed almost an equally large number of the enemy, who in the same way had not attempted to come to close quarters. Our loss was one private, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, wounded, who subsequently died; one sepoy of the Gurkhas and one of the Khaibar Rifles wounded. Brigadier-General Hammond estimated the enemy's loss at not less than 120 or 130, and reported that the men opposed to us were for the most part Chagarzais.

An attack on the hill picquet to the south side of Palosi was projected by the Buner *mulla* of Bajkatta, but was averted by the Mada Khel, who turned out and told the Bunerwals they would not allow it. The *mulla* at the same time received a letter from Mian Gul ordering him to wait till he arrived, as he (Mulla Faizi) was not strong enough to do anything. The Commissioner of Peshawar telegraphed that news from Mardan stated that Mian Gul, with *mullas* and Bunerwals, was starting for Baio, and that he proposed first to parley. That he was taking with him 1,000 or 1,200 men, but this number did not include any men from Swat. The Bunerwals were reported to be disinclined to join, but were unable to withstand the *mullas*.

In the meanwhile road-making on the left bank of the Indus was proceeding as fast as possible: the roads from Ril to Makranai and from Makranai to Kanar were completed; Kanar to Bakrai required two or three days more work; and Bakrai to Darbanai was open. The Ril-Tilli road was in good condition, and that from Ril to Kungar was being pushed on.

On the 28th March the collection of standards at Baio continued until they 28th March. numbered nearly fifty. The Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar telegraphed :—

Hashim Ali and about 1,500 Bunerwals with flags left yesterday for Baio. Mian Gul was still in Buner sending on Bunerwals. All quiet on border here.

On this date a counter-demonstration was made from the camp at Palosi and from the bridge head at Kotkai under Brigadier-General Williamson up the hills to the south-west to within about three miles of Baio. General Williamson was ordered simply to watch the movements of the enemy, and not to attack them unless attacked himself. The advanced parties of the opposing forces arrived within speaking distance of each other, and a sepoy of the Guides (a Bunerwal), who had a brother among the enemy, called him, and he came up with a white flag to our outposts. He confirmed the information that Mian Gul had ordered nothing to be done until he arrived.

A reconnaissance was made up the Shal Nala to Kan, which was found deserted.

Owing to the presence of the large body of armed men at and near Baio, a picquet of 40 men of the 37th Dogras was posted by night at Garhi to watch the *nala* that runs down by that village from Doshkand.

On the 29th the number of men at Baio increased, and the village of Wale 29th March.

Continued increase of armed gathering at Baio. was occupied by their advanced picquets. The gathering was being swelled from various quarters—from Buner, Chamla, and from the Amazai and Gadun country. The Mada Khel and Hasanzai were reported to be still trying to induce the gathering to disperse for their own sakes, but without success.

The following letter was this day received from Baio from the *ulema* and *jirga* of Buner :—

Mian Gul directed us to commit no hostility till he arrived, and we have acted on his instructions. The display of flags was necessary because a number of people said two or three regiments were going towards Wale to fight. If Hashim Khan * brings a message of peace, we shall be satisfied. Mian Gul is unwell and has not reached Baio. When he comes, we shall do as he directs.

Owing to threatening attitude of Buner, 9th Bengal Lancers and 22nd Bengal Infantry ordered from Naoshera to Mardan. On this date, owing to the threatening attitude of Buner, the 9th Bengal Lancers and the 22nd Bengal Infantry were ordered to move from Naoshera to Mardan to strengthen the garrison of that place, which consisted of the North-umberland Fusiliers and the Guides Cavalry. These troops were to be held in readiness for service towards the Buner frontier, and Brigadier-General F. J. Keen, C.B., was ordered to proceed from Peshawar to Mardan and assume command.

Three guns of No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery were ordered to march on the following day from Oghi to Darband, and a wing of the 28th Bengal Infantry to move to Pabal Gali. Orders were also given for the road from Pabal Gali to Tilli to be constructed as soon as possible by civil labour.

The arrangement of the picquets at this time at Palosi are shown in Fig. 2 of sketch facing page 16.

* Hashim Khan was a Bunerwal employed as a go-between by the Chief Political Officer.

Brigadier-General Sir William Lockhart, accompanied by Major Egerton, Assistant Adjutant General, arrived at Palosi from Haripur on the morning of this day.

30th March. On the morning of the 30th he returned to Darband.

Brigadier-General Hammond from Darbanai made a reconnaissance on the 30th up to the Palware Sar (8,200 feet) on the ridge dividing the Akazai from the Chagarzai country. No armed bodies were seen, but a few shots were fired.

A telegram was received from Mardan, dated the 29th, to the following effect :—

Mian Gul was yesterday (28th) still in Krappa, said to be collecting men. No mention of his being ill. It is reported that Ashuzai* have started and Nurezai* started yesterday.

The following letter was this day addressed by the General Officer Commanding to Akhundzada Mian Gul :—

A letter has been received from some *mullas* and Bunerwals at Baio announcing that they have come here under your direction ; that you are on your way to Baio, and desire to make peace. As the assembly of an armed force on the Hasanzai border near the British army does not seem in accordance with that wish, you are requested to state exactly what your object is ; and if you are really desirous of maintaining peace with the British Government, you should send a deputation to state your purpose clearly.

A duplicate of this letter was sent through the Assistant Commissioner, Mardan.

After the above had been written, the following letter was received bearing the seals of a number of the leading men of the various sections of the Bunerwals :—

From the Mulla Sahib of Krappa, the Mulla Sahib of Torsak, the Mulla Sahib of Bajkatta, and Mir Sahib and all the mullas of Buner, and the Bunerwal jirga.

Our petition is that Hashim Khan has come and has told us about you. It is right you should not fire at us, and we will not fire. We will keep this promise. Some one fired a shot to-day without our knowledge. We punished (fined) him. The Government asks why we brought our flags. We respectfully ask you to consider that our flags do you no harm. We promise that till Mian Gul comes we will commit no act of hostility and not a gun shall be fired, and we beg you to observe the truce, because Mian Gul ordered us to do nothing while he was away. We cannot act contrary to his order. Hashim Khan told us to lower our flags. No more shall be raised. Hashim Khan can be trusted. He says you think we mean hostility, but Mian Gul is coming for peace. If Government will not have peace, then we will consider. Secondly, during the past few days a few men have fired at you. They are not under our orders. So we write to explain. To satisfy you, we give to Hashim Khan this paper, with seals, as a security bond for Rs. 1,000 from each section of Buner, *viz.*, Daulatzai, Nurezai, Ashuzai, Gadaizai, Salarzai, that we will not trespass beyond here, and we hope you will not. We are expecting Mian Gul Sahib immediately.

On this date the Chief Political Officer reported that there were in the neighbourhood of Baio or in the Chagarzai country to the north a coalition against us of all the clans from the Peshawar border to Thakot.

* Sections of the Bunerwals.

On the 31st the whole of the Reserve Brigade, troops as per margin,* 31st March.

Concentration of the Reserve Brigade at Darband on the 31st March.

*No. 1 Mountain Battery, R. A. (3 guns).
No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery (3 guns).
1st Battalion, King's Royal Rifles.
15th Bengal Infantry.
27th Bengal Infantry.

under the command of Brigadier-General Sir William Lockhart, were concentrated at Darband.

The designations of the brigades were on this date altered to 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades, commanded respectively by Brigadier-Generals Williamson, Hammond, and Sir William Lockhart.

From Mardan news was received that Mian Gul had told the people of Swat to watch Umra Khan, the Chief of Jandol (in Bajaur), and that if he joined the movement, they were to come to join the Buner *lashkar*, but that if he did not join, they were to guard Swat against Bajaur.

Correspondence with Akhundzada Mian Gul.

A letter was received this day from Mian Gul to the address of Mr. Cunningham to the following effect:—

I respectfully (*suál*) represent that I have received your letter and understood it, and in reply write to say that I have approved of Hashim Khan. I hope that you will accept him. I agree to (the letter) which he brought. Please accept him as my envoy in place of a *jirga*. There is one prayer, which please ask Hashim Khan. He will state it verbally.

To this the following reply was sent:—

Your letter has been received, but neither your letter nor the statement of Hashim Khan is a clear answer to my letter. If Hashim Khan is to be accepted as your envoy, you should remove the *lashkar* back to Buner, or you should send a proper *jirga* comprising a representative of each section of Buner.

On this date the General Officer Commanding despatched a telegram (No. 276-C., dated 31st March) to the Government of India in the Military Department, which, after referring to the above correspondence with Mian Gul, continued:—

I solicit the orders of Government as to whether, in the event of the *lashkar* not dispersing, and their not stating clearly what they want, I am not at liberty to speak more plainly and tell them that if they do not disperse, they will be made to do so by force. The time for operations in these low levels is getting very limited. The river has shown signs of rising, and by the 15th April it will be necessary to shift the bridge lower down. Yesterday and to-day have been very hot without shelter; in short, within twelve days a move to the upper levels of Cis-Indus Hasanzai should be made. I have decided on making a road up the Khappa Nala to join Diliarai and Darbanai with Makranai and Maira, where it is probable good bivouac ground will be found for the present. This road will take 10 days to construct.

On the evening of the 31st orders were given to the Commanding Royal Engineer to commence improving the track from Palosi towards Baio on the following day.

On the 1st April Brigadier-Generals Lockhart and Hammond came to Palosi 1st April for a conference with the General Officer Commanding, but no instructions were issued for any movements pending the final orders of Government.

Mian Gul was reported to have arrived at Baio, but there was no ostentatious display of standards on this day. The gathering at Baio was now a large one and included all sections of the Bunerwals.

Mian Gul reported to have arrived at Baio on the 1st April.

A letter was sent to Mian Gul and the Buner *jirga* by the Commissioner of Peshawar under the orders of the Punjab Government, who had been in communication with the Commander-in-Chief, to the effect that we had no intention of invading the Chagarzai country, and that we wished for peace with the Bunerwals; but that we should consider ourselves at liberty to attack them from both sides in their own country of Buner if after this explanation their *lashkar* did not retire.

Two letters were received from the Chagarzai this day, one purporting to be from Kudrat Khan, and the other from the Chagarzai *jirga*. The first was as follows :—

Samandar Khan, Afridi, sent by you* came to us. He talked in a friendly way. We have agreed to peace and have dismissed the *lashkar*. We were suddenly attacked by you, but dismissed our *lashkar*. We wish to maintain the old peace. Our armed force has been scattered and dispersed by your army. If you wish peace, let us know. We will summon our clan for the purpose, for we desire to keep the peace.

The second letter was as follows :—

Your *Subadar* came to us and talked in a friendly way. We removed our armed force.

The Akazais went by night and did evil (apparently refers to cutting off the water-supply of Darbanai). We were attacked and a number killed. We do not know how it occurred.

Stripped of the ordinary phrases by which in any circumstances a Pathan tribe will seek to deny having done wrong, these letters showed that the Chagarzais were inclined for peace.

It was at the same time reported that their heavy losses had disheartened them, and their tribesmen were dispersing.

During this day the road from Ghazikot along the left bank of the river to Bakrai was completed. It was, however, somewhat dangerous in parts for laden mules. Another road from Bakrai to Makranai was commenced, and the road from Palosi towards Baio was made practicable for mules as far as Ariana.

A *naik* of the 32nd Pioneers was this day killed while employed in road-making by a rock falling on his head, and a private of the King's Royal Rifles was drowned while bathing at Darband.

The dispositions of the force on this date is given in Appendix X.

2nd April.

On the 2nd April the following letter, based on a telegram from the Adjutant General in India, dated the 31st March, was sent by the General Officer Commanding to Mian Gul and the Buner *jirga* at Baio :—

Further correspondence with Mian Gul.

Be it known to you that the British Government had no quarrel with any clan except with the Hasanzai and Akazai, against whom this expedition was directed. If you

* This apparently was an Afridi *Subadar* sent by Brigadier-General Hammond to Kamach.

wish to maintain peace and to avoid provoking Government, you should restrain the Hindustanis or fanatics among you and other clans from joining in opposition. The British Government has no intention of invading your country, but its action towards you will depend on your conduct and on any explanation you can give of your behaviour. For this purpose you are invited to send in a *jirga*.

On the same date two letters were received from Mian Gul, both of which were replies to the letter addressed to him on the 30th March, a duplicate of which was sent from Mardan. The first of these letters was addressed to "My kind friend, the General Sahib, and to Mr. Cunningham, the Political Officer," and was as follows:—

I have received your (the General's) letter and understood it. In reply, I respectfully write that I am sending the *lashkar* back to their homes, and I am a surety before Government for the following clans—Buner, Chamla, Amazai, Mada Khel, Hasanzai, Akazai, Chagarzai—that they should do no harm against Government, and I beg Government not to injure these clans; and this my security (*samanat*) is for my whole life. If any man of these clans shall injure Government, or do any harm, I will punish him as Government may desire; and if he cannot be found, he shall be a criminal (*i.e.*, outlaw) before Government and me; and my security is as the security of a *jirga*. If Government accepts my security, let it kindly give me early intimation, and I will dismiss the *lashkar* to their homes; and after these armed bands are gone, I beg that Government will withdraw its army. I will await an answer. If Government refuses my security (*samanat*) and demands a *jirga*, let me know through Hashim Khan.

The second letter was addressed to the "Hazur General Sahib, commanding the army at Palosi," and was as follows:—

Be it known that to-day I have received a letter from the Civil Officer at Mardan to say that some *mullas* and men of Buner have come to Baio by my order, and that I am myself on the way thither; that I desire peace. The collection of armed *lashkar* on the Hasanzai border near a British army does not tend to peace; that you write to ask what my purpose is. If I really wish peace, I am to send my *motabars* (agents), and let them state my wishes. So in accordance with the letter from the Civil Officer, Mardan, I send the following trusted agents (*motabars*):—Isani Mulla, Haidar Khan, Mardan Shah, Mian Khan Mulla. They will speak to your Honour in accordance with my objects, and I have also sent a separate letter as a reply to your letter.

These letters were both dated the 2nd April.

Mian Gul was reported to have moved from Baio to Maliar, a Hasanzai village a short distance from Baio on the western slope of the Duma range, on account, it was said, of want of water at Baio. Hashim Ali Khan, his brother Sikandar, and cousin Turabaz were said to be with the *lashkar* at Baio.

A reconnaissance was made up the right bank of the Shal Nala to look for a suitable alignment for a road to Maira.

On the 3rd April, under orders from the Adjutant General in India, the following letter was sent to Mian Gul by the General Officer Commanding:—

I have received your friendly letter, and am glad to hear your desire to maintain peace, as your father before you. The British Government have no quarrel with tribes other than Hasanzai and Akazai, against whom this expedition was directed. Since entering their country the British army has been attacked by the Chagarzai and the Hindustanis from their country; with regard to Hasanzai and Akazai, the Government has certain demands against them, and the army will remain in their country across the river till those demands have been satisfied in full. With regard to the Chagarzai, their conduct is before Government, which will decide what punishment is to be inflicted on them.

I shall be glad to see the Chagarzai *maliks* if they wish to make any representation of their conduct. It will promote peace and will hasten a settlement of all differences with these tribes if your *lashkar* dispersed peaceably.

The General Officer Commanding, with an escort, proceeded up the road leading to Baio as far as the Diliasa Kotal, up to which point the road had been made fit for mules.

From a knoll to the south of the *kotal* an excellent view was obtained of Baio, Doba, Manja Kot, the Mahaban range, and the Indus valley towards Darband; also of the hills and principal peaks of the Black Mountain to the north and east. A working party of the Guides was employed on the track towards Baio, and this party was fired on by the enemy from a picquet held by them. On the fire being returned, the enemy evacuated the picquet with a loss of two of their number wounded, there being no casualties on our side. The two wounded men were subsequently reported to have been Amazais, one of them being a *mulla*.

A private of the Seaforth Highlanders was drowned this day while bathing near Bakrai.

4th April.

On the morning of the 4th April, a small force, consisting of a half battalion of the Seaforth Highlanders, with the gatling guns, and a half battalion of the Guides Infantry, under the command of Brigadier-General Williamson, proceeded from camp at 7.30 A.M. to make a reconnaissance of the right bank of the Indus as far as the limits of the Hasanzai territory. The movement was covered on the flanks by the Khaibar Rifles and by the 4th Sikhs with three guns. There was no opposition from Baio, near which only a small gathering was seen. A few standards with a collection of armed men were observed on the spur dividing the Hasanzai from the Chagarzai territory, but these moved off as the troops approached, and their movements were hastened by a few shells from the left bank below Diliarai from the guns of the Derajat Mountain Battery. The right bank south of Karnar was found to be quite impracticable for animals and difficult for footmen; and any improvement would have required much time and labour as the road ran over solid rock.

The village of Bimbal was burnt this day as a reminder to the Akazai that they had not made their submission.

A road up the right bank of the Shal Nala by upper Surmal was commenced. The post at Ledh was transferred to Lashora as more convenient and defensible.

On this date a letter, dated the 3rd April, was received from Mian Gul by the Assistant Commissioner, Mardan. It was as follows:—

I beg to inform you that the day before yesterday I sent you a receipt for your letter,* but I did not enter in it the full details of my coming here. So I write now fully. I always come to Buner to pay a visit to the *ziarat* of Paishunroi Baba. This was well known to the late Assistant Commissioner. I came this year as usual. There I heard that some of the chiefs of Buner had gone to the Hasanzais. As the residents of Swat and Buner are my followers, and my deceased father some 27 years ago made terms with the British Government at Surkhair, by which agreement I am still bound, so I thought

* * This was really the duplicate of the letter from General Elles, dated the 30th March, which was sent through the Assistant Commissioner, Mardan.

it advisable to go to the Hasanzais with the *maliks* and chiefs of Buner. Those whom I found collected there I advised not to fight against the British troops, and persuaded them to return home without fighting.

In conclusion, I beg to say that I did not come to fight against the Government, but to make terms and secure peace on the border. The General commanding the force at Palosi had sent to me Malik Hashim Khan of Torsak (in Buner) and Pir Saiad Nazif of Mardan before the receipt of your letter. I informed them of my intention, and they went back to Palosi. I sent a *jirga* consisting of Khan Mulla, Haidar Khan, Mardan Shah, and Asalai Mulla, with Pir Saiad Nazif and Hashim Khan, to the General Commanding at Palosi, and came myself to Buner. I intend myself to abide by the terms made with the Government throughout my life, and the residents of Swat and Buner and myself will never turn up against the Government.

The following letter (dated the 4th) was received from Mian Gul addressed to "My kind friend the General Sahib at Palosi":—

My enemies have been concealed in this country since my father's time. As soon as they heard that I had made peace with Government (*i. e.*, was working for peace), they began to interfere and to act against me. Please understand that your enemies are also my enemies. Since men fired at your party the day before yesterday (yesterday?) I caused them to be arrested and fined in the presence of Hashim Khan. I have fined all who have tried to bring about hostilities. I beg you to send some Hasanzai and Mada Khel headmen to see whether the *lashkar* here has not dispersed.*

On the same date an old sepoy of the 5th Punjab Infantry (a Bunerwal) came down from Baio and reported that Mian Gul was still at Maliar, but that the *lashkar* was dispersing.

The *lashkar* at Baio was reported to be dispersing on the 4th April.

From Mardan reports were received that all was quiet on the Buner frontier, and that part of the Buner *lashkar* had been sent to their homes by Mian Gul owing to scarcity of provisions, but that the headmen had remained at Baio.

From Darhanai considerable bodies of men were seen moving northwards without standards as if returning to their homes, which corroborated the statement of Mian Gul that he had dismissed the *lashkar* from Baio.

The weather was now getting very hot during the day for troops without tents.

On the morning of the 5th Baio appeared to be deserted and there was little to be seen in the lower Chagarzai country. Mian Gul was reported on good authority to have addressed a letter to an influential man at Biyar to say that matters were being arranged peaceably with the British Government, and to direct him to dismiss any *lashkar* which might have come to fight.

The following moves were ordered:—The head-quarters and right wing of the 32nd Pioneers with the Coolie Corps to Lashora, the left wing to be concentrated at Kungar. A through route was ordered to be constructed between Kungar and Darbanai as soon as possible.

Major Evans, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, died on this date from pneumonia after a very short illness.

*The enemies referred to in this letter were the Amazais and men of Chamla, who had on one or two occasions come down below Baio and taken up a position near our picquets. They were followers of the Mulla of Kotah in the Peshawar district, who is a Wahabi, or was so styled by the late Akhund of Swat.

6th April. On the 6th April the Commissioner of Peshawar reported that an answer had been received from Mian Gul to the letter he had sent to him on the 1st April. The letter was as follows:—

The letter of the Sarkar Daulatmadar reached me to-day, 24th Shaban (4th April), and caused gladness beyond measure. In reply I write that I have dismissed the *lashkar* of the Bunerwals and Chagarzais back to their own homes and countries, and have emptied Baio of the *lashkars*. With regard to the remaining circumstance of peace and reconciliation, let enquiry be made from Commandant Ibrahim Khan and the General Sahib, from whom an abstract of the facts will be ascertained.

Under authority of a telegram from the Adjutant General in India, the following letter was this day addressed to Mian Gul by the General Officer Commanding:—

I have received your letter announcing the dispersal of the *lashkar* at Baio, and in accordance with your request am sending for the Mada Khel and Hasanzai headmen to go to Baio, see and report. Your peaceful action will, it is to be hoped, tend to the establishment of peace between Government and the tribes.

A sufficiently influential *jirga* of Hasanzai and Mada Khel having been got together, it was despatched to Baio to report whether the *lashkar* had entirely evacuated the place.

Information was this day received of unarmed persons passing by Shingri (between Towara and Bela) having been fired on, and also of the post at Lashora being annoyed. These small parties belonged to the Khan Khel Hasanzai, and were partisans of Hashim Ali Khan. With a view to dislodging those near Lashora, the Sabe peninsula was visited by four or five detachments ascending from different quarters, and some houses were burnt as a warning. With this exception, all was reported quiet.

7th April. On the 7th April, owing to a sudden outbreak on the Miranzai border, the

The troops of the 3rd or Reserve Brigade marched on the 7th from Darband for Kohat.

No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery.
1st Battalion, King's Royal Rifles.
19th Bengal Infantry.
27th " "

troops of the Reserve or 3rd Brigade were withdrawn from the Hazara Field Force and marched from Darband for Kohat with transport complete. Brigadier-General Sir William Lockhart and staff had started for the same destination on the preceding day.

On this date the Mada Khel and Hasanzai *jirga* deputed to Baio returned and reported that the place was absolutely deserted, not even the usual inhabitants being there.

Baio found to be deserted.

Steps were at once taken, in accordance with orders received from Army Head-Quarters, to withdraw all troops to the left bank of the Indus.

It was reported that Mian Gul had advised Hashim Ali Khan to surrender, but that the latter had refused to accept this advice, and had gone off to Teri in the Makki Khel country.*

8th April.

At 6-30 A.M. on the 8th the Guides Infantry, accompanied by the divisional head-quarters, marched from Palosi to Ril *via* the flying bridge at Bakrai, and thence by the road through Makranai. This road was very steep and caused delay to the mules, the rear-guard not arriving at Ril till 7-30 P.M.

* The Makki Khel are a small clan supposed to be descendants of Akhund Salak Baba by a slave girl. They are settled on the western side of the Duma range between the Hasanzai, Chagarzai, and Buner borders.

The Seaforth Highlanders with 3 guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery and the head-quarters of the 1st Brigade moved to Tilli *viâ* the bridge-of-boats at Kotkai, and the detachment of the 11th Bengal Infantry joined the head-quarters of the regiment at Lashora. By noon Palosi and Nawekili were entirely evacuated, and the inhabitants were seen returning to their villages. The only troops remaining on the right bank of the river were the 37th Dogras at the Kotkai bridge head.

The left wing of the 32nd Pioneers was at Kungar opening out the road to Seri, which with its neighbouring hamlets continued deserted.

On this date Brigadier-General Keen, C.B., returned to Peshawar from Mar-dan, leaving the senior officer in command of the troops at that place.

On the 9th the General Officer Commanding and staff proceeded with 9th April. an escort of the Guides and Khaibaris *viâ* Abu and Selle to Seri, and returned to Ril *viâ* Selle and Kungar along the new road under construction. Snow was still lying in deep drifts on the top of Abu and in the *nalas* above Seri. At Seri itself the crops were still low and unfit for cutting, though those lower down in the neighbourhood of Maira appeared fit to cut for *khasil*.

A telegraph mule-driver was shot by some of the enemy on the Ril-Tilli road. A party was sent out, but no trace could be found of the offenders.

The road from Pabal Gali to Tilli was on this date reported to be opened throughout.

There was much rain during the day.

On the 10th road-making was continued towards Seri from Kungar and 10th April. Darbanai. The latter road had reached a point about a mile beyond upper Surmal, where there was some heavy rock work. It was to cross the Shal Nala below China, and then to run *viâ* Maira to Seri.

On the 11th the General Officer Commanding, with an escort of the Guides, 11th April. proceeded to the neighbourhood of Panji Gali on the crest of the Black Mountain. The snow was found lying in deep drifts near the crest. A company of the Guides explored the heights to the north towards Akhund Baba, and here the snow was very heavy.

The head-quarters of the 1st Brigade with 3 guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery and the Seaforth Highlanders moved from Tilli to Kungar *en route* to Seri.

It was reported that the followers of Hashim Ali were responsible for the murder of the telegraph coolie on the 9th, and that a few Khan Khel were still lurking in the upper Hasanzai country; but the bulk of his adherents had left these parts, and the Khan Khel villages were deserted, with the exception of the tenants of Ibrahim Khan, the cousin and rival of Hashim Ali, who was present in General Elles' camp.

The following letter was received purporting to be from the *jirga* of the Chagarzai:—

We have heard through Abdulla Khan (of Dilbori) that you wish our *jirga* to attend. Mian Gul is Amir of Afghanistan.* He has made peace with you. We have authorized

* The phrase "Amir of Afghanistan" is, of course, not to be understood literally. By "Afghanistan" is meant the territories of Pathan clans on our border, and the phrase merely implies "is our leader."

him to act for us. Mian Gul has told us to stay peaceably at home; to fight no more, to make no attacks (or commit no offence) in British territory, and not to interfere with you in any way. We are acting on Mian Gul's advice. His *jirga* should be considered as our own. It is therefore unnecessary for us to send a separate *jirga*, and we hope that our excuse will be accepted. Yesterday we sent a deputation to Mian Gul to speak about this matter. He has advised us not to send a *jirga*, and it is therefore not in our power to do so.

On the evening of this day a patrol of the 32nd Pioneers in the vicinity of Surmal came across a party of the enemy, and inflicted a loss of two men on them without any casualties on our side.

12th April. On the 12th the head-quarters, 1st Brigade, with the 3 guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, and the Seaforth Highlanders moved to Seri from Kungar. The remaining three guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery moved from Kotkai to Tilli.

Arrangements were made this day for change of base from Darband to Oghi, the abandonment of all river posts except Bakrai, the dismantling of the bridge on the 15th, and return of the boats down river. The river was reported to have risen 40 inches.

Arrangements made on the 12th April for the change of base from Darband to Oghi.

In accordance with these arrangements, the following moves were ordered:—Divisional head-quarters and Guides Infantry to Seri on the 13th; 37th Dogras from bridge-head to Tilli on the 15th; one company, 11th Bengal Infantry, at Bela to Lashora on the 16th; one company, 11th Bengal Infantry, at Kunarai to Lashora on the 15th; field hospital at Bela to Tilli on the 15th, escorted from Bela to bridge by troops at Bela, and from the bridge to Tilli by the 37th Dogras; 11th Bengal Lancers detachment at Kotkai to Bela on the 14th; and the squadron from Bela to Darband on the 16th, and then to march to Rawal Pindi.

The telegraph line between Ril and Bakrai having been cut, the hamlet of Darbaru in the Khappa Nala, near which the wire was cut, was burned as a warning, and notification as to why it had been burnt was sent to the Hasanzaïs by the Chief Political Officer.

With reference to the Chagarzaïs, the following letter was sent by order of the General Officer Commanding in reply to the one received from them on the previous day:—

I have received your letter brought by Abdulla Khan and Shahdad Khan. Although the British Government is ready to abstain from inflicting further punishment on you in consideration of the losses you suffered in fights with our troops, and on condition that you abstain from all further acts of hostility, yet you must understand that there can be no peaceful settlement between you and the British Government unless and until you send in a complete *jirga*.

13th April. On the 13th the divisional head-quarters and Guides Infantry moved from Ril to Seri. During the previous night the camp at Seri had been fired into, but without doing any harm.

Divisional head-quarters moved from Ril to Seri.

Owing to the telegraph wire having been cut between Bakrai and Lashora on several occasions, and armed men having been seen moving towards Sabe, a party from Bakrai was sent up the Sabe spur to scour it. The village of Badar

was completely burnt as a warning, and the *Saiads* who inhabited the village on the left bank of the Shal Nala opposite Bakrai, and who had professed friendship, were warned that they were under suspicion. A *talwar* and Enfield rifle, loaded and capped, and some ammunition were found concealed behind this village.

On the 14th the weather again became very inclement. A party, accompanied by the Commanding Royal Engineer, proceeded to Kain Gali on the crest of the Black Mountain to look for the best line of road to connect Seri with Oghi *via* the Sambalbut spur. Much snow was still lying near the crest.

The Khan Khel were reported to be beginning to return to those of their villages which were not occupied by our troops. All concerted or general opposition had now ceased, but a few of Hashim Ali Khan's personal retainers or tenants were still wandering about ready to fire at individuals or to cut the telegraph wire.

On the 15th snow fell as low down as Seri and on all the surrounding hills, and this caused further delay in opening up of the road *via* Kain Gali. Steps were accordingly taken for constructing a road from Seri *via* Selle and Panji Gali to join the Oghi-Pabal-Gali road.

The bridge-of-boats at Kotkai, in accordance with the orders issued on the 12th, was dismantled, and the boats proceeded to Darband *en route* to Attock. The 37th Dogras after the dismantling of the bridge moved to Tilli.

On this date the General Officer Commanding, in reply to a telegram from the Foreign Department asking to be informed what was the exact position with regard to the Hasanzai and Akazai, wired as follows :—

The bulk of the Hasanzai—*i.e.*, nine sections out of ten—have long ago made submission; in fact, they have never really opposed us. The remaining section, *viz.*, the Khan Khel, are prepared to send in their *jirga*—that is, all their leading men save a few devoted partisans of Hashim Ali, who have gone away with him. The Akazais have not submitted, but are prepared to send in a *jirga*. They comprise four sections. Two sections would have come in ere this, but were told to collect a full *jirga* of the whole clan. Their *jirga* is expected within a week. The submission of the Hasanzai has been unconditional. The demands which, it is understood, the Government of India have sanctioned are (1) surrender of Hashim Ali Khan; (2) assistance in labour or by furnishing guards for the construction of certain roads; (3) attendance of *jirgas* when required, and agreement as to responsibility in case of offences in British territory; (4) prohibition of any settlement of the Hindustanis. As regards condition (1), it is not in the power of the clans to force the surrender of Hashim Ali Khan or of the Akazai headmen referred to in your No. 223 of the 14th March.* These men are all beyond the reach of the Black Mountain tribes. No terms have as yet been offered for formal acceptance by the tribes, but Mr. Cunningham has no doubt the Hasanzai and Akazai will accept the terms laid down. As soon as the Akazai *jirga* comes in, the Hasanzai and Mada Khel *jirgas* will be summoned, and the above terms formally communicated to the whole. If Government wishes any modification of these terms, more especially with reference to the substitution of perpetual banishment of Hashim Ali Khan and others in lieu of their surrender, the alteration can be made.

* These were the Akazai headmen who took part in the attack on the British troops sent to march along the crest of the Black Mountain in October 1890.

General Elles was informed in reply to this that Government did not wish for a modification of the terms, and that it was hoped that a guarantee that Hashim Ali Khan and the others would not be hanged or transported would enable the tribes to procure their surrender.

On this date orders were sent to the General Officer Commanding the Peshawar district to withdraw the Northumberland Fusiliers and 9th Bengal Lancers to Naoshera from Hoti Mardan, leaving the 22nd Bengal Infantry at the latter station until the return of the Guides Infantry from the Black Mountain.

Withdrawal of the Northumberland Fusiliers and 9th Bengal Lancers to Naoshera from Mardan on the 15th April.

16th April. On the 16th a party of the Guides proceeded from Seri to the village of Moratta, the inhabitants of which had rolled stones down on our foraging parties two days before. The wood was taken from the village, and it was then destroyed.

The head-quarters and five companies of the 37th Dogras moved from Tilli to Ril.

An Akazai *jirga* came into camp at Seri; but as it was not a representative one, it was dismissed with a warning that our troops would occupy their country until complete and unconditional submission was made by a full *jirga* of the clan.

17th April. On the 17th the road from Darbanai to Seri *via* China and Maira was opened for mule traffic. An alignment was fixed across the Shal Nala between Seri and Kan, and was to be opened for mule traffic on the following day. A temporary bridge, strong enough to carry laden mules, was thrown across the *nala*.

immediately south of Kaim Gali
Qima
A party of the Seaforth Highlanders and Guides Infantry ascended to the summit of Akhund Baba, which was thickly covered with snow. Arrangements were made for the establishment of posts of the Guides at Kaima and Kain Gali, so that the route might be used for the transit of mails, although it was not expected to be clear of snow for several weeks.

18th April. On the 18th the Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, with an escort of the Seaforth Highlanders, ascended the Machai peak from Seri. The party went *via* Darai and Larai, and on their return were fired on, but without effect. The enemy were reported to have had one man hit. The snow lay very thick in the neighbourhood of the Machai peak.

19th April. On the 19th the Khaibar Rifles marched from Kungar for Peshawar *via* Hassan Abdal. The General Officer Commanding reported that their conduct during the time they had served with the Hazara Field Force had been exemplary.

The building of posts at Kaima and Kain Gali was proceeded with, and orders were given for the roads from Seri to Kain Gali *via* Kaima and to Panji Gali *via* Selle to be commenced at once.

20th April. On the 20th three guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery moved from Tilli to Ril *en route* to Seri. The 4th Sikhs also moved from Diliarai and Bakrai to Ril. Diliarai was then held by three guns of the Derajat Mountain Battery and a wing of the 11th Bengal Infantry.

On the 21st the head-quarters and five companies of the 4th Sikhs moved 21st April. from Ril to Kungar, and the head-quarters and three companies of the 37th Dogras moved from Seri to Kan, and bivouacked just above lower Kan. One *king house* company of the latter regiment proceeded to Maira to occupy it.

A rearrangement of the telegraph stations was now made, and only the following offices were kept open: Oghi, Phagora, Tilli, Ril, Seri, Darbanai, and Diliarai.

On the 22nd three companies of the 37th Dogras joined their head-quarters 22nd April. at Kan, and the head-quarters and right wing of the 32nd Pioneers moved to Karun.

There were no signs of the *jirga* of the Akazai coming in, and Hashim Ali Khan and his adherents were reported to be in trans-Indus Chagarzai territory, and to have no intention of surrendering themselves.

On the 23rd road-making was proceeded with. In order to make the clans 23rd April. realize that the troops would not be withdrawn till the complete submission of the Akazai as well as of the Hasanzai was made and satisfactory assurances secured for the future, the Chief Political Officer suggested to the General Officer Commanding the advisability of making early arrangements for hutting the troops at Seri. The effect of this on the Akazai and Chagarzai would, in the opinion of Mr. Cunningham, be excellent.

On the 24th April the whole of the Akazai country was visited by a com- 24th April. bined movement from Seri and Kan. One party proceeded from Kan to the crest of the ridge dividing Akazai from Chagarzai territory; another party proceeded from Seri to the crest of this ridge *via* Kan, Sokar, and Toram; a third party visited Doda and Machai from Seri *via* Saudagara and Biran. The whole of the country was found deserted, but 65 head of cattle were captured, and a large amount of grain was found concealed in some of the villages.

On this date Darband was evacuated, and the transfer of the base to Oghi was completed.

On the 26th three guns, Derajat Mountain Battery, moved from Diliarai to 26th April. Maira, forage having become scarce at the former place. One company of the 37th Dogras moved from Kan to Maira, thus making two companies at that place for the defence of the guns. The left wing of the 32nd Pioneers moved to Panji Gali, where they were working on the road.

On the 27th it rained throughout the day, and this continued on and off 27th to 29th April. during the 28th, when some fresh snow fell on the surrounding hills; but on the 29th the weather somewhat cleared.

On the 30th Brigadier-General Hammond started early in the morning with 30th April. some men of No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, 300 men of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and 150 men of the 2-5th Gurkhas, picking up a small party of the 11th Bengal Infantry from Diliarai *en route*. Taking 50 men and some *surnais* (*massaks*) he went on ahead to the river bank, and, crossing over some men on the *surnais*, brought over a raft which was moored on the right bank. The raft was then sent back with a party, and some sheep belonging to the Akazais were brought over. A few shots were fired, but there were no casualties.

The village of Bilianai was destroyed and the fodder cut, about 100 loads of the latter being carried off. The force then returned to Darbanai, having been absent fourteen hours, and having had a long and tiring day owing to the excessive heat at low levels.

1st May. On the 1st May the track from Kan to Toram was improved.

The strength and disposition of the Hazara Field Force on this date are given in Appendix XI.

2nd May. Early on the morning of the 2nd May, under cover of rain and darkness, a raid was made on the camp at Seri from two quarters simultaneously, and some goats and sheep were carried off and a pony killed. The raiders had been seen approaching with torches from the direction of Najorian on the north-west and Larai and Darai on the north-east, and parties accordingly moved out and destroyed these villages, the inhabitants being informed of the reason.

4th May. On the 4th May the General Officer Commanding telegraphed to the Quarter Master General in India as follows:—
Opening of the Panji Gali-Bandi road between Seri and Oghi.

The next convoy will come up *via* Bandi and Panji Gali; distance from Oghi to Seri 17 miles. Tilli and Ril will be evacuated, and in re-arranging troops I intend to place all the British troops at Panji Gali and Seri, and hold the lower Akazai country with two native regiments and three Derajat guns under General Hammond, getting up such tents as may be required.

Orders were received from Army Head-Quarters for hutting two battalions of native infantry and one native mountain battery in the neighbourhood of Seri.

On this date the following letter purporting to be from Hashim Ali Khan was received:—

After respectful salutation my petition is that the *Sarkar* unjustly sent an army against me. Accordingly I collected a *lashkar* of Mussalmans as best I could, and confided the issue (peace or war) to Mian Gul. The Mian Gul, on whom be peace, told us: "The *Sarkar* is making peace with me; you have no authority (to fight)." I replied, "It is as you decide" (*Iktiyar Sahib ast*). Then he said: "I decide for peace, not war." Accordingly, as soon as peace was made, he told us that he had made peace on the following condition: that Government should send its regiments away, and that we should dismiss our gathering (*lashkar*). Sir, we, that is, the Yusafzai clans, have fulfilled our promise, but you have not completed yours. Government has power to do as it pleases. I am going again to Mian Gul.

The assertion that any terms were made with Mian Gul as to Hashim Ali Khan or as to the Hasanzai or Akazai was of course false.

On the evening of this day three shots were fired into Kan, but without doing any harm. A few shots were fired in reply, and in the morning the body of one of the enemy was found, and was identified as that of a son of one of Hashim Ali Khan's most trusted servants. On the following evening (the 5th) shots were again fired into camp at Kan and also at Surmal. At the latter place a sepoy of the 11th Bengal Infantry was wounded.

Consequent on the Panji Gali-Bandi road being open for traffic, the following orders were issued for the redistribution of the force:—No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, to move from Darbanai to Panji Gali; No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery (3 guns), from Maira to Darbanai; Seaforth Highlanders, Seri to Panji Gali; Royal Welsh Fusiliers, Darbanai to Seri; two companies, 4th Sikhs, Ril to Kungar; two companies, 4th Sikhs, Kungar to Maira; head-quarters and wing, 4th Sikhs, Kungar to Seri; wing, 2-5th Gurkhas, Tilli to Darbanai; two companies.

37th Dogras, Maira to Kan; one section, British Field Hospital, Seri to Panji Gali, and another section, Darbanai to Seri; one section of Native Field Hospital, Tilli to Surmal, and another section, Ril to Bandi. Pabal Gali, Bandi, and Oghi were to be occupied by the 28th Bengal Infantry. The company of Sappers and Miners, the 32nd Pioneers, and the Coolie Corps were to remain where they were, *viz.*, at Karun, Abu Kotal, Panji Gali, and Bandi. These moves were all completed by the 10th May.

On the 8th a letter purporting to be from the Akazai *jirga*, to the effect that 8th May. they were ready to agree to terms, was received.

On the 10th the General Officer Commanding proceeded to Oghi *via* Panji 10th to 12th May. Gali for the purpose of inspecting the road and the base. The road was good throughout, and had not been injured by the recent rain. Arrangements were made for bringing up tents from Oghi for the troops. On the 11th Major-General Elles visited the site of the post about to be built at the Jal pass, and on the 12th returned to Seri from Oghi *via* Kain Gali. The road up the Sambalbut spur was being proceeded with, and was expected to be finished to Kain Gali in a fortnight. Letters were received from two partisans of Hashim Ali Khan and also from the Chagarzai. The purport of these letters was not easy to understand, but the reason of their being sent was probably uneasiness at the prospect of our troops remaining in the positions they now occupied.

On the morning of the 13th a party of the enemy waylaid a small convoy 13th May. of mules returning from Toram to Kan, and mortally wounded a sepoy of the 37th Dogras. They then threw him down the *khad*, and carried off his rifle and bayonet. Parties were sent in pursuit, but the raiders had crossed into Chagarzai territory. As a punishment Toram was burnt. It was reported that the party consisted of Gujars of the upper Shal Nala, and accordingly a party of the Guides on the 14th proceeded from Seri as far as Doda and Machai, and burnt 14th May. the villages of Biran and Zanlui, besides several Gujars' huts.

On the 15th a letter was received from the Chagarzai, the purport of which 15th May. was to excuse themselves for the recent raids, which they ascribed to the Akazai. The following telegram was received on the same date from the Adjutant General in India :—

Warn Chagarzais by letter that raiders from their territory have fired on your troops on more than one occasion, and that, if this occurs again, the tribe will be held responsible, and must take the consequences. If after delivery of this letter the Chagarzai or persons from their territory molest your force, you are quite at liberty to follow in hot pursuit and punish all such people, even though this may take you into Chagarzai territory. In acting on this permission, you will understand that it does not authorize you to make an expedition into Chagarzai territory without previous sanction of Government.

In accordance with the orders in the above, the following letter was sent by the General Officer Commanding to the Chagarzai :—

I write to inform you that raiders coming from your territory have on more than one occasion fired at my troops and into camps. If this occurs again, your tribe will be held responsible, and you must take the consequences. If you harbour in your country men who commit such offences, you must expect to see British troops pursuing the offenders into your territory.

By order of the General Officer Commanding, the bearer of the letter is being told to tell the men of Pakban that if offenders coming from their country are pursued into

their limits, they must take the consequences, which may involve injuries to their persons and property.

A long letter was received on this date from the Akazai, the purport of which was that they had decided not to send in a *jirga*. The letter, however, bore only two seals, and it was doubtful if it represented the views of the tribe. Hashim Ali Khan was said to have come in person to the place where the Akazai *jirga* were assembled, and urged them to delay submission.

It being reported that the Akazai of Bimbal and Bilianai had returned to cut their remaining crops, a small party of the 11th Bengal Infantry were sent from Diliarai to reconnoitre. They found about 100 men cutting crops, supported by a party on the right bank. They retreated across the river, firing and saying their *jirga* would not come in, and that we might do our worst.

On the evening of this day some shots were fired into the camp of the 37th Dogras at Kan, wounding one sepoy dangerously.

16th May. On the 16th Lieutenant-Colonel Stead, with a detachment of the 11th Bengal Infantry and three guns No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery, went down to Bimbal, and destroyed the enemy's raft with shells to prevent them again crossing over. The Akazais fired from the right bank, but without doing any harm. The remainder of the standing crops were destroyed. The heat was very great.

17th May. On the 17th the right wing of the 32nd Pioneers moved from Panji Gali to Kan to make a road from that place to the *kotal* to the west that overlooks Najorian.

19th May. On the 19th the work of hutting near Seri was commenced. The site for the huts had been fixed on the Karun ridge. ✕

21st May. On the 21st reports were received, which appeared reliable, to the effect that the Chagarzai had given the Akazai warning to choose between submission and leaving Chagarzai limits. The Akazai had collected another *jirga* at Kamach, and had summoned Ibrahim Khan (Khan Khel) * to be present.

Instructions having been received for the 11th Bengal Infantry to return to India, various moves were necessitated, and orders were accordingly issued on the 22nd May, and were duly carried out. The 37th Dogras were transferred to the 2nd Brigade in the place of the 11th Bengal Infantry.

23rd May. On the 23rd a portion of the Akazai *jirga* arrived in camp at Seri, and on the 24th the remainder followed, as well as a fully representative *jirga* of the Hasanzaïs. The Mada Khel sent an excuse, but a message was sent to warn them to attend at once; otherwise they would be excluded from the settlement.

It was proposed as soon as the agreement was concluded, in view of the contemplated reduction of the force, to concentrate the troops at Seri and on the crest in the positions which would be occupied after reduction.

The time for tilling to save the next harvest was so limited that it was desirable to get the Akazai back to their villages and to work in their fields at once.

* The cousin and rival of Hashim Ali Khan, who was in General Elles' camp at Seri at this time.

On the 25th the road through Kaima to Kain Gali, meeting the road from 25th May.
 Road from Seri to Oghi *via* Kain Oghi by the Sambalbut spur, was completed.
 Gali completed on the 25th May.

On the 26th the Hasanzai and Akazai *jirgas* were interviewed, and the latter 26th to 29th May.
 tendered the unconditional submission of the tribe. They were thereupon given permission to re-occupy their lands and villages on the same terms as had been accorded to the Hasanzai at the commencement of the expedition. On the first condition to be imposed on the tribes, namely, the surrender of Hashim Ali Khan, being brought up, the united *jirgas* declared their inability to procure his arrest and surrender, and the matter was referred to Government, the conference being suspended. On the 28th the approval of Government was received to the terms of settlement proposed by the General Officer Commanding; and on the 29th the *jirgas* of the Hasanzai and Akazai agreed to these terms, and affixed their signatures and seals to the agreement. This agreement is given in full in Appendix XII.

Before the *jirgas* were dismissed, they were addressed as follows by the General Officer Commanding, the address being repeated in Pushtu by Mr. Cunningham:—

The Government of India have no desire to occupy your country. If Hashim Ali Khan is given up, they are ready to remove their whole force at once; but after all that has occurred you cannot expect Government to withdraw without any certainty that you are strong enough to prevent Hashim Ali Khan from returning and raising fresh trouble on the British border. Government has therefore found it necessary to arrange for the maintenance of a force in your country until they think you are in a position to preserve order; but they will be glad to withdraw the force as soon as possible, and in the meantime the force at present here will be greatly reduced; and so long as peace and quiet are maintained, you will be left in peace in undisturbed occupation of your villages, with full liberty to cultivate your lands and reap your crops.

Orders were issued at once for the evacuation of Diliarai, Darbanai, Peza (to which point the Surmal post had been moved on the 26th May), Maira, and Kan.

Telegram of congratulation from the Commander-in-Chief on the successful termination of the expedition. On this date the following telegram was received by the General Officer Commanding from the Commander-in-Chief:—

Please accept my hearty congratulations on the successful termination of the Black Mountain expedition, and let the troops under your command know how highly pleased I am with the excellent work they have done.

This telegram was published in Field Force Orders.

On the 31st May the 1st Battalion, 1st Gurkhas, arrived at Seri. This regi- 31st May.
 ment had been sent from India to take the place of the 11th Bengal Infantry. The head-quarters of the 1st Brigade and the Guides Infantry moved to Nimal.

On the 1st June several movements took place, and the strength and distribu- 1st June.
 tion of the force on this date will be found in Appendix XIII.

On the 3rd June a fully representative *jirga* of the Mada Khel having arrived 3rd June.
 in camp, they were received, and accepted the terms of agreement proposed. This agreement is given in Appendix XIV. After the *jirga* had affixed their seals or marks to the agreement, they were presented to the General Officer Commanding, who addressed them as follows:—

Maliks of the Mada Khel.—You were invited to attend with the Hasanzai and Akazai *jirgas* to join in the agreement entered into with the Government of India in regard to

Hashim Ali Khan, who was jointly *Khan* of their tribes and yours. For some reason known to yourselves, you excused yourselves from attending. You were not well advised. You have now attended and subscribed to those articles of the agreement which concern you, and you have done well, as you have avoided the risk of incurring the displeasure of Government. You have seen what that means during the last three months. Government is now satisfied with your conduct, and I am glad you have ended as you began by behaving in a friendly manner.

The *jirga* was then dismissed.

5th June.

On the 5th June the following order was issued by the General Officer Commanding:—

As the inhabitants are now re-occupying their villages, the following rules will be observed:—It is to be understood that the force is in occupation of the Khan Khel country, and that no person belonging to the force is to go beyond the limits of that territory without proper authority. No soldier or follower is allowed to go more than $\frac{1}{4}$ of a mile beyond the limits of his camp without the permission of his commanding officer. No soldier or camp follower is to enter any village unless ordered to do so.

9th June.

On the 9th June sanction was received from Army Head-Quarters for the return to India of the following troops:—

No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
2nd Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders.
One squadron, 11th Bengal Lancers.
No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery (3 guns),
Guides Infantry.
32nd Bengal Infantry (Pioneers).
2-5th Gurkha Regiment.
37th Bengal Infantry (Dogras).

The following troops were to remain in occupation of the crest of the Black Mountain and at Seri and Oghi:—

No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
1st Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
1-1st Gurkha Regiment.
4th Sikh Infantry.
28th Bengal Infantry.

10th June.

On the 10th June the following farewell order was published by the General Officer Commanding:—

Farewell order of Major-General
Elles, C.B.

Orders having been received for the break up of the Hazara Field Force, the Major-General Commanding has to bid farewell to those corps which are passing from under his command. In doing so, he begs to thank Brigadier-Generals and the staff and departmental officers for the able support they have afforded him throughout, and he desires specially to express his sense of the exemplary conduct of the troops both in the field and in quarters. The high state of discipline exhibited at all times, to which the whole force from the highest to the lowest in rank have contributed, has produced the nearest approach to that condition of an army in which a disciplinary code is a dead letter. But the troops have done more than behave well: they have endured with unvarying cheerfulness much exposure to wet, cold, and heat; and whenever they have had the good fortune to meet the enemy, they have acquitted themselves well and gallantly. The Major-General congratulates the force on having received the approval of the Commander-in-Chief in India in terms which must be a source of gratification to all ranks. For himself he has to assure one and all that he will never cease to look back with pleasure to his association with them during the expedition.

On the 11th the return of the troops to India commenced, and the General 11th June. Officer Commanding and staff proceeded from Seri to Nimal.

On the 13th divisional head-quarters moved to Oghi, and here the *jirga* of 13th June. the Pariari Saiads was in attendance. The agreement drawn up and accepted by them will be found in Appendix XV.

Agreement made with the Pariari Saiads on the 13th June.

The *jirga* was presented to the General Officer Commanding, who addressed them as follows :—

Saiads of Pariari.—I am glad to see you here to pay your respects to me as the representative of the Government of India. The expedition which has recently been directed against the Hasanzai and Akazai tribes has not touched your country, as you have remained peaceably within your borders. When summoned last autumn, you sent in your *jirga*, and were ready to comply with the wishes of Government. On both occasions you have done well, and I am to express a desire that your conduct will be regulated by the same good counsels. The agreement which you have now signed is an earnest of your assurance of good behaviour.

You have seen how evil advice has brought punishment on your neighbours, and you can contrast the state of your country in the near presence of British troops with that of tribes who have incurred the displeasure of Government.

On the 16th the last of the troops for India left Oghi, and the following was 16th June. published in Field Force Orders :—

The field force broken up on the 16th June.

The force having been broken up, Brigadier-General Hammond, V.C., D.S.O., A.D.C., will assume command of the troops remaining to garrison the Black Mountain and Oghi with the following staff :—

Brigade-Major	Captain Bradshaw, 35th Sikhs.
Superintendent, Army Signalling, and Provost-Marshal	Lieutenant Peters, 7th Dragoon Guards.

The title of the force will remain "Hazara Field Force."

	<i>Troops.</i>
No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.	1-1st Gurkha Light Infantry.
Royal Welsh Fusiliers.	4th Sikh Infantry.
4th Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.	28th Bengal Infantry.

This order will take effect from the 17th June 1891.

Permission was subsequently obtained to retain a wing of the 32nd Pioneers at Seri to help in completing the hutting, and this wing remained at Seri till the 10th July, when it left for India. Free rations were allowed to the troops left to occupy the Black Mountain. The complete list of the staff of the force will be found in Appendix XVI.

On the 17th Major-General Elles handed over command of the Hazara 17th June. Field Force to Brigadier-General Hammond, and left with his staff for Rawal Pindi.

On the termination of the operations, Major-General Elles submitted a despatch, dated 22nd June 1891, to the Adjutant General in India, and this will be found in full in Appendix XVII. In this despatch, after describing the operations of the Hazara Field Force, the Major-General Commanding brought to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief the names of the officers who in his opinion were most deserving of mention. A supplementary selected list of officers brought

to notice by Brigadier-Generals and heads of departments was also attached. A return of casualties during the operations accompanied the despatch; and from this it appears that during the expedition 6 men were killed and 47 wounded, the latter including 3 officers.

A return of ammunition expended during the operations is given in Appendix XVIII.

Appendix XIX contains a few points brought to notice by Brigadier-General Williamson regarding equipment, rations, etc.

In Appendix XX is given the report of the Chief Political Officer on the political history and results of the expedition.

Reports on the Engineering and Bridging operations will be found in Appendices XXI and XXII respectively.

Appendix XXIII contains notes on the Coolie Corps.

A report on the Signalling operations is given in Appendix XXIV.

Reports on the Medical and on the Commissariat and Transport Departments will be found in Appendices XXV, XXVI, and XXVII, and a return showing the number of animals attached to the force is given in Appendix XXVIII.

A report on the Survey operations will be found in Appendix XXIX.

Appendix XXX contains a report on the working of the Veterinary Department, and in Appendices XXXI and XXXII are given the reports on the Telegraph and Postal operations.

The following Government General Order, dated the 28th August 1891, relative to the operations of the Hazara Field Force was published in the *Gazette of India*, and was subsequently republished in the *London Gazette* of the 20th October 1891:—

Government General Order published relative to the above operations.
No. 816.—The Most Hon'ble the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council is pleased to direct the publication of the following letter from the Adjutant-General in India, dated the 8th of July 1891, submitting, under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in India, a despatch from Major-General W. K. Elles, C.B., reporting the operations of the Hazara Field Force between the 12th March and the 17th June 1891.

2. The Governor-General in Council, in concurrence with the Commander-in-Chief, desires to record his entire approval of the careful and thorough manner in which the work of the expedition was carried out by Major-General Elles, and of the good discipline and soldierlike conduct displayed by the troops on various occasions in the presence of the enemy.

His Excellency in Council has perused with much satisfaction the favourable mention of the various officers whose good services during the campaign have been brought to notice.

3. The Viceroy is glad to have an opportunity of expressing his sense of the valuable services rendered by Mr. A. F. D. Cunningham, C.I.E., C.S., as Chief Political Officer to the force, and His Excellency notices with pleasure the efficiency of the arrangements made by the Medical, Commissariat-Transport, and other Army departments in connection with the expedition, and by the Postal and Telegraph services under Mr. W. T. Van Someren and Mr. R. C. Barker, C.I.E., respectively.

No. 244-H. "*Field Operations—Hazara*," dated Simla, 8th July 1891.

From—The Adjutant-General in India,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

I have the honour, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a despatch from Major-General Elles, C.B., describing the operations of the Hazara Field Force between the 12th March and the 17th June 1891.

2. The objects of the expedition were as stated in the second paragraph of Major-General Elles' letter, and, as far as it is possible to judge at present, these objects have been fully accomplished; the submission of the offending tribes has been more complete than on any former occasion; they have assented to the construction of roads and dominating posts upon the frontier, and to the permanent expatriation of their chief, Hashim Ali, who for years has been the moving spirit in all border outrages; and a small force remains in their country to observe the fulfilment of their pledges.

3. The Commander-in-Chief considers that great credit is due to Major-General Elles for the careful and thorough manner in which he has carried out the orders of the Government of India; and His Excellency commends this distinguished officer to the favourable notice of the Government; also the officers mentioned by him as well as those included in his supplementary list of officers brought to notice by Brigadier-Generals Williamson and Hammond and heads of departments.

In endorsing these selections, His Excellency has much pleasure in bringing to notice the good discipline of the troops and their soldierlike conduct in the presence of the enemy in the affairs of the 23rd, 25th, and 26th of March at Diliarai, Darbanai, and Surmal ferry, and more particularly in the gallant defence of Ghazikot by the Dogra company of the 4th Sikh Infantry against a fanatical night attack on the 19th March.

4. The health of both fighting men and followers throughout the expedition was phenomenal, the average daily sick having been less than one per cent. of the force.

In acknowledging the receipt of the despatches, together with the above General Order, the Secretary of State for India in a despatch, dated the 12th November 1891, said:—

Acknowledgment of Secretary of State for India of despatches and Government General Order.

I cordially concur in the views expressed by your Government regarding the excellent service rendered by Major-General Elles and the officers and troops under his command.

The papers have been communicated to the Secretary of State for War and His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, and you will observe from the enclosed copy of a letter from the War Office that Mr. Secretary Stanhope and the Duke of Cambridge concur in appreciating the excellence of the work done.

From the Under-Secretary of State for War, to the Under-Secretary of State for India,—dated 21st October 1891.

In reply to your letter of the — instant, No. M.-8472, forwarding copy of a despatch from the Government of India, with accompanying General Order, relative to the operations of the Hazara Field Force on the Black Mountain during the period from March to June last, I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for India in Council, that Mr. Stanhope and His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief concur in considering that excellent service was rendered by Major-General Elles, C.B., and the officers and troops under his command.

The India medal of 1854, with a clasp for "Hazara, 1891," was subsequently granted to all the troops and followers who were employed in the above expedition between the 12th March 1891 and the 16th May 1891, both dates inclusive.

Grant of India medal with clasp for "Hazara, 1891."

To make this account of the 1891 Hazara expedition complete, a brief account is necessary of the events subsequent to the withdrawal of the main portion of the Hazara Field Force in June 1891. As already mentioned, a brigade under Brigadier-General Hammond remained at Seri and at Nimal in order to maintain quiet and ensure the banishment of Hashim Ali Khan. On the 13th July a fully representative *jirga* of the Akazai came to Seri and elected Ibrahim Khan, the cousin and rival of Hashim Ali Khan, as their chief, tying the turban on his head with all due formality. In August the two other Isazai clans, the Hasanzai and Mada Khel, followed this example, and formally elected Ibrahim Khan as their chief.

With a view to increase our control over the clans on this border, to assist in the maintenance of peace, and to secure the continued expulsion of Hashim Ali Khan, the levy of a small force of 200 Border Police, to be recruited from the independent clans and posted at suitable places on the frontier, was sanctioned.

The Swatis of Nandihar, Tikari, Deshi, and the *Saiads* and mixed population of Pariari freely accepted service in this force. The Hasanzai and Akazai at first refused the offer of allowances and of service in the police, but finally agreed in order to shorten the occupation of their hills by our troops.

In addition to the Border Police, for which (including the old Agror Police) a sum of Rs. 29,000 was allotted yearly, Government sanctioned the following allowances for leading men of the clans on this border—to the Hasanzai, Akazai, and Mada Khel—on condition of maintaining the compacts made by them in 1891; to the others on condition of general friendship, good behaviour, and assistance in preserving peace on this part of the frontier:—

				Rs.
Ibrahim Khan, Khan of Seri	2,000
Hasanzai <i>maliks</i>	1,700
Akazai <i>maliks</i>	800
Mada Khel <i>maliks</i>	1,000
Pariari <i>maliks</i>	500
Swatis of Tikari, Nandihar, &c.	1,000

By the end of November the evacuation of the Black Mountain by our troops was complete, and on the 2nd December Brigadier-General Hammond gave up the command of the Hazara Field Force. His report submitted on the breaking up of the force will be found in Appendix XXXIII. Thus ended the fourth expedition against the tribes of the Black Mountain.

APPENDIX I.

Parwana addressed to Hasanzai and Akazai, dated 29th January 1891—Issued 30th January 1891.

By order of Government you are informed that an expedition is about to be sent to punish you for breaking the engagements which you made in 1888, and for your conduct in opposing and attacking a body of troops which was making a peaceable and friendly march on the border of British territory.

You are hereby ordered to make complete submission without conditions of any sort, and, until you do so, your country will be occupied by British troops.

If you submit unconditionally, Government will be ready to treat you with leniency, and will discuss with your *jirga* arrangements for the future management of your country.

APPENDIX II.

STATEMENT OF MULE TRANSPORT REQUIRED FOR THE HAZARA EXPEDITION, 1891.

Estimate of strength of force for purpose of calculating supplies, transport, &c.

Details.	British troops.	Native troops.	Followers.	Horses.	Other horses and ponies.	Battery mules.	Obligatory transport mules. (a)	Mules for balance of equipment up to base.	Camels for balance of equipment up to base.	Transport followers for (a).
2 battalions, British infantry ...	1,240	...	160	20	20	...	270	...	300	Calculated at two men per five mules.
2 mountain batteries, British ...	226	340	180	26	8	276	168	158	...	
1 mountain battery, Native ...	6	270	78	6	4	138	69	65	...	
5 battalions, Native infantry ...	40	3,080	30	65	40	...	595	...	570	
1 battalion, Pioneers ...	8	616	78	13	8	...	184	...	110	
Khaibar Rifles ...	4	308	39	7	4	...	60	...	57	
1 company, Sappers and Miners ...	6	171	32	16	10	...	92	...	16	
2 squadrons, cavalry ...	8	289	166	292	120	...	25	21	...	
Pakhals, spare	40	
$\frac{1}{2}$ British field hospital ...	24	8	280	4	10	...	74	
$\frac{1}{2}$ " " " ...							2	...	33	
1 Native " " " ...	10	22	358	8	24	...	109	
1 " " " " ...							4	...	44	
Ambulance for $1\frac{1}{2}$ hospitals	120	
Commissariat equipments	150	
" establishment	20	
Staff ...	60	60	150	90	60	...	33	...	30	
Total ...	1,632	5,164	1,911	547	308	414	2,015	244	1,160	820
Round numbers ...	1,650	5,150	1,900	550	300	420	2,050	250	1,160	820

Estimate of maundage of food supplies for men and grain for animals and of transport for same.

	FIVE DAYS' SUPPLIES FOR MEN.				TWO DAYS' GRAIN FOR ANIMALS.				Mules for carriage of supplies at 111 mules for 200 maunds + 10 per cent. spare = 122.
	British troops, 1,650.	Native troops, 5,150.	Followers, 1,000.	Transport followers, 820.	Horses, 550.	Other horses and ponies, 300.	Battery mules, 420.	Obligatory transport mules, 2,050.	
Weight of ration <i>per diem</i> ...	lb. 2	lb. 2 $\frac{1}{4}$	lb. 2	lb. 2	lb. 9	lb. 5	lb. 6	lb. 6	
Aggregate weight in lbs. ...	16,500	58,000	19,000	8,200	9,900	3,000	5,040	24,600	
Maunds ...	1,270				530				1,098
Additional maundage of supplies for transport for supplies, the carriage of which is provided for in the 122 mules for 200 maunds.	50				60				1,100
GRAND TOTAL ...	1,320				590				

Abstract of carriage for advance beyond the base.

	Miles.
(1) For transport of troops ...	2,050
(2) " " food supplies ...	1,100
Grand Total ...	3,150

APPENDIX III.

Details of Commands and Staff.

HAZARA FIELD FORCE, 1891.

Elles, Major-General W. K., c.B., Brit. Service	Commanding.
Sandbach, Captain A.E., R.E.	Aide-de-Camp.
Wilberforce, Lieutenant H. W., 2nd Dragoon Guards	} Orderly Officers.
H. H. Prince C. V. A. L. E. A., of Schleswig-Holstein, G.C.B., King's Royal Rifle Corps.	
Shakespeare, Colonel G. R. J., 10th Bengal Lancers	Assistant Adjutant General.
Carter, Captain F. C., Northumberland Fusiliers	Deputy Assistant Adjutant General.
Mason, Captain A. H., R.E.	Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence.
Keith, Lieutenant-Colonel J., R. A.	Commanding Royal Artillery.
Dowell, Captain G. C., R. A.	Adjutant, Royal Artillery.
Greenstreet, Major W. L., R.E.	Commanding Royal Engineer.
Abbott, Captain H. E. S., R.E.	} Field Engineers.
Bond, Captain F. G., R.E.	
Rose, Lieutenant C. S., R.E.	} Assistant Field Engineers.
LeBreton-Simmons, Lieutenant G. F. H., R. E.	
Hamilton, Captain E. O. F., Royal West Surrey Regiment	Superintendent, Army Signalling.
Peters, Lieutenant J. W. P., 7th Dragoon Guards	} Assistant Superintendents, Army Signalling.
Burrowes, Lieutenant A. R., Royal Irish Fusiliers	
Balfe, Major E., B. S. C.	Provost Marshal.
Spurrell, Lieutenant R. J., 3rd Dragoon Guards	Provost Marshal.
Bradshaw, Deputy Surgeon-General A. F., M. S.	Principal Medical Officer.
Lyons-Montgomery, Captain H. F., B. S. C.	Chief Commissariat Officer.
Tulloch, Lieutenant J. W. G., B. S. C.	Divisional Transport Officer.
Wahab, Captain R. A., R.E.	Survey Officer.
Young, Captain W. H., B. S. C.	Field Treasure Chest Officer.
Hagger, Inspecting Veterinary-Surgeon W. R., A. V. D.	Veterinary Surgeon.
Swynnerton, Revd. C.	Chaplain.

Left or River Column.

Williamson, Brigadier-General R. F., Royal Welsh Fusiliers	Commanding.
Lyle, Captain H. T., D.S.O., Royal Welsh Fusiliers	Orderly Officer.
Bradshaw, Captain L. J. E., 35th Bengal Infantry	Brigade Major.
Eustace, Lieutenant A. H., 2nd Sikh Infantry	Field Intelligence Officer.

Ewart, Lieutenant R. H., 3rd Bengal Infantry	Brigade Commissariat Officer.
Waterfield, Lieutenant A. C. M., 11th Bengal Lancers	Brigade Transport Officer.
Taylor, Revd. J., M.A., B.D.	Chaplain.

Right or Tilli Column.

W. C., A. F. C. Hammond, Brigadier-General A. G., D. S. O., 3rd Sikh Infantry.	Commanding.
Barton, Lieutenant F. J. H., Corps of Guides	Orderly Officer.
Colleton, Captain Sir R. A. W., Bart., Royal Welsh Fusiliers	Brigade-Major.
Phillott, Captain D. C., 3rd Punjab Cavalry	Field Intelligence Officer.
Anderson, Lieutenant H. R. F., 16th Bombay Infantry	Brigade Commissariat Officer.
Badcock, Lieutenant F. F., 1st Battalion, 5th Gurkha Regiment	Brigade Transport Officer.

Oghi Column.

Hills, Colonel G. S., 28th Bengal Infantry	Commanding.
Baville, Lieutenant C. H., 18th Bengal Infantry	Brigade Commissariat Officer.
Low, Lieutenant R. B., 9th Bengal Lancers	Brigade Transport Officer.

Civil Staff.

Cunningham, Mr. A. F. D., C.I.E., C.S.	Chief Political Officer.
Smith, Mr. Turton, Punjab Police	Political Officer.
Davis, Mr. W. S., Punjab Police	" "
Renouf, Mr. W. C., C.S.	" "
Barker, Mr. R. C., C.I.E.	Telegraph Department.
Thomas, Mr. J. C.	" "
Van Someren, Mr. W. T.	Postal Department.
Middlemiss, Mr. C. S., B.A.	Geological Survey Department.

APPENDIX IV.

Punjab Gazette Notification, dated the 10th February 1891.

No. 84.—Whereas certain clans of the Black Mountain have been and are in a state of declared hostility to the British Government, His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, with the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council, hereby gives warning to the public generally under Section 2 of Regulation VII, 1873, that they are forbidden to pass, otherwise than on public service, across the frontier of the districts of Hazara and Peshawar into the territories of the Hasanzai and Akazai clans and the clans adjoining them on the Indus river.

APPENDIX V.

Parwana from the General Officer Commanding Hazara Field Force addressed to the Chagarzai, Deshis, Swatis of Thakot, and Pariariwals, dated 3rd March 1891.

Be it known to you that the British Government is sending an expedition to punish the Hasanzai and Akazai for their conduct in attempting to oppose our troops marching peaceably on the border of British territory.

The British Government have no quarrel with you ; but if in re-establishing order on the frontier it shall be found necessary or desirable to move troops within your territories, this will be done wherever it may be thought fit. If you behave as friends, you will be treated in a friendly manner—that is, your villages and property will be respected and protected, and your people will not be interfered with. If the troops require supplies out of your country, they will be paid for. If, on the other hand, you show any hostility whatever, you will be treated as enemies and severely punished.

APPENDIX VI.

Parwana from the General Officer Commanding Hazara Field Force addressed to the Mada Khel, dated 3rd March 1891.

Be it known to you that the British Government is sending an expedition to punish the Hasanzai and Akazai for their conduct in attempting to oppose our troops marching peaceably on the border of British territory in October last.

Whereas you are one of the three sections of the Isazai clan of whom Hashim Ali Khan is chief, the British Government holds you responsible to join the Hasanzai and Akazai in compelling the submission of Hashim Ali Khan, or in any other arrangement of which Government may approve regarding the Khanship of Seri.

The British Government have no quarrel with you ; but if in re-establishing order on the frontier it shall be found necessary or desirable to move troops within your territories, this will be done wherever it may be thought fit. If you behave as friends, you will be treated in a friendly manner—that is, your villages and property will be respected and protected, and your people will not be interfered with. If the troops require supplies out of your country, they will be paid for. If, on the other hand, you show any hostility whatever, you will be treated as enemies and severely punished.

APPENDIX VII.

Return of strength, Hazara Field Force, 10th March 1891.

CORPS.	BRITISH TROOPS.		NATIVE TROOPS.		Mules.	Equipment.	Guns.	REMARKS.
	Officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men.	Officers.	Native officers, non-commissioned officers, and men.				
ff	39	
RIVER COLUMN.								
1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery	3	53	...	83	71	2.5" R. M. L.	3	
2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery	111	55	7-pr. R.M.L., 200lbs.	3	
h Bengal Lancers	166	102	
h Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders	17	663	193	
ached to Seaforth Highlanders	...	30	
Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners	...	2	
ides Infantry	165	100	
Sikh Infantry	635	122	
id (Punjab) Bengal Infantry (Pioneers)	645	122	
h Bengal Infantry (Dogras)	315	100	
...	621	176	
TILLI COLUMN.								
9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery	6	101	...	157	214	2.5" R. M. L.	6	
Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers	18	612	231	
h Bengal Infantry	625	119	
id (Punjab) Bengal Infantry (Pioneers)	300	95	
1 Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles	635	110	
saibar Rifles	318	98*	* Ponies and mules.
OCHI COLUMN.								
h Bengal Lancers	143	94*	
2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery	96	55	7-pr. R.M.L., 200lbs.	3	
h (Punjab) Bengal Infantry	644	124*	
TOTAL	83	1,461	86	5,659	2,190	...	15	

APPENDIX VIII.

Government General Orders Nos. 354 and 951 of 1891.

No. 354.—The Governor-General in Council is pleased to sanction the admission to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit of the undermentioned native officer and non-commissioned officers of the 4th Regiment of Sikh Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force:—

Subadar Dheru.—For conspicuous gallantry in action at Ghazikot, on the Black Mountain, Hazara, on the 19th March 1891, when the picquet under his command was attacked at night by a large number of fanatics, on which occasion he cut down several of the enemy in hand-to-hand combat.

No. 3474, *Havildar Waziru.*— For conspicuous gallantry at Ghazikot, on the Black Mountain, Hazara, on the night of the 19th March 1891, when in command of the advanced party of a picquet, he defended the picquet against the onslaught of a large number of fanatics.

No. 3585, *Naik Ganesha Singh.*—For conspicuous gallantry at Ghazikot, on the Black Mountain, Hazara, on the night of the 19th March 1891, when his picquet was attacked by a large number of fanatics, on which occasion he (with the assistance of Lance-Naik Nihal Singh, who was killed) defended a wall against the advance of the enemy and bayonnetted several of them, being himself dangerously wounded.

No 3597½, *Lance-Naik Alam Khan.*—For conspicuous gallantry at Ghazikot, on the Black Mountain, Hazara, on the night of the 19th March 1891, when he bayonnetted two out of a body of fanatics who were attacking his picquet.

No. 951.—The Governor-General in Council is pleased to sanction the admission to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit of the undermentioned member of the Subordinate Medical Service:—

Senior Hospital Assistant Ahmadulla Khan, Subordinate Medical Department, Bengal.—For conspicuous gallantry in action at Ghazikot, on the Black Mountain, Hazara, on the 19th March 1891, on which occasion, notwithstanding his being exposed to a heavy fire, he performed his duty of attending on the wounded in a most energetic manner, and also defended a wounded man against a fanatic who rushed up and endeavoured to kill him.

APPENDIX IX.

Government General Order No. 952 of 1891.

No. 952.—The Governor-General in Council is pleased to sanction the admission to the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit of the undermentioned non-commissioned officer:—

No. 3561, *Naik Abdul Ahmad, 4th Regiment of Sikh Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force.*

—For conspicuous gallantry in action on the Diliarai heights, Black Mountain, Hazara, on the 23rd March 1891, when, while leading on his section, he engaged in single combat with two fanatics, of whom he killed one and was wounded by the other.

APPENDIX X.

Distribution of Hazara Field Force on the 1st April 1891.

Divisional head-quarters	Palosi
Head-quarters, 1st Brigade.	Palosi.
No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, (3 guns)	Palosi.
No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery (3 guns)	Diliarai.
2nd Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders and Gatlings	Palosi.
Guides Infantry	Palosi.
4th Sikh Infantry—Head-quarters and wing	Diliarai.
4th Sikh Infantry—Wing	Bakrai.
32nd Bengal Infantry (Pioneers)—Head-quarters and wing	Bakrai.
37th Bengal Infantry (Dogras)	Kotkai bridge head.
Head-quarters, 2nd Brigade	Darbanai.
No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery (4 guns)	Darbanai.
No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery (2 guns)	Diliarai.
1st Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers—Head-quarters	Darbanai.
1st Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers (200 men)	Ledh.
11th Bengal Infantry—Head-quarters and 2 companies	Darbanai.
11th Bengal Infantry (1 company)	Bela.
11th Bengal Infantry (1 company)	Kunrai.
11th Bengal Infantry (2 companies)	Palosi.
32nd Bengal Infantry (Pioneers)—Wing	Ril and Makranai.
2-5th Gurkha Regiment—Head-quarters and wing	Darbanai.
2-5th Gurkha Regiment (100 men)	Tilli.
2-5th Gurkha Regiment (100 men)	Ril.
2-5th Gurkha Regiment (100 men)	Makranai.
Khaibar Rifles (190 men)	Nawekili.
Khaibar Rifles (79 men)	Darbanai.
Head-quarters, 3rd Brigade	Darband.
No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery (3 guns)	Kotkai.
No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery (3 guns)	Darband.
1st Battalion, King's Royal Rifle Corps	Darband.
19th Bengal Infantry—Head-quarters and wing	Darband.
19th Bengal Infantry—Wing	Kotkai bridge head.
27th Bengal Infantry	Darband.
Squadron, 11th Bengal Lancers	Bela, with detachments at Darband and Palosi.
Squadron, 11th Bengal Lancers	Oghi.
4th Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners	Bakrai.
28th Bengal Infantry—Head-quarters and Wing	Oghi.
28th Bengal Infantry—Wing	Pabal Gali.

APPENDIX XI.

Statement showing the strength and distribution of the Hazara Field Force on 1st May 1891.

Post.	Corps.	Staff officers.	BRITISH TROOPS.		NATIVE TROOPS.		REMARKS.
			Officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men.	British officers.	Native ranks.	
Seri ...	Divisional and 1st Brigade Staff ...	26	
	No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery	5	92	...	155	
	2nd Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders	18	612	
	Guides Infantry	10	507	
	2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkha Regiment	16	
Kan ...	37th Bengal Infantry (Dogras)	9	443	
Diliarai ...	11th " "	4	268	
Abu Kotal ...	32nd " " (Pioneers)	5	282	
Ril ...	4th Sikh Infantry	4	237	
Kungar ...	4th Sikh Infantry	5	366	
	2nd Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders	6	
Karun ...	4th Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners	4	2	...	151	
Darbanai ...	2nd Brigade Staff ...	8	
	No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery	6	98	...	151	
	1st Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers	16	579	
	11th Bengal Infantry	11	
	2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkha Regiment	7	291	
Surmal ...	11th Bengal Infantry	2	160	
Pabal Gali ...	28th " "	2	167	
Maira ...	No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery	2	108	
	37th Bengal Infantry (Dogras)	1	142	
Tilli ...	2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkha Regiment	3	299	
Oghi ...	No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery	2	
	No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery	1	2	
	No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery	10	
	1st Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers	1	35	

Statement showing the strength and distribution of the Hazara Field Force on 1st May 1891—contd.

Post.	Corps.	Staff officers.	BRITISH TROOPS.		NATIVE TROOPS.		REMARKS.
			Officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men.	British officers.	Native ranks.	
Oghi ...	2nd Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders	2	33	
	11th Bengal Lancers	2	143	
	4th Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners	7	
	11th Bengal Infantry	36	
	Guides Infantry	36	
	4th Sikh Infantry	41	
	28th Bengal Infantry	6	278	
	32nd " "	32	
	2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkha Regiment	31	
	37th Bengal Infantry (Dogras)	33	
Bandi ...	28th " "	1	83	
Sambalbut ...	28th " "	1	115	
Kain Gali ...	Guides Infantry	44	
Kaima ...	" "	41	
Panji Gali ...	32nd Bengal Infantry (Pioneers)	5	277	
China ...	11th " "	2	114	
Total ...		34	53	1,457	71	5,079	

APPENDIX XII.

Agreement made by the Hasanzai and Akazai with the British Government at Seri, dated 29th May 1891.

We, the *maliks* of the Hasanzai and Akazai clans, for ourselves and for our fellow clansmen who have deputed us to represent them, hereby promise and agree as follows :—

I.—We admit and understand that the British Government demands the surrender of Hashim Ali Khan. We are unable at present to give him up, because he fled from our territories before this expedition, and has been, and now is, in the country of other independent clans. We bind ourselves never to permit Hashim Ali Khan or Sikandar Khan, his brother, or Shekh Ata Muhammad, his uncle, or Turabaz Khan, son of Shekh Ata Muhammad, to settle in or return to our country.

We also promise that if they or any of them come into our power, we will arrest and make them or him over to Government.

II.—Each clan agrees within its own boundary to arrange for the protection of any road which Government may make along the crest of the Black Mountain on its own border or within its territory and near our borders while such roads are in construction.

III.—We agree to protect and preserve from injury roads which have been made inside our territory.

IV.—If at anytime Government should wish its troops to march along the frontier on our border on the Black Mountain, our *jirgas* will attend to accompany the troops or officials of Government in a friendly and peaceful manner. Further, as British territory is open to us, and as we are permitted to travel and trade in it without molestation, our country is equally open to the subjects, servants, and officials of Government.

If Government should send any official to visit our country, provided due notice is given to us in order that our *jirga* may take the precautions necessary owing to the state of our society, each clan will be responsible for his safety within its own limits, will furnish escorts, and arrange for his safety and comfort.

V.—We will not permit any of the Hindustani fanatics or their followers to settle in our country.

VI.—If any of our clansmen or of our dependants or tenants dwelling in our country commit an offence in British territory, we will be responsible to make satisfaction by restoring persons kidnapped, or property stolen, or its value, or by payment of blood money ; and we agree, if such cases occur, to send in representatives to settle the case by *jirga* according to the custom of the country.

And as our clansmen if injured in British territory get redress and justice, so will we be responsible for injuries to British subjects travelling in our country. If any of our clansmen have a claim against a British subject or against any one dwelling in British territory, he will seek satisfaction by preferring a petition to the Deputy Commissioner of Hazara in order that the matter may be settled by law, or, if possible, by *jirga*, and in accordance with the usage of the country. None of our clansmen shall arrest any British subject or detain the property of any British subject by way of *baramta* or in satisfaction of any claim for debt or damages, but all such claims shall be referred to the Deputy Commissioner for settlement.

VII.—We recognise and admit that the private estate of Hashim Ali Khan and his family named above is confiscated, and the Government may make it over to any Khan Khel it please, or to the clan on payment of tribute.

VIII.—We understand and recognise that as we are responsible for the conduct of our nominal chief, the Khan of Seri, we may elect any *Khan* we please,

excluding Hashim Ali Khan, Sikandar Khan, Shekh Ata Muhammad, and Turabaz, and any person known to be hostile to Government. If we prefer, we may refrain from appointing any one Khan.

Seals or marks of the following :—

Lukman Khel	{ Midai, Malik. Paidad, Malik. Said Rasul, Mian Sathanadar.
Kotewal	{ Hamid, Malik. Moza Khan, Malik, son of Dour Khan.
Zakariya Khel	{ Jabar, Malik. Hamid Gul, Malik.
Kaka Khel	{ Aladad, Malik. Alam Khan, Malik.
Mir Ahmad Khel	{ Sherdad, Malik, son of Jamdad. Mamun Khan. Dad Khan.
Mamu Khel	{ Miandad, cousin of Khadi, Malik. Mir Hamza, Malik.
Nasrat Khel Kala Khel	Muhammad Ghulam, Malik.
Nanu Khel	Shah Wali, uncle of Fakir.
Dada Khel	{ Turabaz Khan, Malik, son of Yakub. Habib-ulla. Hamza Khan. Kamr Ali.
Khan Khel	{ Ibrahim Khan. Gulam Kadir Khan. Isa Khan. Alam Khan. Mukarrab Khan of Tegram. Najib-ulla Khan.
Nari Khan Khel	{ Hamid Khan. Mir Hassan Khan. Tour Ali. Said Amir.
Khan Khels of Maira	{ Abas Khan. Habib Khan. Arsala. Lal Khan.
Tilli Saiads	{ Nabi Mian. Said Azam Mian. Kashai Mian.
<i>Akazai.</i>			
Tasan Khel	{ Hashim Khan, son of Malik Said Miran. Mansur, nephew of Dad Khan, Malik. Malik Aslam Khan. Said Jamal, Sahibzada Sathanadar.

				{ Mostam, son of Malik Hashim Khan.
				{ Wali Shah, nephew of Hasan Khan, Malik.
Barat Khel	{ Idai Khan, nephew of Gujar Khan.
				{ Awal Khan, son of Hasan Khan of Darbanai.
				{ Mir Jamal, Malik.
				{ Dastan, Malik.
				{ Said Najab, nephew of Malik Nur Ahmad.
				{ Shah Said, son of Malik Said.
				{ Abid Khan, son of Zarif Khan.
Painda Khel	{ Abdulla, son of Malik Amir Shah.
				{ Rasul Khan, son of Malik Hazratulla.
				{ Mir Hasan, relative of Nur Khan.

APPENDIX XIII.

Statement showing the strength and distribution of the Hazara Field Force on the 1st June 1891.

Post.	Corps.	Staff officers.	BRITISH TROOPS.		NATIVE TROOPS.		REMARKS.
			Officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men.	British officers.	Native ranks.	
Seri	Divisional Staff...	16	
	2nd Brigade Staff	4	
	No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery	2	103	
	1st Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers	...	12	555	
	2nd „ Seaforth Highlanders	23	
	37th Bengal Infantry (Dogras)	9	570	
	1st Battalion, 1st Gurkha Regiment	8	507	
Nimal	2nd „ 5th „ „	16	
	1st Brigade Staff	6	
	Guides Infantry	8	500	
Abu Kotal	4th Sikh „	8	564	
	No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery	...	4	93	...	154	
Karun	32nd Bengal Infantry (Pioneers)—Wing	5	262	
	1st Battalion, 1st Gurkha Regiment	41	
Pabal Gali	28th Bengal Infantry	2	162	
Maira	2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkha Regiment*	8	568	
Oghi	No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery	2	...	2	
	„ 9 „ „ „	2	
	„ 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery	1	
	1st Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers	...	3	40	
	2nd „ Seaforth Highlanders	...	2	41	
	11th Bengal Lancers	1	136	
	No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners	1	
	Guides Infantry...	34	
	4th Sikh „	41	
	28th Bengal „	6	281	
	32nd „ „ (Pioneers)	34	
	1st Battalion, 1st Gurkha Regiment	5	
Bandi	2nd „ 5th „ „	35	
	37th Bengal Infantry (Dogras)	32	
	28th „ „	1	99	
Sambalbut	„ „ „	59	

* This regiment reached Seri on the 2nd June.

Statement showing the strength and distribution of the Hazara Field Force on the 1st June 1891—contd.

Post.	Corps.	Staff officers.	BRITISH TROOPS.		NATIVE TROOPS.		REMARKS.
			Officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men.	British officers.	Nativ ranks.	
Kain Gali ...	Guides Infantry	44	
Kaima ...	No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners	4	2	...	159	
Panji Gali ...	2nd Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders	14	585	
	32nd Bengal Infantry (Pioneers)—Head-quarters and left wing	5	286	
Shunglai ...	No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery	6	98	...	148	
TOTAL		...	26	45	1,439	63	4,846

APPENDIX XIV.

Agreement made by the Mada Khel with the British Government at Seri, dated 3rd June 1891.

We, *maliks* of the Mada Khel clan, have heard the terms of the agreement made by the Hasanzai and Akazai with the British Government, and agree to and approve of them. For ourselves and for our fellow clansmen who have deputed us to represent them we promise to do all we can to secure the fulfilment of that agreement. And we specially promise and agree as follows :—

I.—We admit and understand that the British Government demands the surrender of Hashim Ali Khan. We are at present unable to give him up because he is now in the country of other independent clans.

We bind ourselves never to permit Hashim Ali Khan or Sikandar Khan, his brother, or Shekh Ata Muhammad, his uncle, or Turabaz Khan, son of Shekh Ata Muhammad, to return to or settle in our country.

We also promise that if they or any of them come into our power, we will arrest and make them or him over to Government.

II.—We will not permit any of the Hindustani fanatics or their followers to settle in our country.

III.—If any of our clansmen or of our dependants or tenants dwelling in our country commit an offence in British territory, we will be responsible to make satisfaction by restoring persons kidnapped, or property stolen, or its value, or by payment of blood money; and we agree, if such cases occur, to send in representatives to settle the case by *jirga* according to the custom of the country. And as our clansmen if injured in British territory get redress and justice, so we will be responsible for injuries to British subjects travelling in our country. If any of our clansmen have a claim against a British subject or against any one dwelling in British territory, he will seek satisfaction by preferring a petition to the Deputy Commissioner of Hazara in order that the matter may be settled by law, or, if possible, by *jirga*, and in accordance with the usage of the country. None of our clansmen shall arrest any British subject or detain the property of any British subject by way of *baramta* or in satisfaction of any claim for debt or damages, but all such claims shall be referred to the Deputy Commissioner for settlement.

IV.—We recognise and admit that the private estate of Hashim Ali Khan and his family named above is confiscated, and the Government may make it over to any Khan Khel they please, or to the clan on payment of tribute.

V.—We understand and recognise that as we are responsible for the conduct of our nominal chief, the Khan of Seri, we may elect any *Khan* we please, excluding Hashim Ali Khan, Sikandar Khan, Shekh Ata Muhammad, and Turabaz Khan, and any person known to be hostile to Government. If we prefer, we may refrain from appointing any one *Khan*.

Seals or marks of the following *Maliks* :—

Nur Kalam Khan, Khan Khel, of Manja Kot.

Sherdad Khan of Manja Kot.

Mubara Khan (Barai), of Chorakot.

Jafir Khan, Khan Khel, of Maira.

Janas, son of Torai, of Maira.

Anwar Khan, Khan Khel, of Maira.

Ghulam Shah, Bara Khel, of Maira.

Motam.

Aman-ulla (brother of Khadi Khan, Maira).

Bawal Khan.

Said Azim of Mahabra.

Said Mustafa.

Mulla Ahmadji.

Shahmozat Khan

Sadr Khan

Rashid Khan } of Manja Kot.

Sherbaz Khan

Assin Khan

Bazmir, of Karor.

Nadir and Hajat Khan, of Doshkand.

Dadsher, son of Abbas, of Doshkand.

APPENDIX XV.

Agreement made by the Saiads and Chagarzai of Pariari with the British Government at Oghi, dated 12th June 1891.

We, *Saiads* and headmen of the Pariari *ilaqua*, hereby agree and promise:—

- (1) That we will never permit Hashim Ali Khan, Sikandar Khan, Shekh Ata Muhammad, or Turabaz, Khan Khel, who have been proscribed from the territories of the Hasanzai, Akazai, and Mada Khel, to settle or stay in our country.
- (2) If the Government should make a road on its border along the crest of the ridge from Chitabat by Mana-ka-Dana towards the Jal pass, we will arrange for its protection within our limits while under construction.
- (3) If at any time Government should wish its troops or servants to march along its frontier in our neighbourhood, our *jirga* will attend to escort the troops or officials on our border, and to do becoming service in a peaceful, friendly way. Further, just as British territory is open to us, and as we are permitted to travel and trade in it without molestation, our country is equally open to the subjects, servants, and officials of Government.

If Government should send any official to visit our country, provided due notice is given to us in order that our *jirga* may take the precautions necessary owing to the state of our society, we will do our best to provide for his safety within our limits, will furnish escorts, and arrange for his safety and comfort.

- (4) If any of our clansmen or of our dependants or tenants dwelling in our country commit an offence in British territory, we will be responsible to make satisfaction by restoring persons kidnapped, or property stolen, or its value, or by payment of blood money; and we agree, if such cases occur, to send in representatives to settle the case by *jirga* according to the custom of the country.

And as our clansmen if injured in British territory get redress, so we will be responsible for injuries to British subjects travelling in our country. If any of our clansmen have a claim against a British subject or against any one dwelling in British territory, we will seek satisfaction by preferring a petition to the Deputy Commissioner of Hazara in order that the matter may be settled by law, or, if possible, by *jirga*, and in accordance with the usage of the country. None of our clansmen shall arrest any British subject or detain the property of any British subject by way of *baramta* or in satisfaction of any claim for debt or damages, but all such claims shall be referred to the Deputy Commissioner for settlement.

- (5) We will do all we can to secure the maintenance of the arrangements now made by Government with the other Black Mountain tribes, and we bind ourselves not to help or harbour or encourage any who may seek to give offence or interfere with those arrangements or disturb the peace of the border.
- (9) We will not permit any of the Hindustani fanatics or their followers to settle in our country.

APPENDIX XVI.

Staff of force retained for the occupation of the Black Mountain on the termination of the Hazara Expedition.

To command the force	V.C., D.F.C., Brigadier-General A. G. Hammond, D.S.O., Staff Corps.
Brigade-Major	Captain L. J. E. Bradshaw, Staff Corps.
Field Engineer	Captain H. E. S. Abbott, R.E.
Assistant Field Engineer	Lieutenant H. C. I. Birdwood, R.E.
Assistant Superintendent, Army Signalling and Provost Marshal.	Lieutenant J. W. P. Peters, 7th Dragoon Guards.
Commissariat Officer	Lieutenant A. L. Phillips, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General.
Transport Officer	Lieutenant R. G. Munn, Derbyshire Regiment.
Veterinary-Surgeon	Veterinary-Surgeon H. M. Maxwell, A.V.D.

APPENDIX XVII.

No. 305-H., dated Murree, 22nd June 1891.

From—MAJOR-GENERAL W. K. ELLES, C.B., late Commanding the Hazara Field Force,
To—The Adjutant-General in India.

I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief in India, the following report of the operations of the Hazara Field Force, 1891.

2. The objects of the expedition were defined as follows:—

First, to carry out the purpose for which the movement of troops was made last October—namely, to assert our right to move along the crest of the Black Mountain without molestation; and next, and more particularly, to inflict punishment on the tribes concerned for the hostility practised on that occasion. The occupation of the country to be entered will be prolonged until the tribes concerned have made complete submission, and have carried out whatever conditions may be imposed upon them.

The whole of the Hasanzai and Akazai clans are held to be responsible for the hostility displayed towards the force.

It was directed that "to accomplish the above object the force will advance from Darband into the enemy's country in two columns,—one moving *via* Biradar and Pailam to Tilli, and the other along the river route *via* Kotkai and Kanar. Further movements are left to the General Officer Commanding."

It was, however, subsequently directed during the progress of the advance that operations were not to be extended beyond the Hasanzai and Akazai country without the sanction of Government.

3. The concentration of the force was at first ordered to take place by the 1st March, but owing to bad weather the despatch of the expedition was postponed to the 10th March. The River and Tilli Columns, afterwards designated the 1st and 2nd Brigades, were commanded respectively by Brigadier-Generals R. F. Williamson and A. G. Hammond, V.C., D.S.O. The weather remained very unsettled, but both columns were able to move from Darband with reduced field service scale of equipment and without tents on the 12th March. The roads on both routes had been previously opened out as far as the British frontier. Beyond the frontier little or no trace of the roads constructed in 1888 could be found. The river route presented no difficulties as far as Kotkai, which was occupied without opposition on the 12th, the 1st Brigade bivouacking on the Towara plain. The 2nd Brigade reached Pailam on the frontier on the same day.

4. To give effect to the objects mentioned in paragraph 2, I proposed, after the occupation of Kanar and Tilli as directed, to push forward both columns,—the 1st Brigade to occupy the lower Hasanzai country on both banks and the Diliarai peninsula of the Akazai country, and the 2nd Brigade to pass through the middle levels of the mountain by Ril and Kungar, and occupy the Khan Khel country. Thereafter the two brigades to work up and down on the north of the Shal nala through the Akazai country till they met. On a junction being effected, the occupation of the whole country of the two tribes would be completed. As regards punishment, the Hasanzais who had submitted were in the event of their return to their villages to be mulcted in one-fourth of their standing crops. In other cases the troops would subsist on the country, as far as their requirements could be met, until submission took place.

5. The rain continued to fall, and from Brigadier-General Hammond's reports it soon became apparent that, owing to the unusual lateness of the season, some modification of this plan was necessary. The crops in the middle levels were scarcely above ground, and forage had to be brought up from below, even to the comparatively low level of Tilli. The continued wet rendered the clay soil almost impassable, and convoys were with difficulty brought to the front. Transport could not be subsisted in the Khan Khel country for at least a month to come. It was accordingly arranged that the 1st Brigade should occupy

the plain of Palosi and the Diliarai peninsula, where fodder was abundant, while Brigadier-General Hammond, after making a flying expedition to Seri, was to withdraw his brigade from the higher levels, and leaving posts at Ril, Tilli, Kunarai, and Makranai, and turning the obstacle of the Shal nala at its mouth, proceed to extend the line of the 1st Brigade upwards through the Akazai country. As forage became available on the higher levels, the troops would be moved up until the Khan Khel country was reached.

6. This plan was carried out. The upper line of communication from Darband through Pailam was abandoned, and all supplies were brought through Kotkai, where an advance depôt was established. Brigadier-General Williamson proceeded to occupy Kanar and the Palosi plain. The boat bridge was established at Kotkai on the 16th March, and reconnaissances were pushed out on both banks of the river. The bridge head post and the defence of the advanced depôt and communications at Kotkai were entrusted to Colonel Rivaz and the 37th (Dogra) Bengal Infantry. His dispositions were very satisfactory.

Up to the 19th March but little opposition was met with. A few shots had been fired from the right bank on the boats coming up to Towara, but a company of the Corps of Guides cleared the ground. On the morning of the 19th March the picquets of the same regiment under Lieutenant Rich, taking up fresh ground, found the village of Nadrai occupied. Fire being opened on them, the village was rushed with some loss to the enemy.

On the morning of the 19th March a most determined attack was made on the village of Ghazikot, our advanced post on the left bank held by a company (Dogras) of the 4th Sikh Infantry. The attacking force consisted principally of Hindustani fanatics, numbering over 100, assisted by tribesmen. Under cover of the darkness, the Hindustanis collected in front of the village among rocks, and charged sword in hand. They passed by an advanced picquet undeterred by its fire, and the picquet retired in good order by order of Subadar Dheru, who commanded the main body of the company holding the village. The defenders, being outnumbered, were forced back through the village, disputing every wall and street until the last house, the *masjid*, was reached. Here a stand was made until the arrival of the first reinforcement from Kanar under Lieutenant Maconchy, 4th Sikh Infantry. The whole company behaved with the greatest gallantry. Subadar Dheru, Havildar Waziru, Naik Ganesha Singh, and Lance-Naik Alam Khan have been rewarded with the Order of Merit. Jemadar Darshanu fought bravely until his sword broke and he was cut down. I now beg to bring to the notice of His Excellency the good service of Lieutenant Maconchy, who arrived on the scene at a critical moment, and was himself wounded. Colonel Sir B. P. Bromhead, *Bart.*, 32nd Bengal Infantry (Pioneers), came up shortly after with further reinforcements of his regiment. The enemy left 25 bodies on the field, and their loss amounted to at least 50. The casualties among the defenders were—4th Sikhs, 4 killed, 18 wounded; 32nd Pioneers, 3 wounded.

7. On the 19th March the village of Kanar, held and covered by picquets of the 4th Sikh Infantry and 32nd Pioneers, was attacked during the whole night from the hill above. The enemy at one time succeeded in entering the upper portion of the village, but were cleared out, and retired firing to the crest of the hills, which they occupied till daylight. Three of the 32nd Pioneers were wounded, and one follower killed and one wounded.

8. On the occupation of the Palosi plain on the 21st March, the move having been delayed by bad weather, it became apparent that the possession of the Diliarai peninsula would be disputed. This ridge fills a loop in the Indus, and forms a barrier between the Palosi plain on the south and the Kamach plain in Chagarzai territory on the north. The village of Bakrai and the heights of Diliarai were seen to be occupied, and were shelled. On the 22nd March boats were brought up from Kotkai through some bad rapids, and on the morning of the 23rd a flying bridge was established at Bakrai, at the mouth of the Shal nala. The operation was covered by the 4th Sikh Infantry under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Gaselee.

9. The Diliarai hill rises rapidly from Bakrai to a height of about 2,000 feet. During the morning the village of Diliarai was visited by Lieutenant-Colonel Gaselee, who selected positions for the picquets lower down. About 3 P.M. the enemy began to collect about the

picquets and open a desultory fire. Lieutenant R. Harman was in command of the picquets, consisting of two companies of the 4th Sikh Infantry (one Sikh and one Pathan), and, finding the enemy increasing, he decided to drive them off. This he did with great dash, ably assisted by Lieutenant F. H. Taylor (3rd Sikh Infantry, attached to the 4th Sikh Infantry), upon whom the command devolved when Lieutenant Harman was wounded by a sword cut. Towards evening the enemy became more pressing and began to collect in large numbers. Lieutenant-Colonel Gaselee had himself assumed command at the front, and a wing of the Guides Infantry under Lieutenants G. M. MacHutchin and H. W. Codrington, arrived as a reinforcement, despatched by Brigadier-General Williamson. Finding the enemy still increasing, Lieutenant-Colonel Gaselee decided to attack the heights and occupy the village of Diliarai. This was effected with complete success, the enemy being entirely cleared from the field. It should be mentioned that the action being witnessed from Palosi, a well directed fire opened on the heights just before the final advance by Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan's guns under the orders of Brigadier-General Williamson. As the fire ceased, the 4th Sikh Infantry were seen in the dusk ascending the terraces and crowning the hill on which the village is situated. The enemy, whose loss was about 30 killed and wounded, asked permission to reclaim and bury their dead. The 4th Sikh Infantry had 5 wounded. Lieutenant-Colonel Gaselee mentioned with special commendation Lieutenant Harman, 4th Sikh Infantry, Lieutenant Taylor, 3rd Sikh Infantry, and Lieutenant Codrington, Queen's Own Corps of Guides; also Subadar Lehna Singh and Jemadar Mir Hassan, 4th Sikh Infantry. He further brings to notice the conduct of Naik Abdul Ahmad, 4th Sikh Infantry, who displayed great personal gallantry in leading on his section, when he engaged in single combat with two fanatics, of whom he killed one, but was wounded by the second. Brigadier-General Williamson, in reporting the action, states:—"The affair reflects the highest credit on the soldierly ability displayed by Lieutenant-Colonel Gaselee." I beg to support this commendation, and to bring this able officer as well as the fine regiment he commands to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief.

10. In the meantime, Brigadier-General Hammond had been continuing his advance, but, owing to the rain and the badness of the track, was able to reach Tilli with a portion only of his brigade on the 13th March. During the following days the men suffered much from exposure to weather and difficulty in cooking, but work on the roads was proceeded with cheerfully, and the Brigadier-General speaks with special approval of the exertions of Lieutenants Badcock and Anderson in bringing in a large convoy when he thought the work was almost impossible. On the 21st March he was able to start for Ril, *en route* for Seri, with 700 men from the 1st Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 2-5th Gurkha Regiment, 32nd Pioneers, and Khaibar Rifles,—carrying four days' cooked rations, blankets being carried by coolies. No mules could be taken, as the track had been destroyed in several places. A few shots were fired from Abu, which was ascended and held by the 2-5th Gurkha Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Molloy and the Khaibar Rifles. The remainder of the column bivouacked at Ril. During the night a violent storm occurred, and Lieutenant-Colonel Muhammad Aslam Khan, C.I.E., was severely injured by the falling of a hut. He was obliged to return to Darband, and afterwards to Peshawar, and the force was deprived of his valuable services, much to the regret of Brigadier-General Hammond and myself. On the 22nd Seri was occupied without opposition, and on the 23rd the place was blown up and destroyed, and the column marched back to Tilli, posts being left at Ril and Makranai. On the 24th the 2nd Brigade moved by Kotkai to Palosi and Bakrai. On the morning of the 25th Brigadier-General Hammond crossed the river by the flying bridge, and ascended the Shal nala to occupy Darbanai.

11. The track up the *nala* was a most difficult one. The movement was covered by Lieutenant-Colonel Gaselee, who advanced along the ridge with a wing of the 4th Sikh Infantry, three guns of the Derajat Battery, and the Khaibar Rifles (under Lieutenant Barton, Corps of Guides). On the 2nd Brigade leaving the *nala*, about half a mile from Darbanai, the enemy opened fire from the village and the spur above. Brigadier-General Hammond disposed his force as follows:—The Khaibar Rifles to ascend the hill on the right, the Gurkhas to the left, and the Royal Welsh Fusiliers and the 11th Bengal Infantry to advance direct. The enemy left the village before it was reached, and retired down the slope of the hill towards lower Surmal, the Royal Welsh Fusiliers following

closely. Second-Lieutenant Doughty of that regiment was here severely wounded in the knee. One sepoy of the Khaibar Rifles was also wounded. The enemy's loss was about 40. The village of Darbanai stands on a small plateau, about 1,000 feet above the Indus, and commands the lower Chagarzai country and a long stretch of river, including the ferry at Surmal. No. 9 Mountain Battery made good practice on the retreating enemy. The operations of the 2nd Brigade between the 21st and 26th of March exhibit much hard work and endurance in the troops as well as skilful leading on the part of the commander, and I submit Brigadier-General Hammond's dispositions as worthy of the favourable notice of His Excellency.

12. On the 26th March a force was seen collecting at lower Surmal, and on the 27th Brigadier-General Hammond moved out to attack them, covered by the fire of Major Bowles's battery. The Khaibar Rifles ascended the hill to the right, the 2-5th Gurkhas made a closer flank movement to the right, and the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, with the 11th Bengal Infantry in reserve, had to cross a *nala* and ascend to Surmal, in and about which 400 or 500 of the enemy were collected. The Gurkhas reached the spur first, and dislodged the enemy under a very heavy fire from both Gurkhas and Fusiliers, who came up at once. The Khaibar Rifles and a company of Gurkhas had met and dislodged an equally large body of the enemy. The enemy lost severely—not less than 120 or 130—while on our side the casualties amounted only to 3 wounded. Brigadier-General Hammond speaks very highly of the conduct of the troops engaged, and observed "that no troops could have behaved more steadily or shown more eagerness to get to close quarters than the Royal Welsh Fusiliers and the 2-5th Gurkhas under Lieutenant-Colonels Norman and Molloy."

13. Up to this point it appeared that the active opposition offered to the expedition emanated from (1) the Hindustani fanatics; (2) the Chagarzai tribe and their foreign allies from the north; and (3) that portion of the Khan Khel who had followed Hashim Ali Khan. The Hasanzais as a tribe had unconditionally submitted and abstained from hostilities throughout. The Akazais had not submitted, but as a tribe had not appeared in arms. The Mada Khel, who were only indirectly concerned in the expedition as owing allegiance to Hashim Ali Khan, kept quiet and offered no opposition. But from the 22nd March it had become apparent that there was a movement of trans-Indus tribes to the Buner frontier under the direction of Mian Gul, the Akhundzada of Swat. The gathering was visible at and about Baio, a village on the watershed between Chamla and the Indus valley, and had been gradually increasing in numbers. In view of this movement, troops were moved up from Naoshera to Mardan in the Peshawar valley, but it was the desire of Government that collision with the trans-Indus tribes should be avoided. The attitude of the gathering seemed to indicate that the intention of its leaders was to watch the Buner frontier, with which country there was no intention to interfere. Negotiations were entered into with Mian Gul under the orders of superior authority, partly through me and partly through Peshawar, with the result that the Akhundzada disclaimed any intention of making war against Government, and withdrew his following. The duty of showing a front to Mian Gul's gathering fell to the Seaforth Highlanders and the Corps of Guides, and I cannot speak too highly of the admirable discipline of these two fine regiments, and of the judgment displayed by Brigadier-General Williamson in directing their movements. Simultaneously with the retirement of Mian Gul, the gatherings of armed men in the Chagarzai territory dispersed, and by the 6th April there were no hostile bodies to be seen. On the 4th April a reconnaissance was made along the right bank of the Indus round the Diliarai peninsula by Brigadier-General Williamson with portions of the Seaforth Highlanders and the Corps of Guides as far as the Chagarzai border. No opposition was met with. A few parties of the enemy were moving to the north, and were dispersed by shell fire from the Diliarai heights. The route lay between the river and the precipitous slopes of the Duma range, and was found to be quite impracticable for animals. The march occupied the whole day, and was a trying one owing to the heat.

3 guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery,
Royal Artillery.

* 3 guns of No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain
Battery (from Oghi).

* 1st Battalion, King's Royal
Rifles.

* 19th Bengal Infantry.

* 27th Bengal Infantry.

14. As soon as the movement in Buner had been ascertained, the Reserve Brigade at Rawal Pindi was mobilised, and by the 31st March the additional troops as per margin had been concentrated at Darband. On the 7th April the corps marked* were withdrawn, and marched for Kohat.

15. The two brigades had on the 25th March acquired the positions referred to in paragraph 5, and, having regard to the orders noted in paragraph 2, further instructions with respect to the attitude of the Chagarzai tribe had been solicited on the 27th March. On the 6th April orders were received to move the whole force to the left bank with the least possible delay, and proceed with the occupation of the Hasanzai and Akazai territory. The further movements of the force were accordingly directed with this view. The roads on the left bank had been pushed on, enabling the transfer of the force to be effected simultaneously in two columns,—one *via* Bakrai and the flying bridge to Ril, and the other *via* the bridge at Kotkai to Tilli. The movement was carried out on the 8th April. Before this date the road connecting Kanar with Bakrai along the precipitous slopes of the left bank, a very difficult section across the mouth of the Khappa nala, had been completed. The 15th April had been fixed as the latest date up to which it would be safe to retain the bridges in position. The river had already risen considerably, and a flood might be expected at any time. There was, however, no further occasion for them, as the trans-Indus Hasanzais were re-occupying their villages. The bridges were accordingly broken up on the date named, and the boats returned to India. Brigadier-General Hammond remained in occupation of the lower Akazai country extending from the Diliarai peninsula to Darbanai. The Bimbal plain was kept clear of the Akazais (who endeavoured to cut their crops) by the 11th Bengal Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Stead, D.S.O. This work in May was hot and trying.

16. General Williamson proceeded to occupy the Khan Khel country, and his headquarters were established at Seri on the 12th April. Forage at this elevation (6,000 feet) was still backward, but supplies were drawn from the lower level of Maira in the Shal nala. A road connecting the two brigades through Maira was taken in hand, and opened on the 17th April.

A road into the upper Akazai country was completed on the 22nd April, on which date the two Kans were occupied by the 37th Bengal Infantry. Before the end of April the whole of the upper Akazai and Khan Khel territory had been either occupied or frequently explored by parties of the Seaforth Highlanders and the Corps of Guides, and later by the 37th Bengal Infantry. Snow still lay thickly at elevations above 8,000 feet. The country was found deserted, but a few raiders hung about the heights and ravines, approaching the camps at night, and occasionally firing shots. On one occasion, watching an opportunity, a small party waylaid an insufficiently protected foraging convoy in a rocky glen near Kan, and killed one sepoy of the 37th. Colonel Rivaz had previously laid a trap for, and succeeded in killing a raider, who proved to be the son of an influential adherent of Hashim Ali Khan.

17. By the middle of April the heat in the Indus valley had become oppressive. Arrangements were accordingly made to transfer the base to Oghi, and Darband was evacuated on the 24th of April. Communication was then established across the Pabal Gali pass, and through Tilli and Ril. Pabal Gali had been occupied as soon as the state of the snow permitted by a detachment of the 28th Bengal Infantry from Oghi. The new route proved unsatisfactory owing to its length and the difficulty of the sections of road passing under and around the cliffs of Abu. Accordingly, as soon as the snow cleared, a shorter and much more convenient line was opened through Panji Gali. This route was made practicable by the 1st May and opened for regular traffic on the 7th, and the distance between Oghi and Seri was reduced from 30 to 17 miles. As this is in every respect the best line of route across the mountain from Oghi to Seri, considerable labour has been expended on the road. It is probable that in ordinary winters it could be kept clear of snow by working parties. Kain Gali remained deep in snow until May, but was occupied in April by a post of the Corps of Guides, and communication was established by this route across the mountain for the use of the mails.

18. After opening up the upper portion of the Shal glen, it remained only for the force to occupy its position until the Akazais submitted as a tribe. Representatives of the several sections made offers of surrender from time to time, but unconditional submission of the whole tribe could alone be accepted. Internal jealousies and dissensions and the influence of Hashim Ali Khan for a time prevented them from agreeing, but eventually their full *jirga* attended, and gave in the unconditional submission of the tribe. The Hasanzais had been allowed to return to their villages from the first, and had gradually taken

advantage of that permission. The Akazais were now allowed to do the same. The united *jirgas* of the two tribes were assembled on the 28th May, and subscribed to the full terms imposed by Government. The Mada Khel *jirga* attended a few days later, and subscribed to those clauses of the agreement which concerned them. A full *jirga* of the Pariari Saiads also came in, and signed an agreement to the terms applicable to them.

No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.

1st Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers.

No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

1st Battalion, 1st Gurkha Regiment.

4th Sikh Infantry.

28th Bengal Infantry at Oghi.

19. The objects of the expedition having now been accomplished, the force was reduced to the detail named in the margin, half being located on the crest and in British territory, and the other half at Seri on Hashim Ali Khan's lands.

The *jirgas* were informed that the occupation of their country was not intended to be permanent, and would continue only until Hashim Ali Khan surrendered, or until Government was satisfied that the tribes were sufficiently strong themselves to give effect to the terms of their agreement. Under instructions from head-quarters, Brigadier-General Hammond took over command of the reduced force from me on the 17th instant.

20. The conduct of the troops throughout the expedition has been admirable. All ranks have borne with equal cheerfulness exposure to wet, cold, and heat, and have worked with a will in any service they were called upon to perform. Their discipline has been exemplary. In action with the enemy they have shown themselves worthy of the traditions of the British and native armies. There was little sickness to speak of in the force either among British or native troops or among followers. I believe I am within the mark in stating that at no time did the sick state much exceed one per cent of the force in the field. Major E. R. Evans, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, died from pneumonia, and was much regretted. He was unremitting in his attention to the welfare of his men, and never spared himself.

21. A return of casualties during the above operations is attached.

22. In addition to the names specially distinguished in paragraph 9, I would now beg to bring to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the officers who in my opinion are most deserving of mention :—

Brigadier-Generals R. F. Williamson and A. G. Hammond have afforded me the most loyal support throughout. I have already referred to their services in describing the operations of their brigades, and I now commend them both to His Excellency as thoroughly trustworthy commanders. To the unceasing care and direction of Brigadier-General Williamson, a thoroughly practical soldier, I attribute in great measure the remarkable immunity from sickness and disease in that part of the force which came most under my personal observation. Brigadier-General Hammond in his detached operations exhibited an energy and resource worthy of all praise.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Keith, commanding the Royal Artillery, is an officer well experienced in mountain artillery in the field, and was specially fitted for his appointment. The service of the guns was most efficient on all occasions.

The engineering operations were most admirably conducted under the superintendence of Major W. L. Greenstreet, Commanding Royal Engineer. This officer worked most indefatigably, never sparing himself, and displayed both energy and ability. The pontoon section of the Bengal Sappers and Miners was commanded by Major P. T. Buston, Royal Engineers, and it was entirely due to this officer's indomitable energy and perseverance that the standing and flying bridges were established exactly when required. It was no light task to bring up the heavy boats from Attock through shallows and over rapids dangerous in many places, with very little loss of material and no loss of life, and his successful accomplishment of the task is worthy of all praise. The movements and communications of the force were entirely dependent on its constructive capacity in road-making. No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, did excellent service under Captain F. J. Aylmer, Royal Engineers, and Major Greenstreet

speaks highly of him. He also acknowledges the cordial co-operation of the 32nd Bengal Infantry (Pioneers). The wings worked separately under Colonel Sir B. P. Bromhead, *Bart.*, C.B., and Captain W. H. Jameson, and both did most valuable work. The Coolie Corps under Lieutenant H. C. I. Birdwood, Royal Engineers, was also of the greatest use.

The Medical Department was very efficiently supervised by Deputy Surgeon-General A. F. Bradshaw, Medical Staff, whose excellent sanitary advice was most valuable. His arrangements in regard to the dispositions of the field hospitals and the transport of the sick and wounded were also extremely good and judicious. The department throughout was most efficient.

Under the able direction of Captain H. F. Lyons-Montgomery, Chief Commissariat Officer, everything connected with the Commissariat Department was entirely satisfactory. In this department forethought and pre-arrangement are specially required. Captain Lyons-Montgomery never failed in this respect, and I had every confidence in his calculations and assurances as to supplies. The transport was supervised by Lieutenant J. W. G. Tulloch, a most valuable officer, far beyond his years in knowledge and experience, and possessed of high administrative ability. I would also beg to express my acknowledgments to Lieutenant-Colonel R. Patch, Commissary-General, Western Circle, for the readiness with which all demands on him were met.

In connection with the transport, I have to acknowledge the services of First Class Veterinary-Surgeon W. R. Hagger and his assistants. The veterinary arrangements of the force, including the lines of communication in India, were so well conducted that there was no epidemic sickness of any sort.

The postal arrangements were complete in every respect, and to Mr. W. T. Van Someren's care and attention in noting the changes in the disposition of troops the force is much indebted for the prompt delivery of their correspondence.

The Telegraph service was conducted with the greatest efficiency by Mr. R. C. Barker, C.I.E., and a very capable staff. Mr. Barker is an officer of marked ability and energy, and he succeeded in inspiring the whole department with his own good qualities. The organisation of the field telegraph now leaves little, if anything, to be desired. The incorporation of the military telegraphs with the Telegraph Department of India has been shown to work successfully in the field both as regards *matériel* and *personnel*. The rapidity with which lines were laid down behind advancing columns, over very difficult ground, and taken up when no longer required, augurs well for the successful construction of field lines in more ordinary conditions of warfare. I beg to bring Mr. Barker and his staff most prominently to notice.

The force was fortunate in having the services of Captain E. O. F. Hamilton, Royal West Surrey Regiment, Inspector of Army Signalling, whose experience was invaluable. All branches of this service worked most efficiently, and Captain Hamilton succeeded in bringing his stations into complete correspondence with the field telegraphs.

Major E. Balfe's duties as Provost-Marshal were light in respect to the administration of discipline. In the matter of sanitation, they were more arduous. I am indebted to him for acting as my Judge Advocate and legal adviser.

Captain R. A. Wahab, Royal Engineers, was able to make a finished survey on a large scale of a considerable tract of country hitherto imperfectly delineated. He is an accomplished military surveyor.

Captain W. H. Young's arrangements in charge of the treasure chest were all that could be desired.

To Mr. A. F. D. Cunningham, C.I.E., C.S., I am much indebted for his able assistance as Chief Political Officer attached to the force. His intimate knowledge of

Hazara and the frontier tribes, which he was always ready to impart, was of the greatest value, and his linguistic attainments enabled him to conduct negotiations and business generally with the tribesmen with ease and precision. I beg that His Excellency will bring his services to the favourable notice of the Government of India.

I desire to record my appreciation of the services of the officers of my immediate and personal staff.

Colonel G. R. J. Shakespear, Assistant Adjutant General, has throughout given me the most loyal and unremitting assistance. He is possessed of sound judgment, and is a thoroughly trustworthy staff officer.

Captain F. C. Carter, Northumberland Fusiliers, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, was also a most valuable assistant. He is quick and ready, never wanting in resource.

Both these officers were employed in the preliminary work of organising and despatching the force, and I am greatly indebted to them for their exertions during many months.

Captain A. H. Mason, Royal Engineers, was of great assistance as Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence in procuring information, and his previous knowledge of the country was most valuable. I would here refer to Captain (now Major) Leslie Rogers, a commanding officer of Volunteers, who was deputed by His Excellency for employment with the force. He was attached to Captain Mason, and showed great zeal in acquiring information as to the working of troops in the field. The advantage to the Volunteer Force in the widening of the experience of its officers cannot but be productive of the best results, and I beg to recommend the extension on future occasions of the privilege here accorded to one of their number.

Captain A. E. Sandbach, Royal Engineers, Aide-de-Camp, and Lieutenants H. W. Wilberforce, 2nd Dragoon Guards, and His Highness Prince Christian Victor of Schleswig-Holstein, G.C.B., King's Royal Rifles, Orderly Officers, rendered me much ready help. Captain Sandbach has already seen considerable and varied service in the field, and was specially useful. Lieutenant Wilberforce is a most promising officer in every way. Prince Christian Victor of Schleswig-Holstein was most zealous in the performance of all duties that fell to him, and takes great interest in his profession. On his battalion being ordered for service in the field elsewhere, he requested and obtained permission to rejoin it.

23. A supplementary selected list of officers brought to notice by Brigadier-Generals and heads of departments is attached.

24. Before concluding, I beg to acknowledge the obligations of the force to the Nawab of Amb. He rendered much valuable service in furnishing boats and supplies as well as guides. He accompanied the force during active operations, and was always ready to meet demands on his resources.

Supplementary selected list of officers brought to notice by Brigadier-Generals and heads of departments.

Colonel J. F. Hilton, Commanding the 2nd Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders.

Colonel V. Rivaz, Commanding the 37th (Dogra) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel E. Molloy, Commanding the 2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkha Regiment.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. Stead, D.S.O., Commanding the 11th Bengal Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. R. L. Morgan, Commanding No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. Gaselee, officiating Commandant, 4th Sikh Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. Norman, 1st Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers.

Major F. D. Battye, Commanding the Queen's Own Corps of Guides.

Lieutenant-Colonel Muhammad Aslam Khan, C.I.E., Commanding the Khaibar Rifles.
 Major F. A. Bowles, Commanding No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
 Major C. Dempster, 4th Sikh Infantry, selected to organise the base and lines of communications, which he did with marked ability.
 Captain H. B. Brownlow, Royal Artillery, Commanding No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery.
 Captain L. J. E. Braishaw, 35th Bengal Infantry, Brigade-Major, 1st Brigade.
 Captain Sir R. A. W. Colleton, *Bart.*, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, Brigade-Major, 2nd Brigade.
 Captain H. E. S. Abbott, Royal Engineers, Field Engineer, 2nd Brigade.
 Captain F. G. Bond, Royal Engineers, Field Engineer, 1st Brigade.
 Captain H. T. Lyle, D.S.O., Royal Welsh Fusiliers, Orderly Officer to the General Officer Commanding the 1st Brigade.
 Lieutenant E. W. S. K. Maconchy, 4th Sikh Infantry.
 Lieutenant F. F. Badcock, 1-5th Gurkha Regiment, Brigade Transport Officer, 2nd Brigade.
 Lieutenant C. H. Beville, Commissariat Department.
 Lieutenant F. J. H. Barton, Queen's Own Corps of Guides, Orderly Officer to the General Officer Commanding the 2nd Brigade. (Commanded the Khaibar Rifles in the actions of the 25th and 27th March).
 Lieutenant R. J. Spurrell, 3rd Dragoon Guards, Provost-Marshal, 2nd Brigade.
 Lieutenant R. Harman, 4th Sikh Infantry.
 Lieutenant F. H. Taylor, 3rd Sikh Infantry (attached to the 4th Sikh Infantry).
 Lieutenant H. W. Codrington, Queen's Own Corps of Guides (attached to the 3rd Sikh Infantry).
 Surgeon-Major W. M'Watters, Medical Staff.
 Surgeon-Major H. H. Stokes, M.B., Medical Staff.
 Surgeon-Major A. M'Gregor, Indian Medical Service.
 Surgeon-Major E. Palmer, Indian Medical Service.
 Mr. J. C. Thomas, Telegraph Department.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the Hazara Field Force, 1891.

Corps.	OFFICERS.		NATIVE OFFICERS, WARRANT AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MEN.		FOLLOWERS.		REMARKS.
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	
No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.	
No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.	
11th Bengal Lancers	
4th Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.	
1st Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers.	...	1	...	3 (a)	...	2 (b)	(a) One private died of his wounds.
2nd Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders.	(b) One died of his wounds.

Return of Killed and Wounded in the Hazara Field Force, 1891—contd.

Corps.	OFFICERS.		NATIVE OFFICERS, WARRANT AND NON- COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MEN.		FOLLOWERS.		REMARKS.
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	
11th Regiment of Bengal Infantry.	1	2	
32nd Regiment of Bengal Infantry (Pioneers).	6	
37th (Dogra) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.	2 (a)	(a) Both men died of their wounds.
The Queen's Own Corps of Guides.	
4th Sikh Infantry	2	4	22 (b)	(b) One sepoy died of his wounds.
2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkha Regiment.	2	...	2	
Khaibar Rifles	3	
Commissariat and Transport Department.	
Telegraph Department	1	...	
Coolie Corps	
TOTAL	3	5	40	1	4	

Total=6 killed and 47 wounded.

NOMINAL ROLL OF BRITISH AND NATIVE OFFICERS KILLED AND WOUNDED IN ACTION.

Killed.

Jemadar Darshanu, 4th Sikh Infantry,—at Ghazikot on the 19th March 1891.

Wounded.

Second-Lieutenant C. H. M. Doughty, 1st Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers,—severely, at Darbanai, 25th March 1891.

Lieutenant E. W. S. K. Maconchy, 4th Sikh Infantry,—slightly, at Ghazikot, 19th March 1891.

Lieutenant R. Harman, 4th Sikh Infantry,—severely, on the Diliarai heights, 23rd March 1891.

Subadar Dheru, 4th Sikh Infantry,—very slightly, at Ghazikot, on the 19th March 1891.

APPENDIX XVIII.

Return of ammunition expended during the operations of the Hazara Field Force, 1891.

ARTILLERY AMMUNITION.

			Common shell.	Shrapnel shell.
No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery	22	27
No. 9 " " " "	96	99
No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery	18	10
		TOTAL	136	136

SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION.

No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery	97
No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery	1
11th Bengal Lancers	4
1st Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers	590
2nd " Seaforth Highlanders	105
Bengal Sappers and Miners	5
11th Bengal Infantry	518
Guides Infantry	1,374
4th Sikh " "	1,995
28th Bengal Infantry	6
32nd " " (Pioneers)	35
2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkha Regiment...	5,801
37th Bengal Infantry (Dogras)	50
Khaibar Rifles	5,488
		TOTAL	...	16,069

APPENDIX XIX.

Points brought to notice by Brigadier-General R. F. Williamson, Commanding 1st Brigade, Hazara Field Force, 1891.

(1) The present iron jumpers in use with pioneer regiments should be replaced by octagonal steel ones. Proper crates and saddles in accordance with Roorkee pattern, as in use with Sappers and Miners, should be issued to pioneer regiments.

Equipment—ordnance.
Recommended elsewhere.
W. K. E.

(2) *Kukris* should be issued instead of bill-hooks.

(3) A certain proportion of spare handles should be issued to regiments for tools. The handles are perpetually breaking, and the new handles made up do not last owing to their being made of green woods, often of inferior quality, and from the neighbouring jungle.

(4) The knives supplied to batteries for cutting grass are almost useless on account of their semi-circular shape. The blades should be straight, and curved inwards at the point only, to enable the teeth on the edge to act when drawing the knife towards the body.

(5) The scale of rations for native troops on field service seems to require revision. Of late years there has been a great improvement in this respect, and the ration is more varied and liberal. It must, however, be now borne in mind that, there being no *baniahs* with the regiments, the native soldier is quite dependent on the Commissariat Department for any little luxuries which vary his main diet. *Ata* must always be the principal food of the Punjabi soldier, and it has several times been represented that men find it hard to do their work on the 1½ lbs. allowed. In the present campaign, by special sanction, this ration has been increased to 2 lbs. per man during hard work, which on active service may be said to be constant. I think it would be advisable to increase the allowance of *ata* to 2 lbs. on service. I think, moreover, that certain luxuries might be supplied for the native soldier, such as tobacco. In the present campaign the want of these was not felt owing to the base being so near at hand, but such a contingency cannot always be counted on.

Commissariat (rations, &c.)
Noticed elsewhere.
W. K. E.

(6) The rations were issued in bulk five days at a time. But nothing to protect them from the rain was supplied; consequently in the wet weather some articles, such as *ata* and *gur*, got damaged, and consequently the soldiers' rations thereby lessened. An issue of tarpaulins would remedy this.

(7) The method of computing the weight of meat ration when animals are issued alive to native troops does not give satisfaction. The allowance for offal, &c., should be nearer half than one-third of the live weight. There is no doubt that the native soldier does not get anything like the meat ration laid down for him.

(8) All waterproof sheets should not be less than 7' by 4'; many 6' by 3' were issued, and they are not large enough.

Waterproof sheets.
Noticed elsewhere.
W. K. E.

(9) One mule per company for native regiments should be allowed for carriage of cooking pots in addition to the carriage allowed, *viz.*, six kits per mule.

Transport, carriage, &c.

(10) I think also that officers should be allowed to make private arrangements for carrying their mess to the extent of three officers to one mule, and that rations for these should be sanctioned on payment.

(11) The equipment allowance of mules for pioneer regiments (32 per regiment) should consist of selected animals, and should remain with the regiments. Those that were issued to the 32nd Pioneers for the campaign were not properly broken in to carry pioneer equipment; the consequence was that several got injured by the crows and jumpers, and accidents were constantly occurring owing to the animals being frightened at the noise of the various tools on their backs. As several loads are beyond regulation weight, a superior class of mule should be given.

(12) The amount of carriage allowed for office requires consideration. It is useless to say that returns are not wanted on service; whether they are actually necessary or not, they are at all events called for, and with Boards and Courts of Enquiry very soon accumulate into a considerable load. Every post brings in Controller's circulars, General Orders, &c., besides profuse correspondence written on thick paper which has to be kept in the office. The question is one that affects corps, departments, and the staff. A battery is ordered to take two trunks of forms, &c., for a three months' supply on service; but carriage for these has been omitted in the detail of mules.

(13) Catheters and trocars should always be in possession of the Veterinary Surgeon of the brigade. The want of these instruments was much felt during this expedition.

Veterinary instruments.

(14) As no *dhobis* are allowed, and it is often most difficult for the soldiers to obtain soap, I think the Commissariat Department should be prepared to supply country soap on repayment. In the present expedition, the base being so close, commanding officers were able to make their own arrangements.

Soap.

Du's.
Noticed elsewhere.
W. K. E.

(15) The large *dulis* are quite useless in hill warfare, those made of blankets being the most suitable.

(16) Moving by sections does not work satisfactorily, and is not practicable in large convoys on narrow tracks. It is necessary to have men amongst the mules in twos to replace loads and protect

Baggage guards.

the drivers.

(17) Army book 82 is much too large for service. A smaller book, but similar, would be better.

(18) A form for trial of native soldiers by summary court-martial is required similar to the form now in use for trial of British soldiers.

(19) Field service form No. 7 is on too thick paper. Paper similar to that in use in Commissariat Department is recommended.

(20) The ammunition return is absurdly large. The information could be given on paper one-quarter the size.

Remarks by General Officer Commanding Hazara Field Force, 1891.

(2) The *kukri* is a superior implement, but the bill-hook would answer well enough if it were of good material. The bill-hook was complained of generally as of very inferior metal. Elsewhere I have reported that the leather cases for bill-hooks and axes to enable them to be carried on the person answered very well, and are generally recommended for adoption.

(6) The commissariat should have sufficient tarpaulins for this purpose.

(7) There were several complaints of this nature, and the question requires looking into.

(9) An extra mule per company is required. In many regiments the cooking pots cannot be carried on the person.

(10) The allowance of mule carriage per officer is sufficient at present, but only for short periods. Extra carriage should be given to bring up renewals from the base, but this can be done without altering the regulations.

(11) I agree.

(12) This is a suggestion worthy of note. All correspondence in the field should be on thin paper similar to that used for commissariat returns. Brigadier-General Williamson's remarks should be considered in connection with the general question of correspondence addressed to regiments in the field—see also remarks as to economy in weight of stationary in the body of Brigadier-General Williamson's despatch.

(13) Should be brought to the notice of the Principal Veterinary Surgeon.

(14) Soap is very necessary. This is a good suggestion.

(16) In hilly country, where movement is only possible on the road, sub-division of the escort is imperative; otherwise it is better they should keep in groups or sections.

(18) A shortened form of summary trial under the Indian Articles of War on thin paper would be of great advantage.

APPENDIX XX.

Report of Mr. F. D. Cunningham, C.I.E., C.S., Chief Political Officer, Hazara Field Force, 1891, addressed to Major-General W. K. Elles, C.B., dated 22nd June 1891.

I have the honour to submit the following report upon the political history and results of the late expedition to the Black Mountain :—

1. To make the account more complete and intelligible, a few words are necessary to explain the events which led to the despatch of the Hazara Field Force of 1891. Among the terms of the agreements executed by the Hasanzai and Akazai clans after the expedition of 1888 was one by which they bound themselves not to molest officials of Government or troops visiting the crest of the Black Mountain on the Agror border. One of the causes which led to that expedition was the attack made by Gujars and other dependents of these clans upon Major Battye and a company of the 1-5th Gurkhas while marching along the summit of the hill, and the object of the condition quoted was to assert our jurisdiction up to the watershed which is the boundary of British territory. After the submission of the tribes and withdrawal of the troops in the end of 1888, the Government of India took into consideration measures to secure control for the future over these clans and to give easy access to their country.

Among these the Supreme Government ordered the construction of several roads leading from Agror up to the crest of the range, and in the same despatch called for the opinion of the Local Government whether, in order to reap the full benefit of these roads, troops should not use them and visit the border periodically. After some correspondence it was resolved to send a force to make a route march in a peaceable manner on the crest of the mountain in the autumn. The reports which I had the honour to submit at the time showed that the clans especially resented the idea of the construction of the roads which the Government of India had ordered, and neglected to send in their *jirgas* when summoned. They offered to submit to the march of troops if the roads were abandoned.

It was represented as probable that Hashim Ali Khan, taking advantage of feuds in the clans and their general dislike to any measures which would bring us nearer to them, might succeed in organizing some small opposition; and it was suggested that if any opposition were offered, the officer commanding the troops should have the means, the time, and the discretion to pursue and punish the offenders on the spot.

In the month of October a force drawn from the Abbottabad garrison was ordered to march to the crest of the hill; but as necessities elsewhere required the return of the troops to join in the Attock camp of exercise, the General Officer Commanding was directed not to push forward if opposed, nor to stay on the hill, but to retire, having informed the clans they would be punished by an expedition in the spring.

In the end, Sikandar Khan, brother of Hashim Ali Khan of Seri, collected some Khan Khel Hasanzai and Akazai to oppose the march, and on the night of 23rd October a few of them came down to Barchar in Agror and fired into camp. The force was withdrawn next day, and the clans warned that their punishment was deferred till the spring.

2. Accordingly in a letter from the Military Department to the Quarter Master General in India, No. 3328 B. of 12th December 1890, the Government of India directed the despatch of an expedition "to carry out the purpose for which the movement of troops was made last October—namely, to assert our right to move along the crest of the Black Mountain without molestation, and more particularly to inflict punishment on the tribes concerned for the hostility practised on that occasion."

In a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, No. 3-F. of 2nd January 1891, paragraph 4, the aim of the Supreme Government was further explained to be the establishment "of a system of tribal management in which the co-operation and good-will of tribal chiefs would be enlisted on the side of peace and order by the grant of tribal allowances in return for service rendered."

The same letter directed that the tribes should be informed that the expedition would take place ; that Government demanded their unconditional submission ; that, if they submitted, they would be leniently treated, and that Government would be prepared to discuss with them the future management of their country.

These orders were received by me with No. 16 of 23rd January 1891 from Commissioner, Peshawar, and *parwanas* exactly repeating them were addressed * to the Hasanzai and Akazai.

* *Vide* Appendix I.

The letter of the Foreign Department last quoted called for the views of the Local Government as to manner in which the object described could best be accomplished. Upon this I had the honour to submit a full report with my No. 1-E. C. of 29th January to Commissioner, in which I ventured to represent that the only means by which to secure control of the country through the co-operation of the clansmen would be to create service for them by making a road and enlisting sufficient numbers as border police. At the same time it was suggested that control to the degree which the Government of India desired, including the levy of light land revenue, could only be secured by the assumption of complete jurisdiction backed up by occupation, amounting in fact to annexation. The views of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor were communicated in his Secretary's letter No. 91 of 16th February, and the orders of the Supreme Government as to the conditions which should be imposed on the clans were given in Foreign Secretary's No. 323-F. of 14th March, which reached us at Palosi in Hasanzai country.

These orders approved of the following conditions suggested by the Punjab Government:—

- I.—The surrender of Hashim Ali Khan.
- II.—Assistance in making or in protecting the construction of certain roads which, as above stated, the clansmen had sought to prevent by the demonstration made in October 1890.
- III.—Attendance of deputations of the tribes to accompany troops and escort officials on the border.
- IV.—Responsibility for offences by clansmen in British territory and general good behaviour.
- V.—Prohibition of settlement of the Hindustani fanatical colony in their country.

Meanwhile on your telegram No. 208, dated 23rd January, to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, asking whether "action against tribes other than Hasanzai and Akazai was contemplated," and upon a letter from the Adjutant General in India, No. 655-A. of 29th January, in which it was recommended that no preliminary communication be held with these clans and that no *jirgas* of other tribes should be summoned, the Government of India, Military Department, in their No. 46-H. of 11th February directed that some days before the advance of the force notices should be sent to "the tribes, other than the Hasanzai and Akazai, with whom we have at present no quarrel or cases to settle," to inform them that our troops would move within their limits wherever thought fit in a friendly manner, but that on the first display of hostility they would be treated as enemies.

Early in March I received from you a draft of the notice to be issued, and under your orders translations were sent to the following clans: Chagarzai, Swatis of the Thakot country, Deshis, and to the people of Pariari.† The Mada Khel were addressed in similar terms, but in consequence of their connection with the Hasanzai and Akazai, they were told in addition that they were held responsible to join in compelling the submission of Hashim Ali Khan or in any arrangement which Government might approve regarding the Khanship of Seri.‡

† *Vide* Appendix V.

‡ *Vide* Appendix VI.

In order to explain the excitement which was developed soon after and the growth of a large coalition of clans of the adjacent countries to assist the Chagarzai, whom they imagined to be menaced, it is necessary to note here that the tribes addressed included all up to Thakot on both routes.

The Hasanzai and Akazai at first in all probability did not credit the *parwanas* sent to them in January, but the gradual collection of stores at Darband and the arrival of

troops convinced them that active measures were really intended. Both clans knew their inability to oppose any force which might be sent against them, and pressed Hashim Ali Khan to submit and join them in a deputation to the authorities. The Hasanzaïs further sent back a detachment of Hindustanis who came to offer help, and told them that as they did not want to fight, they needed no assistance. While the force was concentrating at Darband, the Hasanzai sent a *jirga*, but under your orders it was not permitted to pass the border by the officer commanding on the ground that no further communication was to be held with the clans until their country had been occupied. The Mada Khels were similarly prohibited from attending at Darband.

The Hasanzai then sought the advice or intercession of Buner, partly in order that through them they might learn the terms on which peace would be accorded to them, and partly no doubt in the hope that the Bunerwals would bring pressure on Hashim Ali Khan and prevail on him to submit.

For the reason given, the Buner *maliks* were not interviewed, but before they had left Amb you directed a native official to cross the river to assure them that "Government had no quarrel with them, and no intention to interfere with them or their country." On the same day, 10th March, a Hasanzai *malik* was sent to inform his clan that "if they were desirous of submitting unconditionally, but were afraid to show submission by remaining peaceably in their villages . . . , they need have no fear; for, if they did not resist, they would not be harmed in their persons, and their villages would be protected from injury."

3. The force, consisting of about 6,300 men and 18 guns, was concentrated at Darband by the 10th March. On the 12th one column advanced by the river road and bivouacked at Towara, and the 2nd Brigade, going by Pailam, occupied Tilli. No opposition was offered; a few shots fired at the boats from across the river hardly deserve notice; the people of Tilli, *saiads* and their dependents holding their lands as 'seri' or as a grant from the clans, remained peaceably in their hamlets, and brought supplies to the troops.

The river-side villages were deserted. A few days later it was thought desirable to get the people back to their villages, and a notice was issued to them to say they had permission to return to their homes; that if they brought back their families and cattle, they would not be harmed, but a quarter of their crops would be taken.

For many weeks this remained practically a dead-letter; our troops occupied their larger villages, and constantly visited the others; fear of their women being seen, of their cattle being lost, or of themselves being mistaken for enemies, kept them out with their families crowded in small shelters, or hiding in caves and under rocks on the higher slopes of the Baio hill. Meanwhile fodder had to be got for the transport and firewood for bakeries and camp fires. The result of this was that gradually the entire wheat and barley crop of the Hasanzai country was cut as forage, and whole villages in the neighbourhood of our bivouacs had to be dismantled for firewood—a far more effectual way of destruction than burning. The punishment was severe, but salutary and deserved.

Kanar was occupied on the 14th; on the 19th a band of Hindustani fanatics attacked a picquet of the 4th Sikhs at Ghazikot by night, losing 25 men; on the 21st the River Column bivouacked at Palosi; the 2nd Brigade moved from Tilli on the 22nd and burned Seri; on the 24th Diliarai was occupied after some opposition, and Darbanai on the 26th, the enemy, who were mostly Chagarzai, Akhund Khel, Chakesaris and others from the north, being driven off with some loss.

The 1st Brigade was detained for some days (21st March to 5th April) at Palosi in consequence of a gathering of Bunerwals, Amazai, Gaduns, Chagarzai, and others at Baio on the ridge between Hasanzai and Buner country. The nature of this gathering and the causes which led to it will be noticed separately below. For sake of clearness it seems desirable to keep the thread of the story of our dealings with Hasanzai and Akazai distinct. It is sufficient to note here that Mian Gul, son of the Akhund of Swat, who was put forward by the Bunerwals and Chagarzai as their representative and spokesman, was clearly told in the letters addressed to him by you, under orders of Government, that our quarrel was with the Hasanzai and Akazai, and that British troops would remain in occupation of their country cis-Indus until the demands of Government were satisfied. No other assurance was given to him or to any one else as regards these two clans.

As for the Hasanzai, it is sufficient to say that from first to last they offered no opposition at all; a few shots were fired across the river one day at the boats; a few into camp Kanar and at Mishkot by a small gang of Hashim Ali Khan's followers and servants, who for some days roamed about the country with Sikandar Khan; and General Hammond's column advancing on Seri met with some feeble opposition from the same band, joined by some volunteers from the rabble which had meanwhile overrun the Chagarzai country.

From the outset the Hasanzai practically submitted. They sent messages asking what was expected of them, as "unconditional submission" was a phrase which they hardly understood. Their headmen being permitted to come in to Palosi, promised to accept any terms within their power which Government might impose. As a matter of fact, the final orders of Government were not known, and a formal settlement was deferred until it could be carried out with both Hasanzai and Akazai clans together.

The Akazai cannot be said to have attempted serious opposition to our advance: they sent their families to the Chagarzai, abandoned their country, and left it to us; they never really attempted to fight; a few men now and then fired at the camps; and the telegraph wire was cut twice in three months; but these were rather the acts of marauders than of an enemy at war.

We entered their country on the 24th March, when Diliarai was occupied after a fight with a horde of Chagarzai and north country tribes, who were again encountered when Darbanai was taken on the 26th but there were very few Akazai among the enemy on either day. Speaking broadly, it may be said that the clans whom we went to punish never fought at all, nor did they seek the assistance of the coalition of tribes which assembled on the Buner border and in Chagarzai limits, although some of the *lashkar* of Chakesaris, Akhund Khel, and Chagarzai, impelled by the fanaticism of *mullas*, preachers, and Hindustanis, surged over the Akazai border and met us at Diliarai, Darbanai, and again on the 27th near Surmal on the Chagarzai border, where some of our troops getting above them cut off their retreat, inflicting such heavy loss that they never showed any desire to fight again.

With all this, although not actively hostile, the submission of the Akazai was delayed by a variety of causes.

The country was not fully overrun and held till after the occupation of the Hasanzai lands had been completed. Their women and families had been sent to the Chagarzai, and while that clan were doubtful whether they would be invaded and punished or not, the Akazai could not safely get their women away, as the Chagarzai were not inclined to let the Akazai make peace till they themselves were assured against war.

Lastly, the Akazai saw their spring crops eaten up by our troops, many of their villages destroyed, some burned, some dismantled for firewood—a more complete form of destruction; but as the hot weather came on and time passed, they argued that the force would probably leave, and for a while they tried to hold out in the hope that the troops would depart while there was yet time for them to sow their autumn crops. As days passed by, one or two individual rogues from among their clan or their Gujar dependents committed some petty offences, firing into camp, and on another occasion waylaying and shooting one of two sepoy escorts mules. The Chagarzai were warned they were responsible for the refugees among them, and began then to put pressure on the Akazai to submit. At length the signs of preparations for hutting troops on the Karun spur convinced the Akazai that continued sulking would forfeit their autumn crops as well as the spring harvest already lost; that the only hope of raising their Indian-corn and rice lay in submission; and, finally, on the 23rd or 24th of May a deputation representing all four sections of the Akazai came in to Seri, accompanied by a large *jirga* of the Khan Khel and other Hasanzai sections. They offered complete and unconditional submission. They were informed that the Government pressed for the surrender of Hashim Ali Khan, and they said in reply, truly enough, that as he had run away when the expedition first advanced, and was now among the Chagarzai on the Buner border in a clan stronger than themselves, they could not capture him or force his surrender. It was then represented that it was not in the power of these clans by threat or inducement to compass this: from capture and

threat of harm he was safe ; bribes or promises of profit would have little attraction for a man who knew that surrender meant imprisonment or detention, where any boon the clans might promise would avail him nothing. Finally, orders were received sanctioning an alternative condition by which the clans bound themselves to keep Hashim Ali, his brother, uncle, and cousin for ever banished from their territories.

4. On the 29th May the united *jirgas* of the Hasanzai and Akazai clans after full Agreement made by Hasanzai and Akazai. explanation and discussion executed an agreement, of which a translation is appended (*vide* Appendix XII). This agreement will be found, I believe, to give effect to all the objects desired by Government which under the circumstances of the situation it was possible for the clans to accept or for us to realize. The surrender of Hashim Ali Khan was, and is now for the tribes, a physical impossibility : that he would run away when our troops advanced was foretold as likely in my report of 29th January, and now no one but himself can give him up.

The realization of any land revenue save under a continued military occupation would, I think, appear to all who know the clans and their country hopeless and impracticable.

The terms to which the clans bound themselves with a full understanding, and which I believe the more sensible among them honestly wish to fulfil, are briefly—

I.—The perpetual banishment of Hashim Ali Khan, Sikandar Khan, Shekh Ata Muhammad, and Turabaz Khan, and their surrender if ever they come within the power of the clans.

II.—Protection of the road along the crest of the Black Mountain upon their border while under construction.

The other roads ordered by the Government of India in their letter (Foreign Department No. 412-F. of 27th March 1890) had all been made during the past few months, and this one alone remained.

III.—The protection and preservation of roads made during the expedition within their territories.

In regard to this condition, I may note here that it bears somewhat hardly upon the clans where our roads have been carried through their terraced fields, cut with much labour out of the hill-sides. In some places, *e.g.*, near Maira, this destruction of their terraces not only takes up an appreciable amount of their little arable land, but interrupts and interferes with the irrigation of the whole. In parts more distant from Seri it is too much to expect that this condition will be carried out to the letter. To understand the value of these laboriously-made terraces, it must be remembered that there is not an acre of level ground anywhere save in two small plains by the Indus. Apart from Towara and Palosi, nine-tenths of their culturable land consists of narrow terraces built up on the hill-sides, often less in breadth than the height of the retaining walls.

IV.—Obligation to accompany troops and escort officials marching on their frontier on the Black Mountain, and engagement on notice given to escort and protect officials of Government in their country.

In regard to this condition, I may note that with the best wishes and disposition on the part of even a large majority of the clan, it is one which they will have some difficulty in fulfilling, and it should therefore be enforced warily and with due regard to time and place. The people are very democratic ; few *maliks* have any real power ; they are split up and weakened by feuds and jealousies ; if one party take steps to carry out this arrangement, the other will look about for a chance of doing anything which may discredit or injure their enemies.

V.—Prohibition of any future settlement of the Hindustani fanatics in the clans' territories.

VI.—Responsibility for offences by clansmen in British territory, reciprocity in the matter of protection of British subjects in their country, and an undertaking to refer claims for debt or damages arising out of disputes about

money or women to the Deputy Commissioner, and not to arrest British subjects in their country or detain their goods.

The latter part of this article is important, and, if it can be carried out, will remove a frequent cause of friction. But to work it properly, to enquire into, and settle the many cases which will arise, it will be necessary for the Deputy Commissioner of the district to have always the services of a Political Assistant.

VII.—Recognition of the confiscation of the estate of Hashim Ali Khan and his family, and the right of Government to make it over to any Khan Khel or to the clan on payment of rent or tribute.

VIII.—Freedom of election of the Khan of Seri (outside the four proscribed Khan Khels, Hashim Ali and his relatives) and full responsibility for his conduct.

These two terms will be further discussed below in speaking of future arrangements for the Khanship of Seri.

5. The Mada Khel had been warned to attend when the Akazai came in, but, for reasons which are not altogether clear, they did not put in an appearance at that time, excusing themselves on the ground of harvest work and visitations of locusts. Feuds among themselves, a wish to clear their character with their neighbours for not having joined the gathering at Baio, and a desire to avoid any formal admission of joint responsibility with Hasanzai and Akazai for the conduct of the Khan of Seri were probably the reasons which induced them to seek to keep aloof. A message to the Nawab of Amb reminding him significantly of his known influence with this clan appears indirectly to have had some effect upon them, and on the 2nd and 3rd June a large *jirga*, including *maliks* of their four principal villages—Manja Kot, Maira, Chorakot, and Karor—came in. They executed an agreement (*vide* Appendix XIV) in which they declared their recognition of the terms accepted by the other Isazai clans, Hasanzai and Akazai, bound themselves to assist in securing their fulfilment, and then specifically promised to abide by the following among other conditions of the Hasanzai-Akazai agreement, *viz.*—

I.—As to banishment and surrender of Hashim Ali Khan, &c.

II.—Prohibition of settlement of Hindustanis.

III.—Responsibility for offences by clansmen in British territory, and for protection of British subjects in their country; future good conduct; reference of disputes and claims against our subjects to the Deputy Commissioner.

IV.—Recognition of the confiscation of the lands of Hashim Ali Khan.

V.—Recognition of joint responsibility with Hasanzai and Akazai for the conduct of any Khan of Seri whom the three clans may elect.

It should be explained that an important point has been secured by thus tying down the Mada Khel to join in the banishment of Hashim Ali Khan and in responsibility for the conduct of any future Khan of Seri. Hitherto, while their position trans-Indus has kept them out of actual participation in raids or offences on our border, they have secretly supported Hashim Ali Khan in conduct hostile to us against the counsels and wishes of one party among the Hasanzai who desired peace.

The only absentee of any importance, Mukarrab Khan of Manja Kot, came in a few days later, and subscribed the agreement.

Soon after this, orders were received for the reduction of the Hazara Field Force, part of which was withdrawn, leaving a force of two native regiments at Seri, intended later on to occupy temporary huts built on the Karun spur, and a British regiment and a British battery at Nimal on the crest of the hill.

6. The headmen of Pariari having shown a disposition to come in and enter into friendly relations, the opportunity was taken to call them into Agror, where a deputation larger than any that had been in yet arrived some days before your return to Oghi. They were interviewed on the

12th, and, after full discussion and explanation, they executed an agreement (*vide* Appendix XV) by which they bound themselves:—

- I.—To exclude Hashim Ali and his family from their country.
- II.—To protect the construction of a road along the crest of the Mana-ka-Dana spur on their border.
- III.—To escort officials and accompany troops marching on their border; also to do their utmost to escort British officials travelling in their country, provided due notice be given.
- IV.—To responsibility for offences by their men in British territory, and to protect our subjects in their country, to be of good behaviour, to refer disputes and claims to the Deputy Commissioner, and not to arrest or detain a British subject in Pariari in satisfaction of claims against him or another.
- V.—To do all they can to secure the fulfilment of engagements made by other Black Mountain clans.
- VI.—Not to permit any settlement of Hindustanis in their country.

7. Before summing up the political results of this expedition, it is necessary to advert to the large coalition of neighbouring clans which assembled in the end of March, came into collision with us at Diliarai, Darbanai, and Surmal on one side, and on the other contented itself with a demonstration on the heights of Baio; for, although these gatherings did not prevent the successful accomplishment of the declared objects of the expedition, the widespread excitement and fanaticism aroused on this occasion, unlike anything seen in 1888, naturally delayed their fulfilment, and as a matter of border history is an event of some importance and significance.

Before the advance from Darband a *jirga* of Buner *maliks* sent for by the Hasanzai to give weight to their arguments with Hashim Ali Khan, and also probably invoked by the Chagarzai to assist in case of any advance into their country, came to the Hasanzai villages and counselled submission. They were not permitted to come to camp, but were assured by the mouth of a native official that no interference with Buner was contemplated.

From the Hasanzai the Buner *maliks* went to Didal, and in reply to the Chagarzai prayer for advice or aid said they would not interfere if the operations of Government were limited to Hasanzai and Akazai, who had justly offended the *Sarkar*.

Meanwhile, however, the efforts of Hashim Ali Khan acting on clans who misinterpreted the notices issued to them early in March to mean an advance of the army up the river Indus aroused widespread excitement and fanaticism. The Hindustanis marched south from their settlements near Biyar, Akhund Khel of Kabalgram, Saiads of the river, Yusufzai clans of Chakesar, Kana, and Ghorband, and the valleys and hills which drain into the Indus from Swat southwards, with contingents from Thakot and even Kohistan, accompanied by *mullas* and *talibs* armed with hatchets and swords, poured into Chagarzai territory; and though a large party among that clan, fearful of punishment, favoured inaction, they had to be silent for fear of being branded as *kafirs* by the mob of fanatics who practically dominated their country.

The Hindustanis pushed southward first, and suffered a rude repulse in the failure of a desperate attack on a picquet of the 4th Sikhs at Ghazikot under cover of darkness on the night of 18th—19th March, when they left 25 dead on the ground, and many more wounded and missing.

Large bodies of the northern clans and Chagarzai opposed the occupation of Diliarai on the 24th and the capture of Darbanai on the 26th, losing heavily. In an action near Surmal on the 27th March they suffered still more severely, losing over 70 killed and many wounded. So far as is known, the dead included no Akazai, and were mostly Bahlolzai, Atawisht, and other distant sections of Chagarzai, with Saiads of Biyar, Jatkul, and Basi Khel of Judba.

Meanwhile the excitement spread to Chamla and Buner. Shortly after our arrival at Palosi a few standards were planted at Baio on the Hasanzai-Buner border on the

summit of a mountain ridge overlooking the Palosi-Garhi plain. Faizi Mulla of Bajkata, with a following of *mullas* from Buner and Akhund Khel of Kuria in Chamla, was the first to come. Ere long he was followed by contingents from the Pathan sections of Buner and by Mian Gul, son of the Akhund of Swat, whom the *lashkar* put forward as their leader and spokesman. To complete the coalition at Baio, it was joined by Gaduns from the Peshawar border and Amazais. Whether Mian Gul came down from Swat in order to raise this gathering against us, or whether he came for a pilgrimage to the shrine of Pir Baba, and, finding this excitement rampant, thought best, or was compelled, to lead it, is uncertain.

This much is clear that his communications were couched in a friendly, even respectful, tone, and that as soon as he was assured by letters from the Commissioner of Peshawar and yourself that there was no intention of invading the Chagarzai country, that our quarrel was with Hasanzai and Akazai, and that our army would remain in their limits across the river (*i.e.*, cis-Indus, the letter being written from Palosi), he retired, and the gathering at Baio disappeared in a few days. A deputation of Hasanzai and Mada Khel *maliks* sent up on 6th April reported it to be deserted.

The numbers of the *lashkar* at Baio have been frequently greatly exaggerated. The following of the Bajkata *mulla* was a few hundred men. With the arrival of the Buner sections and the Amazais and others, the gathering at its height numbered perhaps 2,500 or 3,000 men. The flags seen were in excess of the armed men. What was most remarkable about it was the power which Mian Gul had to restrain them.

For days this fanatical gathering sat at Baio watching our position, but not more than one or two shots were fired, which were promptly apologised for, and the offenders punished and fined.

The question whether this clannish gathering should be attacked and driven away from Baio was one which was much discussed at the time, and will be hereafter. It is doubtful whether any good would have come of driving them away. At the time I ventured to say that, if left alone, they would clear away of themselves, and in the end this proved correct. To expel the Bunerwals by force would have been easy, but not to punish them severely. These ill-armed clansmen would have fled at our approach, and with the whole of Chamla and Buner to take refuge in on the other side of the hill, pursuit so as to make them suffer heavily would have been difficult. Meanwhile, it is almost certain that immediately our backs were turned, the whole *lashkar*, with even more flags, would have appeared on the ridge again defiant, although perhaps harmless. But to complete the action which such a collision would have rendered inevitable, it would have been necessary to undertake distinct operations against Buner by a separate expedition, to which sanction of Government was doubtful.

It is impossible, or would be inconvenient, to burden this report with detailed notes of the orders from head-quarters upon which were based your communications with Mian Gul and with the Chagarzai. The letters which passed are all recorded in the diaries which I had the honour to submit daily.*

* * * * *

Simultaneously with the disappearance of the *lashkar* from Baio, the clan gatherings in the Chagarzai country melted away. On the 12th April, under orders in telegrams No. 7-H. of 4th, No. 8-H. of the 5th, and No. 14-H. of the 6th April from the Adjutant General in India, a letter was despatched to the Chagarzai to say that in consideration of the heavy losses they had suffered, the British Government was ready to forego further punishment for their attacks on our troops, but that to effect a peaceful settlement it would be necessary for them to send in a complete *jirga*. Although the Chagarzai did not send in their *maliks*, yet later on the conduct of those sections who adjoin the Akazai border was all that could be expected or reasonably desired. To some extent their earlier hostility was forced on them by the horde of fanatical tribesmen from distant hills and valleys, who knowing less of our power than even the Chagarzai recked less of our enmity. A mob of *mullas* and *talibs* for a while dominated the country; the Hasanzai and even some Chagarzai *maliks* could not move without fear of dishonourable treatment at their hands. When these gangs cleared away, the Chagarzai, though they did not send in a *jirga*, showed their sense

* These are given in their proper places in the history of the expedition.

of their escape from punishment by doing what they could to avoid further cause of offence. The dread of incurring punishment, which Government was generous and powerful enough to forego, impelled them to keep the Akazai when with them under some control. Nothing else would account for the remarkable rarity of any attempt even by thieves or individuals to molest or worry our camps and roads and foraging parties during the time that the Akazai had deserted their country and we were in occupation, daily eating up their crops and cooking our meals with the materials of their houses.

As the expedition of 1888 aroused no such widespread coalition as that which this year witnessed, it is of some interest to consider what led to this hostile gathering.

In my first diary or memorandum on frontier news submitted to you on 13th February I mentioned that, while the Hasanzai and Akazai would probably yield without a blow, and would not be assisted by other clans if they did fight, any operations against the Chagarzai would certainly be opposed by them and the Yusafzai clans of Chakesar, and that they would in all probability receive assistance from Buner.

Unreasonable as it will appear, it is a fact that all the Yusafzai clans of the Indus valley believed that it was intended the force should march through Chagarzai and Akhund Khel territory to Thakot. Some such project was the talk of the *bazars* from Rawal Pindi to Abbottabad, and the notices despatched to these clans, including those who did not border on either Hasanzai or Akazai, warning them that troops would march within their limits, wherever thought fit, were misrepresented so as to give substance to rumours which reached the tribes. It may be said that the clans, being told we had no quarrel with them, had no reason to fear; but, whether we admit it as a reasonable fear or not, the visit of an army is dreaded for reasons borne partly of ignorance of us and partly of knowledge of themselves. Ignorance leads them to mistrust our intention; while even the peaceful party among them knows that in a democratic society like theirs it is difficult, and at times impossible, for them so to control all the loose firebrands of their neighbourhood as to ensure the absence of that "first sign of hostility" which was to lead to their being treated as enemies. Their own feuds and factions increase this hazard. A village on the river or on the probable line of march will desire peace, while a *malik* of some distant hamlet up in the mountains may not be unwilling to embroil others by firing at our camps in the neighbourhood of villages against whose headmen he has a feud. In ordinary times each section can guard its limits, but villages would probably be deserted even before a 'friendly march,' and the people have not then the same power to keep their bounds clear of enemies.

This was seen at Thakot in 1888. The history of Thakot also aided to increase the ignorant suspicions of these fanatical hillmen. For although, no doubt, there were good reasons clear to us why the "subjugation of Thakot" should have been made a "primary objective" of the expedition of 1888, yet as the people of Thakot had no communication with us for good or evil, had neither raided nor robbed upon our border, the ignorant clans around did not or would not understand what caused them to be visited; and though after its subjugation Thakot was uninjured, other villages near it had to be destroyed, and there is no doubt that Hashim Ali Khan and his friend spread rumours among the tribes between Pálosi and Thakot which made them dread the same treatment. In order to realize this, it must be remembered that these people are fanatical, ignorant, and suspicious to a degree, which those who have no personal experience will not readily conceive. Intensely jealous of their independence, they dread the visit of an army as possibly preluding subjugation and certainly involving a risk of general punishment if some misguided men fire at a camp or cut a telegraph wire. Such prejudices have, of course, no right to survive in face of a forward policy and the necessity of extending our influence beyond our border. All that seems advisable is that it should be understood that they exist in a form which makes it difficult for us in the absence of special arrangements to make friendly marches in a peaceful way among some of these clans, or to get them to co-operate for the management of their country upon lines which they dislike. When they have been well beaten, they will be more malleable, and, once annexed, they would soon make peaceable subjects. At the same time the Chagarzai have now learned a lesson from the severe losses which they and other clans beyond suffered

at Diliarai, Darbanai, and Surmal; and as our influence established now over Hasanzai and Akazai reaches their border, they will probably be more ready to cultivate friendly relations in future and to accept the inevitable condition of residence on the border of a great civilized power. Some incipient mark of this may be seen in applications received from a nephew of one of the leading Basi Khel *maliks* to bring 100 men for enlistment in the Border Police.

8. It remains to sum up briefly the results of the expedition and to offer some suggestions as to the means by which the arrangements now made under your orders can best be built up into

Results of the expedition.
permanence and stability.

The three Isazai clans—Hasanzai, Akazai, and Mada Khel—and the Saiads and Chagarzai of Pariari have entered into agreements binding themselves to the perpetual exclusion and banishment of Hashim Ali Khan and his family, to be of good behaviour, to be responsible for all offences by their clansmen in British territory, to protect our subjects in their country, to refer claims against them to the Deputy Commissioner, and to refrain from the time-honoured custom of *baramta*, by which a clansman, having a fancied claim against one British subject, seizes the person or property of any other he can lay hands on. They have also bound themselves not to permit any settlement of Hindustani fanatics in their country.

The Hasanzai, Akazai, and Pariariwals have further promised to accompany troops marching on their borders, and with due notice given to escort and arrange for the safety of officials and British subjects who may visit their country. The three Isazai clans admit their joint responsibility for the conduct of any Khan of Seri whom they may elect.

Failing the actual surrender of Hashim Ali Khan, which, as he ran away before our troops advanced, these clans could not effect, the next best arrangement which could be secured is his perpetual banishment. The agreements made by the tribes constitute a barrier which I hope will be permanent against his return. They understand that Government was disposed to insist absolutely on his surrender, and that having accepted his banishment in lieu, it would view his return with extreme displeasure. I do not think the clans concerned will risk further punishment by permitting him to come back. The orders of Government contained in Foreign Department telegram No. 741-F. of 28th May were announced to them in open *jirga* by yourself. They were told that Government had no desire to occupy their country; that if Hashim Ali Khan is given up, it (Government) is ready to withdraw the whole force at once; but that after what has occurred Government could not withdraw without any certainty that the clans are strong enough to prevent Hashim Ali Khan from returning.

The address made to the *jirga* is important, as it was probably understood by the *maliks* to mean that, if Hashim Ali Khan should surrender, Government would remove its troops from Seri, and it was understood in that sense by me because the security demanded, *viz.*, that the clans are strong enough to prevent his return, would clearly be fulfilled by his surrender followed by his detention in a British jail, where we at least are strong enough to keep him. The question is not likely to arise in the immediate future, as it does not seem probable Hashim Ali Khan will care to run into prison; but I note it here because doubts have been expressed on this point. Meanwhile, for the reason given, our troops occupy temporarily a commanding position on the Karun spur above Seri, looking to the hamlets below Abu on one side and to Kan of the Akazai on the other, while the crest of the hill is held at Nimal. This temporary occupation of a part of the Khan Khel country is the best and surest means to keep Hashim Ali Khan out and to give effect to the order confiscating his lands. It is so fatal to all hope of his return, and gives his enemy Ibrahim Khan so good a chance of strengthening his position, that it is viewed with dismay by Hashim Ali and his partisans, who voluntarily remain in exile with him. Latest reports show they are seeking to stir up Mian Gul to move on their behalf on the ground that Government has annexed the country, and that this constitutes a danger to other neighbouring clans. It may be well therefore to report here that no assurance or condition was ever made with Mian Gul or any one as to Hasanzai and Akazai. He was distinctly told (*see* letter from General Officer Commanding Hazara Field Force of 3rd April) that, while we had no desire to interfere with Buner or others, we had a quarrel with Hasanzai and Akazai

and demands against them, and that until these demands were fulfilled our troops would occupy Hasanzai and Akazai country cis-Indus. Moreover, the Hasanzai and Akazai themselves knowing this well never pretended that any peace or condition was made on their behalf by Mian Gul. They submitted unconditionally, and with the exception of Hashim Ali Khan's friends, who cannot at once fall in with Ibrahim Khan, they have accepted the temporary occupation of Seri as a necessity. During our occupation Ibrahim Khan, Khan Khel, the rival and enemy of Hashim Ali Khan, a man whose interests are certainly bound up with ours, has an opportunity of planting himself at Seri, of winning the suffrages of the clans, and of becoming Khan of the Khan Khel.

There are different opinions about the capability of this man to hold his own. One represents him as worthless. My own views were described at length in a memorandum recorded in the diary of 19th May, and are, briefly, that with a little assistance from us circumstances are so much in his favour that he should be able to establish himself firmly, and maintain himself as *Khan* after our troops are withdrawn. Left entirely to themselves, Hashim Ali Khan could doubtless soon drive him out, but the tribes are bound to keep Hashim Ali Khan in exile, and fear will probably make them fulfil their promise. Hashim Ali Khan being thus removed, there can be no question that Ibrahim Khan is the only possible candidate for the Khanship. The party of an exile must decrease while Ibrahim Khan's will grow daily. He has the support of the Nawab of Amb based on the attractions of his daughter, the last addition to the Nawab's wives, the good wishes of all Hashim Ali's enemies, and the support of all who desire peace. I recommend that we should give him 20 Enfield rifles (on sufficient security) and a sum of money, say Rs. 1,000, as a present, with the aid of which he will increase his party. It is probable that ere long we shall hear that *jirgas* of the three clans have elected him *Khan*, and when that is done I would recommend he be formally accepted by us, and that he be given a yearly allowance of Rs. 2,000, of which part should be assigned to him, part to his cousins Ghulam Kadir and Isa Khan, and part designated as tribal subsidy to keep the votes and fidelity of the *maliks* around.

Meanwhile he has been put in possession of the estate of Hashim Ali Khan and his family, and this should greatly strengthen his hands, while it works to our advantage by ensuring that not a bushel of Indian-corn or wheat or rice will find its way to Hashim Ali from the rental of his lands. We should insist as long as possible on this absolute confiscation of the lands of Hashim Ali Khan's family, both as the best means of starving him into self-surrender and as an example to deter others from imitating him. I may note that to these clansmen this is a far more severe punishment than it seems to us. Their system does not admit of perpetual exile and forfeiture of lands. The worst offence among them (murder) may be punished by temporary exile and loss of lands, but after a few years the heirs of the murdered man are expected to make peace on payment of blood-money, and, if they refuse, the murderer may come back and take his chance: to take vengeance on him after that would in itself be murder. In the memorandum on the Khanship of Seri above quoted, I suggested that a rent of Rs. 500 might be taken from Ibrahim Khan for these lands, but I am now of opinion the amount should be put at a lower figure. This is partly because our occupation and the consequent desertion of many villages in the Khan Khel country extended so late that the people will not be able to sow the land fully for autumn. In many parts, *e.g.*, at Seri, the surface of the ground trampled down by men and lines of transport animals is so hard that it cannot be ploughed up in time for sowings. Besides that, the ground marked out for the cantonment at Karun has taken up nearly all the arable lands of that village in which Ibrahim Khan had a large share. He has to make that and the shares of other Khan Khels good out of the confiscated estate of Hashim Ali Khan. On the whole, without waiving the claim of Government to levy a rent as a formal right, I would recommend that none be fixed at present: this matter can lie over without prejudice.

9. All this may be summed up by saying that the security which we have for future

Security for the future, and means of maintaining our control over these clans from India after withdrawal of our troops.

peace consists of (1) the perpetual banishment of Hashim Ali Khan enforced by the fear of punishment; (2) the establishment at Seri of a *Khan* whose interests at present and for years to come must be as ours; (3) the lesson taught to the clans by severe punishment, in which it may be reckoned that they lose

nearly Rs. 80,000 worth of crops, besides many villages totally destroyed—a lesson that punishment follows promptly and does not take 20 years to ripen; (4) the construction of roads from several points up to the Black Mountain, along the crest, and about their own country in all directions.

The question arises whether these securities will suffice to make the clans fulfil the promises for the future which they have made. In my opinion, which is offered with deference, if it is desired to acquire that large degree of control which the instructions of the Government of India in Foreign Department letter No. 3-F. of 2nd January 1891 seem to aim at, we need some further and constantly acting hold and influence over these clans. While we are established at Karun beyond the summit of the mountain, from which any village which offends can be punished without having time to remove its cattle and women, this control exists; but, in anticipation of the day when our troops will retire, it seems to me we should take one more measure—that is, the enlistment from Hasanzai, Akazai, Saiads of Pariari, and Chagarzai of a Border Police of 200 men. To be of any use as a hold over the tribes, the force must be large enough to give valuable service to enlist many *maliks'* sons; a few men are of no good. With such a force we could hold posts at Pabal Gali, Panji Gali, Selle, Karun, at Kain Gali, and other points on the crest during the summer, and at Mana-ka-Dana down to the Jal post. The cost of such a force would be about Rs. 26,797 *per annum*, and an initial grant of some Rs. 5,500 would be required to get uniform, accoutrements, furniture, &c. In an appendix* I give details of the force suggested, with which I would amalgamate the existing Border Police (30 men) in Agror; but the 200 men should be in addition. It is, of course, possible that it may be held the game is not worth the candle, and that the consolidation of our influence in this mountain region will not repay so much outlay. A final answer to that question would probably depend upon matters which are unknown to me, whether the countries between Hazara and the Indus or beyond in the direction of Gilgit are thought strategically so important that it is necessary or desirable to push our influence here as on the Khaibar and Gumal borders. There are here no highways of commerce, no trade routes. If we wish to secure the co-operation of headmen to manage their country according to our views, and somewhat against their own prejudices and desires, in the matter of submitting to visits from British officials, we must create a service for which we can pay them, and must pay liberally so as to touch many houses in many villages. If such control is wanted, a considerable Border Police is the only way that I can see by which it can be acquired. It would have to be supplemented by small allowances to the *maliks* of clans, which for Hasanzai, Akazai, and Pariariwals might come to Rs. 6,000 *per annum*. The total cost would be under Rs. 33,000 *per annum*. This may seem a large figure, but will appear less if we remember that it is little more than half of what I am told was the monthly cost of hired transport animals during the recent expedition. If it gives us increased control over the clans on our border and facilities for visiting their country peaceably, we shall probably find the benefits extending as Chagarzai and others seek similar profitable employment.

It will be understood that my recommendation is founded on the assumption that Government has determined it is desirable to acquire beyond the border in this region an influence by which we may control the clans from India and get their co-operation in managing their affairs according to our views. If this is to be done, then the expenditure proposed seems to me necessary, and the only effectual means short of annexation. But I desire to express no opinion that the ultimate benefit to the Empire will repay the outlay.

10. It only remains for me to bring to your notice the services of the political officers who with me had the honour to serve under your orders.

Notice of officers.
Mr. Turton Smith, an officer of great experience and mature judgment, acted as Political Officer to General Hammond's brigade till towards the close of operations, when his services were reclaimed by the Punjab Government. He worked with zeal and success; his information was accurate, his views sound, and his assistance always valuable.

* Not considered necessary to reprint here. The arrangements finally sanctioned by the Government of India are given on page 44.—A. H. M.

Mr. Davis (Assistant District Superintendent of Police) acted as Personal Assistant at head-quarters, and proved of great help in all matters. Mr. Renouf, C.S., Assistant Commissioner, also did good work as Assistant Political Officer with both columns, and I am greatly indebted to the assistance given by both.

Ibrahim Khan, Khan Bahadur, late Assistant District Superintendent of Police, accompanied me as Native Political Assistant. His past services are well known to the Government of India. He commenced his life in the Sher Dil Paltan before the Mutiny, rose to be a gazetted officer of police, was employed on many important missions under the Government of India—to Yarkand, at Kabul, and on the Boundary Commission. He is now retired from active employment on a pension, and came as a volunteer. His experience and knowledge of the people, his acuteness and ripe judgment, make his opinions always valuable. He was of great assistance to me in many ways, and I venture to recommend him for a handsome *khillat* from Government.

11. As the Political Department had to arrange to carry all mails from the bases at Darband and Oghi, I venture at the instance of Mr. Van Someren, Superintendent of Post Offices, to bring to your notice the excellent service done by Abdur Rahman Khan, the *tonga* proprietor. He provided a horse *dâk* to Darband from Haripur, a new *tonga* line to Khaki, and a horse *dâk* to Oghi. His arrangements on this occasion as on all others that I have seen in the past four years were excellent, and *dâks* were carried to Darband and Oghi with unfailing regularity. I venture to suggest that the title of 'Khan Bahadur' would be an appropriate reward for his services now and in past years. In connection with this subject, I venture to point out that although as political officer I arranged for carriage of all mails from the bases, taking them over there from the post office as directed in the "Field Postal Manual," experience shows (as both Mr. Van Someren and I are agreed) that this system has no advantage, while it is more costly than if the Postal Department carried mails in the field throughout. We had to supply "Political *Dâk* Agents" as required by the "Field Postal Manual," who had no work but to receive mails from a post-master and make them over to carriers—a duty which the post-masters themselves could have done equally well. Moreover, the duties of a political officer generally keep him at head-quarters of the force or of a brigade, while the Superintendent, Post Offices, can travel up and down the line. I submit that the postal officers should control and manage the *dâk*-runners throughout, the political or civil officer assisting him to find men for this service. According to the letter of the "Manual," the political officers should have carried the mails from the railway (Hasan Abdal), although the Postal Department had already old-established lines running thence to Abbottabad and to Darband and Oghi.

APPENDIX XXI.

Report on the Engineering operations, Hazara Field Force, 1891, by Major W. L. Greenstreet, Commanding Royal Engineer, dated 23rd May 1891.

The preparations for the engineering operations connected with the Black Mountain expedition of 1891 were commenced by the collection of field park stores at Darband and Oghi and the despatch from Roorkee of a small party of non-commissioned officers and sappers to look after them.

2. The chief source of supply for the field park stores was the Rawal Pindi arsenal, and every assistance was given by the ordnance officers in charge and their subordinates in promptly complying with my indents.

Such mathematical instruments as seemed likely to be required were obtained from the Mathematical Instrument Department at Calcutta.

3. The stores were sent from the arsenal to the godowns of the Executive Engineer, Military Works, and, having been packed up there under my directions, were despatched by local contractors to Darband and Oghi, so that when the force assembled at the base the field park was fully equipped with all requisite tools and stores, and the only articles of which it was subsequently found necessary to increase the supply were dynamite, gun-cotton, and detonators.

4. Dynamite is not kept in the arsenal, nor is the supply of gun-cotton retained there in stock sufficient to supply the wants of an expedition, on which much road-making in a difficult country is required.

Fortunately the North-Western Railway possessed a large stock of dynamite not far from Rawal Pindi, and the Executive Engineer, Mr. Harrington, was most obliging in permitting me to draw upon him for what I required.

5. I may remark here incidentally that dynamite for this part of India can only be obtained from Bombay, and that its carriage by rail is prohibited during the hot months of the year (April to October), and consequently it might be impossible to obtain any of this valuable explosive for a frontier expedition taking place during this period unless Government will arrange to keep a stock at one or two central positions near the frontier, whence it might be carried by carts to the base of the expedition.

Attock would be an especially suitable place for keeping such Government stores of dynamite, as the explosives could be carried by boats down the Indus to any convenient locality in rear of the frontier.

6. It was arranged by the General Officer Commanding before the troops marched that, instead of light entrenching tools, they should take full sized picks and shovels as part of their regimental equipment, as it was foreseen that the lighter class of tool would be of little use for the heavy work to be done in making roads through a difficult country.

The result of this arrangement was thoroughly satisfactory, excellent work being done by the infantry working parties with their heavy tools, whilst the latter being of the same class as those carried with the field park were easily exchanged when worn.

7. The pioneers, however, still carry only their light picks, and, notwithstanding the fact that this regiment did excellent work, I cannot help thinking that it would have been done more easily and expeditiously if the men had been provided with a heavier pick. The steel tipped iron jumpers provided from the arsenal are quite unfit for service, as they rapidly wear out. Fortunately I was able to obtain a number of steel jumpers from the Military Works Department at Attock.

8. Before the expedition commenced, the General Officer Commanding, foreseeing the importance of having men whom he could leave to improve communications in rear after the forward march of the troops, had obtained sanction to the formation of a coolie corps of 200 men, who were placed in charge of Lieutenant Birdwood, R. E. The value of this gang of men was fully shewn during the progress of the expedition.

9. The chief engineering feature of this expedition has been the bridge-of-boats over the Indus at Kotkai and the flying bridge over the same river at Bakrai.

The idea of arranging for these structures originated with Major-General Elles, C.B., who, in a telegram dated 25th January to the Quarter Master General in India, advocated the construction of a boat bridge above Darband, and asked for sanction thereto, recommending that the bridging section of the Bengal Sappers and Miners should be sent from Roorkee in charge of Major Buston, R.E., to take the requisite tools and bridging materials up the Indus from Attock, and to construct the bridge in such a position above Darband as might be found suitable.

10. The requisite sanction having been given, Major Buston with the bridging section passed through Rawal Pindi on the 10th February, and having obtained his orders from Major-General Elles, C.B., proceeded to Attock, and at once set to work to collect the materials for the bridge and to take them up the river.

The accompanying report by Major Buston (*vide* Appendix XXII) describes his procedure in detail, and gives some idea of the difficulties which he had to encounter in towing the heavy boats required for bridging purposes, heavily laden as they necessarily were with bridging materials, up a river, rapid and shallow and cut up into numerous streams, separated from each other by banks of sand and rock.

11. It was only by dint of great energy and determination, which cannot be too highly praised, that Major Buston succeeded in his task; and whilst remarking on these qualities as exhibited by Major Buston himself, it is right also to remember that they were displayed only less conspicuously by the non-commissioned officers, sappers and miners, and Attock boatmen who accompanied him, and who by their patient labour made his task possible.

12. On the 16th March, or just a month after the boats left Attock, the bridge was opened for traffic above Kotkai, and was at once brought into constant use, troops and stores passing frequently over it for several weeks whilst the River Column remained at Palosi.

13. The bridge, when completed, consisted of seven country boats and one Government boat securely anchored and connected by a strong iron chain running from bow to bow, and fixed to the rocky bank on each side. The spaces between the boats were spanned by strong trussed beams 30' x 7" x 7" supporting 2" chesses covered over with brushwood, sand, and grass to form the roadway.

At the point where the river was bridged it was 105 yards wide.

14. In addition to the fixed boat bridge at Kotkai, the General Officer Commanding also directed Major Buston to construct a flying bridge about 2 miles higher up the river at Bakrai. This bridge also was a complete success, and greatly facilitated the conveyance of stores to the 2nd Column at Darbanai and Diliarai.

15. There can be no doubt that these bridges were of great use in contributing to the success of the expedition, not only on account of their actual utility in facilitating the movement of troops and supplies from one side to another of the Indus, but also from their moral effect on the tribes, who must have seen with dismay the apparent facility with which the two banks of the river were linked together, and with which large convoys of stores were passed over from bank to bank.

16. Although the bridges were the most striking engineering feature of this expedition, the road-making was a not less important one, as from the nature of the country it is impossible for troops and their *impedimenta* to move through it in any direction until roads have been prepared for their advance.

17. It might, indeed, have been supposed, and I myself expected to find it the case, that the expedition of 1891, coming less than 2½ years after that of 1888, would find the roads made by the latter all ready to hand, and requiring little work to make them suitable for mule traffic.

But for some reason or other this was very far from being the case. Whether it is that severe rain (or in the higher regions the snow) has destroyed the roads made in 1888, or whether they have been injured by the tribes, or whether many of them were less completely finished than I had supposed from the report to be the case, little has been found

of them by the present expedition beyond occasional traces here and there of narrow paths which differ but little from the village tracks which lead from one hamlet to another along the mountain slopes.

18. Possibly some future expedition may have equal difficulty in finding the roads which have been made in 1891. In some places they may be destroyed by the stones which rush down the mountain slopes. In some they may be converted by an industrious population into fields already terraced to their hand, and in others the snow pressing down the the lower edge, and filling the upper with *debris* from the hills above, may gradually destroy the road, and even in the end obliterate the very track.

However this may be in the future, there can be no question that on the present occasion but little has been found of the roads made in 1888, and the work has practically required to be done again.

19. The work of road making which was begun towards the end of February is detailed in diary form in the accompanying reports of Captain Abbott, R.E., and Captain Bond, R.E., Field Engineers to the 2nd and 1st Columns respectively.* Previous to the advance of the force the roads were pushed on from the camp at Darband to the frontier in two directions—*viz.*, for the 1st Brigade along the valley of the Indus, and for the advance of the 2nd Brigade up the spurs of the Black Mountain below Tilli.

20. These roads were open for mule traffic—the former as far as Bela, the latter beyond Phaldar—before the advance of the column on the 12th March. The river road was subsequently opened out as a camel road, and extended as such as far as Palosi, crossing the Indus by the boat bridge at Kotkai. It was also continued on the left bank of the river to Kanar and Ghazikot, and on the 16th March a road was commenced from Kanar to reach Tilli *via* Kunarai so as to open up a good communication between the Tilli and River Columns. This work was done by the head-quarter wing of the Pioneers and the 4th Company, Sappers and Miners, working upwards from Kanar, and by the right wing of the Pioneers and Coolie Corps working downwards from Tilli. This road was reported fit for mules on the 18th March, and, after having been widened to about 6 feet, it remained the main line of communication by which supplies were sent on mules to the troops in the hills during the time that the base remained at Darband.

21. For although the road from Darband to Pailam had been continued by the 2nd Column as far as Tilli, it was never a satisfactory line for the passage of convoys, being cut partly out of rock and partly out of heavy clay, and having steep and difficult gradients. It had been hurriedly made for the advance of the 2nd Column on their march from Darband to Tilli, and there was no time to improve it afterwards sufficiently to make it a good line of communication.

22. On the 24th March the greater part of the 2nd Brigade moved by the Tilli-Kanar-Kotkai road to Palosi, and on the following day crossed the Indus from the right bank near Palosi to the left bank at Bakrai, making use of the flying bridge at that point which had just been completed by Major Buston. They then marched on Darbanai, the stronghold of the Akazais, which was taken and occupied.

23. On this occasion Captain Aylmer, Commanding 4th Company, Sappers and Miners, received orders to advance with his company immediately in rear of the column, and to make the road passable for the mules from Bakrai to Darbanai as soon as possible; and it speaks highly for the energy of that officer and the working capabilities of his men that they opened out so good a track before nightfall that the whole of the mules of the advancing column reached the bivouac at Darbanai shortly after sunset.

The road to Darbanai, which ran along the right bank of the Shal nala as far as Ledh, and then was carried by zigzags up the spur to the south of that village, was subsequently improved and widened to 6 feet by the sappers and coolie corps, and remained for some time the main line of communication for the 2nd Brigade.

24. Before, however, stores could reach Darbanai by this route, they were required to cross the river twice, *viz.*, at Kotkai from the left to the right bank, and at Bakrai from the right to the left bank—an arrangement which it might be very difficult to retain as soon as

* These have not been reprinted here.

the heavy floods began to pass down the Indus. The General Officer Commanding accordingly directed the Commanding Royal Engineer to endeavour to find a line by which the road along the left bank of the river could be continued from Kanar and Ghazikot to Bakrai.

The idea of constructing this road had been relinquished for a time in consequence of the difficulties caused by the steepness of the rocky cliffs overhanging the Indus and Shal nala as well as the narrow gorge of the Khappa nala which required to be crossed.

25. The necessity, however, for having a continuous road on the left bank of the river from the base at Darband to the strategically important village of Darbanai was so imperative that it was felt that no labour should be spared in seeking for a practicable line for a suitable mule road in continuation of that from Darband to Kanar.

Fortunately, after some days of careful investigation, the Commanding Royal Engineer was able to report that a road was practicable from Kanar passing through Ghazikot; thence above the high, steep cliffs overhanging the Indus; then up the narrow and precipitous gorge of the Khappa nala, and back over the cliffs which overlook the Shal nala opposite Bakrai. It was foreseen that the expenditure of much time and explosives would be required for the construction of this road, but its importance was so clear that the General Officer Commanding ordered it to be commenced, and it was accordingly made, the Sappers, the head-quarters wing of the Pioneers, and the Coolie Corps being employed in its construction at one time or another.

When finished early in April, it was from 5 to 6 feet wide, and in many places more, and proved to be a good and satisfactory mule road. The Shal nala was crossed by a wooden bridge below Dadam, from which point a junction was made with the existing road from Bakrai to Darbanai.

25. Up to this time the only communication between the river road and the tracks connecting the villages on the upper slopes of the Black Mountain were the road mentioned in paragraph 20 from Kanar to Tilli *via* Kunarai and a steep zigzag path which had been made by the pioneers from Kanar to Makranai, and which, though used occasionally for laden mules ascending the hill, had only been intended, and was only fit, by reason of the steepness of its gradients, for unladen animals.

27. In order that an additional communication between the upper and lower series of roads might be available, the General Officer Commanding directed the construction of a road running up the spur to the left of the Khappa nala to connect the Kanar-Bakrai road with Makranai, and thence with Ril.

A zigzag mule road with easy gradients was consequently laid out by the Commanding Royal Engineer and constructed by the Sappers and Coolie Corps up the spur on the left bank of the Khappa nala, and was joined on to a road previously made by the right wing of the Pioneers from the top of the spur to Makranai, and thence to Ril.

28. This road was completed on the 8th April, on which day the divisional headquarters and Guides marched by it from Palosi to Ril.

On the same date the Seaforth Highlanders, with the rest of the 1st Brigade not employed on outpost duty, marched across the Kotkai bridge *via* Kanar and Kunarai to Tilli, and the right bank of the Indus was shortly after abandoned, the bridge broken up, and the boats and superstructure returned to Attock.

29. The road previously made from Tilli to Ril by the 2nd Brigade was now improved; that from Ril to Kungar under the west cliff of Mount Abu had already been made a good mule road some 6 feet wide by the hard work of the right wing of the Pioneers under Captain Jameson.

30. In order to complete the communication to the chief village of the Khan Khel section of the Hasanzais, the General Officer Commanding on arriving at Ril gave orders that a good mule road should be made from Kungar to Seri, and the work was accordingly carried out by the 4th Company, Sappers and Miners, and the right wing of the Pioneers, a 6 feet mule road being made throughout and portions being subsequently widened to 8 feet.

31. It had been foreseen that in consequence of the great heat of Darband and the Indus Valley, it would be necessary, if the campaign were carried on into the summer, to

change the base from Darband to Oghi, and to relinquish altogether during the summer months the river line of communication. It therefore became necessary to find some other means of reaching Darbanai than by the river route, and the General Officer Commanding had accordingly, before leaving Palosi, caused reconnaissances to be made with the view of finding a line for a road by which Darbanai could be reached from the Ril-Seri road, and thus be put into communication with the new base after the river line through Kanar and Bakrai had been done away with.

32. It was ascertained by these reconnaissances that a road could be made from Darbanai running high up along the right bank of the Shal nala *viâ* Surmal and China, and crossing the Shal nala opposite Maira, and that it could be continued to Seri through Maira and Banj.

The head-quarter wing of the Pioneers and the Coolie Corps were accordingly set to work to make this road on the Darbanai side of the Shal nala under the direction of Captain Abbott, R.E., Field Engineer; the right wing of the Pioneers and the Sappers being employed on the portion between Seri and Maira.

This road was opened for traffic on the 17th April, and that *viâ* Kotkai, Kanar, and Bakrai was abandoned.

33. Meanwhile, in order to render possible the change of base from Darband to Oghi and to open up communications with the Black Mountain generally, a provincial road had been made from Oghi to Pabal Gali, and thence a military road for mule traffic had, by desire of the General Officer Commanding, been constructed by Captain MacLagan, R. E., Assistant Engineer, Public Works Department, from Pabal Gali to Tilli.

Hence on the change of base to Oghi, the Oghi-Pabal Gali-Tilli-Ril-Kungar-Seri road became the main road for convoys, the distance traversed being more than 30 miles from Oghi to Seri, places which stand only $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles apart as the crow flies.

34. It had been the intention of the General Officer Commanding to abandon this line for that which leads from Oghi up the Sambalbut spur to Kain Gali, and thence by Akhund Baba to Seri; but it was found that, owing to the lateness and severity of the previous winter, the slopes of Akhund Baba as low down as Kaima were covered with snow varying from 4 feet to 10 feet thick on the 13th April, when the divisional head-quarters arrived at Seri, and that there was little chance of the snow clearing away within a month or six weeks sufficiently to admit of a road being made over Akhund Baba or under its crest. Consequently on the Commanding Royal Engineer reporting that a road could be made from Seri *viâ* Panji Gali to strike the Oghi-Pabal Gali road at Bandi, the General Officer Commanding having ascertained that the Punjab Government were unwilling to make that portion of the road which would lie in British territory, *viz.*, the part between Panji Gali and Bandi, obtained sanction to make it by military labour. The work was accordingly carried out by the Coolie Corps working upwards from Bandi and by both wings of the Pioneers working from Seri to Panji Gali and for 2 miles downwards from the crest of the mountain towards Bandi.

35. This road, which brought Seri to within 17 miles of its base at Oghi, was made a good mule road from 7 feet to 8 feet wide, and was opened for occasional traffic on the 1st May and for convoys on the 7th.

The total length of this road is only 17 miles (Seri to Panji Gali, $4\frac{1}{4}$; Panji Gali to Bandi, $4\frac{1}{4}$; Bandi to Oghi, 8 miles); and as it crosses the Black Mountain at a level of 7,250 feet, or nearly 2,000 feet lower than Akhund Baba (9,150'), it has considerable advantages over the Kain Gali-Akhund Baba route both in being clear of snow earlier in the year, and therefore open for a longer time, and in being easier for baggage animals in consequence of the less height to be ascended.

36. The foregoing paragraphs describe the chief roads which have been constructed through the country of the Hasanzaïs and the Akazais, but minor roads have also been made, and are described in the reports by Captains Abbott and Bond, Field Engineers, and in the detailed statement of roads prepared by Captain Bond and the tabular statement made by me and attached to this report.

37. There being no towers or other fortified places in the country, the demolition of such structures, which frequently forms a principal feature of the engineering work of other frontier expeditions, has been absent from this one.

38. During the progress of the expedition about 1,900 lbs. of gunpowder, 1,800 lbs. of dynamite, and 1,400 lbs. of gun-cotton have been expended in making the 130 miles of road which are shewn in detail in the annexed tabular statement.

39. The roads generally have been found satisfactory for mule traffic when completed, and I believe that comparatively few accidents have occurred to the animals throughout the campaign—a result which, though due in a great measure to the excellent arrangements of the transport officers, may also be in considerable part attributed to the careful supervision and labour bestowed upon the roads.

40. The work has been ably superintended by the Field Engineers Captains Abbott and Bond, assisted by Lieutenants Rose and LeBreton Simmons, Assistant Field Engineers, and has been carried out by military labour supplemented by the Coolie Corps of 200 men under Lieutenant Birdwood, R.E.

Good work has been done by working parties of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers and 4th Sikhs and other regiments,—as, for instance, the Seaforth Highlanders and 37th Dogras, who were at all times ready to give assistance when called upon; but, of course, the brunt of the work has fallen upon the 4th Company, Sappers and Miners, and the 32nd Pioneers, and I cannot close this portion of my report without bringing to your notice the energy and zeal of Captain Aylmer and his officers and the excellent work done by his company of Sikhs and Pathans, and without alluding to the hearty co-operation which I have received throughout this expedition from Colonel Sir B. Bromhead, Commanding the 32nd Pioneers, and the officers of his regiment, the right wing of which under Captain Jameson (and for part of the time Captain Brander) worked as a separate unit from the head-quarter wing.

The work of both wings of the Pioneers has been excellent throughout, the men labouring willingly and heartily under the careful supervision of their officers.

41. Lieutenant Birdwood, R. E., deserves all praise for the good work done by his coolies. He had the difficult task of keeping together and getting good work out of a heterogeneous gang of men without discipline and frequently in a state of discontent, and in this he has been thoroughly successful.

In my opinion, so long as troops remain on the Black Mountain, the Coolie Corps, or, at any rate, a portion of it, should be kept up, as constant repairs to the roads will be necessary during the rains and after the heavy storms which appear to be frequent throughout the year in this mountainous country.

42. In carrying out my duties, I have had the advantage of the assistance of the following excellent staff of officers, who have throughout been actuated by the spirit of willing zeal in the performance of their duties :—

Captain H. E. S. Abbott, R. E. }
Captain F. G. Bond, R. E. } Field Engineers.

Lieutenant C. S. Rose, R. E. }
Lieutenant G. F. H. LeBreton Simmons, R. E. } Assistant Field Engineers.

also

Major P. T. Buston, R. E., on special duty in connection with the bridges over the Indus.

Lieutenant H. C. I. Birdwood, R. E., in charge of the Coolie Corps.

Of Major Buston's work I have already made mention. I would further now venture to invite your special attention to the excellent work done by Captain Abbott, who as the senior Field Engineer with the force was generally in a position of responsibility at a distance from myself, and by Captain Bond, who, in addition to performing with ability and zeal his duties as Field Engineer with the 1st Brigade, gave me great assistance in looking after the field park.

The services of these officers and of Captain Aylmer are specially brought to your notice.

* * * * *

I append notes on certain points in connection with the roads in the Black Mountain, which, if added here, would render the body of this report inconveniently lengthy.

Remarks of the General Officer Commanding Hazara Field Force, 1891.

The efficiency of the engineering staff has been conspicuous.

Every officer of Royal Engineer employed in the force has done good service, and Captain MacLagan, R.E., although not attached to the force, should be included among those who have done good service. The provincial roads constructed by him were indispensable to the force. He worked as if he belonged to the force.

Captain Aylmer's company of Sappers and Miners, composed of Sikhs and Pathans, worked most admirably.

Addendum to the above report by Major W. L. Greenstreet.

Note 1.—The following remarks may be worth recording in connection with making roads for the use of pack animals (not including camels) in a mountainous country.

I.—For ordinary mule traffic a slope of $\frac{1}{6}$ seems to be most suitable; an easier slope than this, if a considerable height has to be attained, is probably wasteful of time and labour of both in the making and of the former in the using.

A gradient of $\frac{1}{8}$ answers well, and appears to be ascended by loaded mules without difficulty, though with very long ascents it tells upon them more than the easier slope.

For *short* lengths gradients of $\frac{1}{4}$, or even of $\frac{1}{3}$, seem to offer no great difficulty to the animals, but such steep slopes should only be used when it is necessary to avoid some severe rockwork in rapid road-making, and they should not extend for more than a few yards at a time.

II.—Such steep slopes are very difficult to keep in repair, as they wear to pieces under the feet of the mules and are rapidly destroyed by rain. If they are unavoidable, it is frequently better to make solid stone steps, which, if the stones are not too smooth, appear to be easily mounted by loaded animals.

III.—When slopes are necessarily steep, additional width should be given, as the mules are more likely to come into contact with the back cutting and fall over the *khad* when struggling up a steep slope than when on easy gradients.

IV.—Roads should only be left dangerously narrow or steep when from military considerations time is not available to make them safe, as the price of one mule at Rs. 200 or 300 would pay for many coolies or other workmen improving the road on 2 annas to 6 annas a day.

V.—As regards width of road-way, mules travel quite safely on a path which gives them but a narrow footway, provided there is sufficient width where the load comes. The worst loads are probably the water-proof sheets and bedding of native regiments, which frequently occupy great lateral space and readily catch against projecting rocks and bushes. Such a load will sometimes extend 2' 6" beyond the saddle, or 3' 6" from the centre of the mule. If, then, the animal walks a foot from the outer edge of the path—his usual position—the road excavation should have a width of at least 4' 6" on a level with the animal's body, though the pathway itself may be much narrower.

VI.—The climate of the Black Mountain appears to be very damp, and every few days there are heavy storms of rain. A road for continuous use by convoys cannot therefore be made and left to take care of itself, but having been rapidly opened for the passage of troops should be improved, drained, and kept in repair by parties of coolies retained for the purpose.

Note 2.—Routes in the Black Mountain. I make the following notes about the routes which may be adopted for any future expedition into the Black Mountain should such become unfortunately necessary hereafter.

There are now two main roads through the country, *viz* :—

- (i) (a) The river road running from Darband *via* Bela, Kotkai, Kanar, Ghazikot, and Bakrai to Darbanai; and (b) the Seri road from Oghi to Bandi, and thence to Panji Gali, Seri, Maira, China, Surmal, and Darbanai.
- (ii) The former of these will probably remain in existence for several years, and will be easily opened out for military traffic when required hereafter.
- (iii) The latter road, as far at least as Seri, will probably not be allowed to fall into disrepair, but beyond Seri to Maira it will doubtless be ploughed up and cultivated at least below Banj; but there will be no difficulty in re-opening it whenever required. The portion beyond Maira, which lies between China and Surmal, is not unlikely to be destroyed in heavy rain, as the path is made along the side of a steep hill formed of disintegrated rock of a kind very liable to landslips.
- (iv) The best line of communication between these upper and lower roads is that from Seri to Kungar, Ril, Makranai, and Bakrai, which, if necessary, might be supplemented by making a road from Kungar to Ashkot, Naranj, and Makranai, a fairly easy line to construct.
- (v) If it be required to reach the river from the base at Oghi, the better line would be afforded by the Oghi, Pabal Gali, Kunarai, and Kanar route.
- (vi) The road between Tilli and Ril would require complete re-alignment and the expenditure of much time and labour before it could be made a satisfactory line of communication in all weathers. The same remark applies to the road from Pailam to Tilli.
- (vii) In view of the risk to the present China-Surmali road from landslips mentioned above, it may be necessary to find some other line of approach to Darbanai, and this might be done by carrying the road up the Peza spur from Darbanai, and, after passing through the several hamlets on the crest above Surmal and the Surmal-China road, to bring the road down to meet the existing road at the upper China neck.* This road might also perhaps be connected with Kan, an arrangement whereby the Akazai country would be the more thoroughly opened up.

Tabular statement of roads made during the expedition.

Name and position of road.	Description of road.	Length in miles.	Remarks.
Darband road from Darband village to camp (Chauni).	An <i>ekka</i> road	3 miles.	Continuation of provincial road from Haripur to Darband village; largely used for camels, <i>ekkas</i> , and mules.
Road to Gar from Darband camp.	Camel road	3 "	Made across fields and scrub jungle to connect camp with Oghi-Darband road. Being made through fields, this road will disappear after troops leave.
Towara road from Darband to Towara.	A camel road made above high water level on the left bank of the Indus by cutting through the cliffs where necessary passes by Bela and Shingri.	9 "	Much of the 1888 road could not be found. Apparently it was below high water level, and was washed away.
	Carried forward	15 miles.	

* *N. B.*—Since this was written, a road has been opened up from the hill above Darbanai to Peza, and thence to the upper China spur. It was made just before the force crossed the Shal nala on vacating the Akazai country.

Name and position of road.	Description of road.	Length in miles.	Remarks.
	Brought forward ...	15 miles.	
Kotkai road from Towara through Kotkai to the boat bridge above Kotkai.	A camel road used by large convoys for about three weeks.	2 "	
Palosi road from Kotkai bridge to Palosi on right bank of river.	A camel road largely used by convoys for about three weeks.	3 "	
Baio road from Palosi to within half a mile of Baio.	A rough mule track ...	5 "	The upper portion of the road was made by working parties under Captain Bond, R.E., under fire.
Kanar road from bridge left bank to Kanar.	A good mule road carried above left bank of river and through sides of cliff.	1½ "	
Bakrai road from Kanar through Ghazikot, and across the Khappa nala and Shal nala to Bakrai.	A good mule road, many parts made by blasting through the cliffs above the Indus and Khappa nala.	4 "	Road from 6 to 7 feet wide.
Darbanai road from Palosi across Indus by flying bridge, and by Bakrai to Darbanai.	A good mule road, largely used by convoys.	5 "	Made along right bank of Shal nala. At Lashora village the road goes for about 200 yards along the bed of the <i>nala</i> through small boulders. From Ledh there is a stiff climb up to Darbanai.
Diliarai road from Bakrai to Diliarai, and thence to Darbanai.	A fair mule track ...	Diliarai to Bakrai, 1 mile; ditto to Darbanai, 3 miles.	Bakrai to Diliarai very steep. Diliarai to Darbanai good mule road, and likely to remain so.
Kunarai road from Kanar to Kunarai, and thence to Tilli.	A good mule road, largely used by convoys.	7 miles.	The last mile into Tilli through fields will disappear.
Makranai road from Bakrai to Makranai.	A fair mule road rising 2,300 feet chiefly by zigzagging up the spur above Khappa nala.	3 "	
Kanar-Makranai road ...	A steep road, used occasionally by loaded mules.	2½ "	
Makranai-Ril road ...	A good mule road...	1½ "	
Pailam road from Darband camp to Pailam <i>via</i> Phaldar.	Ditto ...	12 "	
Phaldar road. Alternative route from Darband to Phaldar <i>via</i> Biradar.	Ditto ...	7 "	<i>Via</i> Ambhoi and Maira. Up to Ambhoi <i>via</i> right bank of Unhar stream.
Tilli road from Pailam to Tilli.	A mule road, but difficult and not much used.	5 "	Difficult from Pailam up to crest of ridge. Steep ascent through granite rocks; thence easy for 1½ miles. Then very steep and difficult descent to Tilli, which portion is not likely to last long after repairs cease.
Chamb road from Bela to Phaldar.	A bridle path, steep in places	Should be realigned if to be much used.
Ril road from Tilli to Ril ...	A mule road largely used, but steep and difficult in places.	5 miles.	
Kungar road from Ril to Kungar.	A very good mule road; much of it blasted out of the rock.	2½ "	
Seri road from Kungar to Seri <i>via</i> Karun.	A good mule road ...	4 "	The portion from Seri to Selle widened out to from 8 to 10 feet.
	Carried over ...	78 miles.	

Name and position of road.	Description of road.	Length in miles.	Remarks.
	Brought forward ...	78 miles.	
Maira road from Darbanai to Seri <i>via</i> Surmal, China, and Maira.	A good mule road, much used by convoys.	10 "	Darbanai to Maira 6 miles. There will probably be big landslips between Maira and Darbanai during monsoon rains.
Kan road from Seri to Kan across the Shal nala, which is bridged.	A fair mule road, steep in places.	3½ "	
Bandi road from Seri to Bandi <i>via</i> Panji Gali.	A good mule road about 8 feet wide.	9 "	This road brings Seri to within 17 miles of Oghi, and is the most convenient line for crossing the ridge of the Black Mountain.
Kain Gali road from Seri to Kain Gali over Akhund Baba.	A fair mule track much used ...	3½ "	The portion of this road near Seri as far as Kaima is about 8 feet wide.
Abu Kotal road from the lower plateau of Panji Gali to Abu Kotal.	A mule track ...	1 mile.	
Water road at Panji Gali ...	A good mule road	1 "	
Palware Sar road from Kan to the peak 8,160' (Palware Sar).	A fairly good mule road	4 miles.	
Peza road from hill above Darbanai to Peza, and thence to China Kotal.	Ditto	4½ "	Some of the gradients rather steep, but there was no time to improve them before leaving the Akazai country.
Panji Gali crest road from Panji Gali to Akhund Baba.	A rough mule track	2 "	
Seri cantonment roads. Roads of inter-communication in the cantonment.	1½ "	
Roads at Nimal	1 mile.	
	Total ...	130 miles.	

APPENDIX XXII.

Report on Bridging operations, Hazara Field Force, 1891, by Major P. T. Buston, R.E.

The pontoon section of the Bengal Sappers and Miners, strength as under :—

One British officer,	Two British non-commissioned officers,
Two native officers,	Seventy non-commissioned officers and sappers,

left Roorkee on 9th February, and went straight through to Rawal Pindi. At Pindi orders were received regarding the bridge to be constructed over the Indus from Major-General Elles through Major Greenstreet, and on the 11th the detachment arrived at Khairabad.

As I found that no arrangements had been made for boats or superstructure, I left the detachment with orders to camp there and proceeded myself to Peshawar. On the 12th I had an interview with Mr. Barratt, the Provincial Works Engineer, and on the 13th he accompanied me to Naoshera and pointed out what stores he could let me have out of those belonging to the Naoshera boat bridge. I found that there was a sufficiency of superstructure in addition to that which I already possessed, and which belongs to the temporary boat bridge at Attock. On enquiry I found that I could get Government boats from Kushalgarh, but they told me that they would take six or seven days to bring from Kushalgarh to Attock; and I was further informed that it would take from 10 to 12 days to tow empty boats from Attock to Torbela, and four or five days from there to Darband—*i. e.*, in all about three weeks for empty boats from Kushalgarh to Darband. I knew that the then orders were for the force to assemble at Darband on 1st March, or in a fortnight; further, the times given above were for empty boats; the time for laden boats, the boatmen stated, they knew nothing about, as laden boats were not in the habit of going up the Indus; neither in their opinion was it feasible to take them up. Taking also into consideration that the Government boats draw more water than the country boats, and that one of the chief difficulties about getting boats up as far as Torbela was said to be the shallowness of the water, and seeing that it would be a great saving of time, as I could get country boats on the spot, I therefore decided to take country boats, supplemented by two Government boats and one rowing boat which Mr. Barratt kindly furnished me from the Naoshera bridge. Thanks to the prompt assistance rendered by Mr. Merk, the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar district, by the evening of 15th February I had collected at Khairabad ten country boats, mostly boats said to be capable of taking a cargo of from 300 to 400 maunds.

On 16th February I started all the boats, most of them having been loaded up the previous day; six of the boats I got off in the morning, and they managed to get about two miles up the river till they came to a bad rapid in front of the Attock fort. Here one of the Government boats ran on to a rock, and had to be left behind to be repaired. The 17th February was devoted to getting the remaining boats up the rapid mentioned above; but, though we worked till dusk, three boats had still to be got up, and one of those we had tried to take up ran on to a rock and sank, fortunately without losing any stores. Two days out from Khairabad two boats were disabled, and still there were three boats to get up this rapid, and I began to think the boatmen were right, and that I should be unable to get laden boats up to Torbela. That evening, however, news arrived that the force was not to leave Darband till 10th, so that I had ten days more than I expected. On 18th February I got the remaining three boats up the rapid without loss, and we then went about a mile up the river, when we were met by a very shallow rapid (we had taken a side channel on account of the current being less). Here we had to unload each boat in succession and pull it up the rapid empty, and then re-load it. We had on an average eight boatmen per boat and twelve coolies and five sappers; four boatmen on the boat and four assisting the coolies to tow; seeing that the towing rope did not catch in boulders, and pushing the boat off, when she went aground. On 13th February, when I obtained from Mr. Barratt at Naoshera what superstructure he could let me have, I found that I was short of chesses and cross-beams (the latter 14' x 7" x 7"). I at once wired to Roorkee to send me the 100 yards of chesses there belonging to the bridge train, and also despatched men to Torbela to get sawn up for me there 40 cross-beams, so as to be ready by the time I should get there. On 20th February I rode back to

Attock, and found that the chesses I had ordered from Roorkee had arrived. As, however, I could only obtain two more country boats at Attock, and as I wanted those to bring on the stores of the two boats that had come to grief on 16th and 17th, I decided to send on the Roorkee chesses to Torbela on bullocks. The Tehsildar at Attock was most obliging, and the chesses left the next day for Torbela. It may be as well to state here that on first arriving at Attock I heard that only two days previous eight boats (country) had gone from Jehangireh to Topi for the purpose of ferrying the Guides across the Indus at that point; and as Topi is only a few miles below Torbela, I counted on being able to have the use of these boats so soon as the Guides had crossed, and so felt justified in collecting extra stores at Torbela. On 3rd March I arrived safely at Torbela without having lost any more boats. I passed Topi on the 1st, and found that the eight boats from Jehangireh were there; but, as the Guides were not to across till the 7th, I could not take any of the boats on. On arrival at Torbela I went at once to Haripur, and there found orders for me to go on at once with the bridge to Darband, so hurried back to make arrangements for starting the following day.

I found the chesses from Roorkee and also the cross-beams I had ordered ready at Torbela when I arrived. Coming up to Torbela I had loaded the boats, only having regard to one point, *viz.*, that the boat when loaded was to draw 2' 6". But for the advance from Torbela, I determined to make each boat carry its own superstructure and that of the adjacent bay. This made the contents of each boat—

Trussed beams	3
Cross beams	7
Chesses (Naoshera bridge pattern)	11
Chesses (Roorkee pattern)	25

I then divided amongst the boats the superstructure for the shore bay and also the pontoon section equipment of pickaxes, shovels, artificers' tools, &c., taking care that no boat drew more than 2' 6". As a matter of fact, when so loaded, no boat drew more than 2' 3". Further, I distributed the sappers and their tents among the boats as follows:— I had twelve boats, as the two which left Attock after us arrived on the evening of the 4th at Torbela. The sappers were divided into four sections, one section to every three boats, and the men of each section were further subdivided among the boats, giving about five sappers per boat; these men's duty was to help to tow and also to see that the coolies worked. I thus had with me sufficient material for bridging 153 yards of river, *i.e.*, 12 boats at 12 yards per bay and one shore bay of nine yards. The remaining stores, *viz.*—

Trussed beams	16
Cross beams	19
Ribands	37
Chesses	211
Railing planks	22
Stiffening pieces	20

I left to be brought on by the eight boats at Topi after they had ferried the Guides across. I had left Attock using the 3" and 2" manilla rope belonging to the bridge units to tow the boats, and by the time I arrived at Torbela this rope was nearly worn out, and whenever we came to a rapid the cables of at least two or three boats would break. I had some time previously telegraphed for more, and the day after I left Torbela it arrived by boat from Darband, giving me new cable of 50 fathoms for each boat. On 8th March we arrived at 10 A.M. at the camp at Darband, and moored just below a rapid opposite the camp. The next day I took the boats up this rapid and some little way above to be clear of the camp water-supply. I also arranged with the *Wazir* to the Nawab of Amb to send me coolies the next morning. The start on the 10th was delayed waiting for the Amb coolies, but eventually I started without them, and it was fortunate that I did so, as they did not turn up till three P.M.; but, as the going had been through water with a current of only about three miles an hour, it did not much matter.

Arrived at Bela early on the 11th and halted there, starting early on the 12th. There is a very bad rapid just above Bela, and it took till 1 P.M. to get the first six boats up. As soon as they were up, I started on with them with an escort of the Guides under Lieutenant

MacLean. About a mile above the rapid a spur ran down to the river on the right bank, from which a few shots had been fired by the enemy during the morning. I was leading in my row boat by about 200 yards, when within about 300 yards of this spur two shots were fired at us; so I sent for Lieutenant MacLean and a few of the escort, and we rowed across to the right bank. The enemy fired seven or eight shots at us during this operation, but stopped the moment we got to the other bank, and by the time we got to the place where they had been firing from, they had disappeared, with the exception of two men, and they were some way off, and retreating rapidly. I crossed over some more of the escort, and the boats then came on. There were only two small rapids between us and Towara, and we arrived there about 5 P.M. A few shots were fired at the boats just after dark, but after putting two companies of the Guides across the river this ceased. On 13th March I accompanied the General Officer Commanding to select a site for the bridge, and he selected the site about 300 yards above Kotkai, well covered from there, and also from the high bank on the other side. The great drawback to the site was that the approach to the bridge on the right bank was down a gorge in the rock, and at first sight it looked as if it would be difficult to make a road down it fit for camels. The width of the river at this point was 105 yards. There was an alternative site for the bridge opposite the village of Marer, but on measuring this it turned out to be 163 yards, and I found on my return that of the six boats I had left behind coming up the Bela rapid in charge of Company Sergeant-Major Crofton, only five had arrived; the ropes on the 6th one had broken coming up the rapid, and the boat had swept down on to a boulder and had broken up, so I had only eleven boats, and this would only permit me to bridge 144 yards of river till the other boats should arrive from Topi. The water was so deep close to the banks that trestles or crates would have been of no appreciable assistance. Four small boats arrived from Amb on this date, capable of being used for ferrying purposes, but not fit for use with the trussed beams even if they had not been required for ferrying purposes. On 14th March I moved all the boats, with the exception of the Amb boats, which stayed for use at the ferry at Marer, up to the site of the bridge. I at once put the boatmen on to unload the boats and my artificers to fix on the gunwale pieces; the remainder of the sappers I started on the approach on the right bank. I was unable to do anything towards getting the boats into position on account of the blasting on the right approach. On 15th March cast three tringar anchors, and began to make the bridge; had a strong working party on the right approach; a lot of filling in had to be done, as this was found quicker than blasting away the large boulders. By evening all the boats were in position, and were chessed, with the exception of the shore bays, which could not be done till the right approach and landing were ready. A heavy storm in the afternoon somewhat interfered with the work. On 16th March got the landing on the right approach finished and put in that shore bay, and then swung the bridge straight and completed shore bay on left bank, finished off the approaches, racked down the chesses, and put sand and grass on bridge; also put up hand rail consisting of up-rights in each boat with two lines of rope running through them, and was able to report the bridge ready and fit for use that evening.

The bridge, when completed, consisted of seven country boats and one Government boat. The Government boat was of the pattern used in

Details of Kotkai bridge.

the Naoshera and Kushalgarh bridges; the country boats were all of one pattern, though they varied slightly in length and breadth. I attach a rough sketch showing the dimensions of one of these boats (see Fig. 1 in the accompanying sketch). The bridge was formed as follows, the gunwales of the country boats being rather low, and it was necessary on account of the struts of the trussed beams to have a clear waterway of at least two feet between the trussed beam and the water so as to permit of logs, &c., floating through; on to the gunwales of all the country boats were nailed blocks 6" x 6", and on these were nailed the gunwale pieces which were 7" x 7" x 14'. Four trussed beams rested on these gunwale pieces from boat to boat, and across each boat were placed three cross beams 14' x 7" x 7". The trussed beams were 30' x 7" x 7". The anchorages used were nets full of stones, and after the bridge was up an iron chain was taken along the bridge and pulled tight by hand from the bow of one boat to the bow of the other, and then fastened securely to an anchorage on either bank. Similarly a 6-inch manilla cable was taken from stern to stern of boat. Down stream anchors were also used for three of the boats, which

were partly in a back-water. The trussed beams were tied on to the gunwale pieces and the cross beams nailed to the gunwale pieces; on top of trussed and cross beams were put the chesses, and ribands were laid along the chesses and tied to them with rope; for hand-rails an upright was put in the centre of each boat on either side of the roadway and secured to the cross beam; in this upright two holes were bored, one 1' 6" above the roadway and the other 2' 6", and through these ropes were passed from boat to boat. Width of the roadway was 9 feet. The wood for riband and uprights was obtained from Kotkai. The Government boat, which had a higher gunwale than the country boats, was put next the shore on the right bank, and this enabled me to have the shore transom 7 feet above the water; with the help of this, and by filling in largely between the boulders with stones and covering the whole over with sand, a very good approach was made on the right bank and at a very easy gradient. The left bank was shelving, and so there was no difficulty about the approach. When complete, the roadway was covered with "senatta," of which large quantities grew on the hill sides, and sand over this.

On 19th March I moved up with the pontoon section and five ferry boats to Kanar, leaving Sergeant Roff in charge of the bridge with 50 boatmen and three extra boats. There is a very bad rapid just below Kanar, and one of the ferry-boats got its towing rope caught, and bumping on a stone broke in two. We had emptied all the boats to bring them up this rapid, so no stores were lost.

On 20th March sent back to Kotkai, and brought up two of the boats I had left there and 20 boatmen; also what materials I had to construct a flying bridge. I got these boats with difficulty up the Kanar rapid, but had to empty them first and take up their stores by hand. The time was taken up till the 22nd in getting ready stores for flying bridge. I had only chesses, and had to get all the baulks for it out of the village of Kanar. I did not bring up any trussed beams from Kotkai, as they were so heavy and I thought we could manage without them.

On 23rd March moved three of the ferry boats and the two boats for flying bridge to Bakrai, arriving there by 10-30 A.M. The river was very easy, there being only one small rapid just below Bakrai. Set to work at once to put together raft for flying bridge and to make anchorages for wire cable and also take it across the river. The raft was ready for use by 4 P.M. The site was just opposite the village of Bakrai. The river at this spot was 150 yards wide, and had a current of three miles an hour; but it had a strong back-water on the left bank, which made the start from that bank slow, as we had to row out of it. This was afterwards improved by building out a jetty of boulders. The raft consisted

of two country boats; on the gunwales of these were nailed gunwale pieces 7" x 7", and on to these were nailed the baulks, of which there were five across the boats 12' x 6" x 5", and six between the boats 14' x 6" x 6". The distance between the boats was 12 feet and across the boats 9 feet, making the total length of raft 30 feet. On top of the baulks were put the chesses. I had brought with me six railing planks, *i.e.*, chesses with an upright let into one end to support two railings; these were distributed as follows: two at each end and two in the middle, and they carried the side rails, of which I had made eight 18' x 5" x 2½" into the upright at the end. I had also fixed iron staples to carry two slip rails at each end to close the raft when every one was on board. Doors were obtained from Bakrai, and with them we constructed two platforms, one for each bank, and these were laid in position when the raft reached the bank before the slip rails were taken away. As the baulks rested on the gunwales instead of the centre of the boat, when loaded the boats had a great slant inwards, and this, besides being unsightly, had a tendency to frighten the mules. The eight boats from Topi arrived at Kotkai on the 23rd with the spare stores I had left behind at Torbela; so on the 27th I sent to Kotkai and had some more chesses brought up by hand and four trussed beams made into a raft and towed up the river; and on the 28th I reconstructed the flying bridge raft by taking away the baulks between the boats and putting a

transom 14' x 7" x 6" along the centre of each boat and resting on the five baulks in it. I also put two gunwale pieces on the outside gunwales; I then put the four trussed beams resting on the two transoms on the centre of each boat, and some small pieces from these transoms to the outside gunwale pieces; over the whole were put 14 feet chesses and eight instead of six

railing planks. This was a great improvement; it made the raft 40 feet long and 12 feet wide; and as the bearing was on the centre of the boats, the raft when loaded remained perfectly level; and in place of being only able to take over nine laden mules, we could now take over 15 easily, and we also took over 40 unloaded Government mules or 50 country mules. A rough sketch of the type of boat used is attached (see Fig. 2 of the accompanying sketch). The raft was practically capable of taking any load you could get on it. I saw on it on one occasion 350 maunds of grain and 30 men.


The river began to rise on 30th March, and this necessitated raising the landing stages; the sappers had been continually employed on improving the approaches and landing stages. At first, on account of the back-water on left bank, it took 15 minutes from the time the raft began to load at one bank till it got back again to the same bank again after having taken its load across; but when the landing stages were improved, a trip could be done in 10 minutes: this meant crossing 250 to 300 unladen mules an hour in place of 150 to 200. I had also the four ferry boats; so that by unloading the mules and taking the loads across in the boats and the mules on the raft, a convoy could be taken across without a very great loss of time.

On the 29th I received instructions to prepare skin rafts, and at once proceeded to make up the superstructure. Seventy-five "sarnais" arrived on the 2nd for this purpose, and on 3rd two natives from the Kabul river accustomed to making up and using these rafts. I had telegraphed to the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar for these men as soon as I heard these rafts were required. On arrival these men pointed out that the "sarnais" were unsuitable for the purpose; for one thing they were too small. The principal objection, however, to them was that they were old, and would not remain full of air when any considerable weight was put on them. I made a raft of them, but in 15 minutes the "sarnais" were only half full of air. I then got permission to have the skins of the cattle killed by the commissariat; and as they have to be skinned in a particular manner, sent my own men to skin. I could only get five or six skins a day by this method, and in fact had only got 14 skins when the force left Palosi, and of these four were lost by one of the boats sinking coming down the Indus. The skins that I did get it took about three days to prepare, and when blown out they remained inflated without any appreciable loss of air.

I constructed one raft of ten of these skins as follows. The skins were placed as shewn in the sketch and lashed to the transoms A; on to these transoms were lashed the baulks 18" apart, and on these were laid the chesses made of deodar 1" thick and 14' long. A raft of 10 skins took 25 men easily, and one of 14 skins, which was the size I calculated on with the 14 feet chess, would carry 25 armed men and the necessary boatmen to manage and work the raft.

In accordance with instructions received on 9th April, I dismantled the flying bridge and took it and its stores back to Kotkai, leaving the four ferry boats at Bakrai. Coming down the rapid at Kanar, one of the boats shipped some water and became unmanageable, got broadside on, and shipped more water, and shortly parted in two. No lives were lost, but we lost all the spare ammunition and the mass of the heavy articles of engineer equipment.

On the 13th, in accordance with instructions received, I sent all the spare boats and superstructure back to Darband; and on the 15th, after the 37th Dogras had crossed the bridge, I commenced to dismantle it at 9-30 A.M., and at 12-30 started for Darband: the boats went down nearly empty, as the trussed beams and most of the chesses were made into rafts. Darband was reached without any mishap at 3 P.M. On the 16th all the boats and rafts started about 7 A.M., and we got down about four miles below the Hund ferry, and arrived at Attock at 10 A.M. on the 17th. The boats had all to be let down the last rapid opposite Attock by hand; such stores as had been borrowed from the Punjab Government



were then returned, and the remaining stores belonging to the temporary boat bridge equipment were stored in the Public Works Department godown at Khairabad.

There are 37 rapids between Attock and Torbela; with the exception of the first one, which is just opposite Attock fort, none of these are dangerous.

Description of Indus between Attock and Kotlai.

The principal difficulty they present is that many of them are of the form shewn in Fig. 3 of the accompanying sketch, where the dotted line represents the top and shallowest part of the rapid, and A B represents the points between which the boats must pass to avoid going aground; and as it is too far to take a rope to C, and the water above the rapid too deep for men to wade in, it requires very careful steering to prevent the boats going aground; and if they go aground when they are laden, it probably takes you at least an hour to float them off. Between Attock and Torbela the river runs in three or four channels, and another difficulty is to tell which channel to take. The depth of water in these channels alters yearly, and the boatmen themselves often make mistakes. On one occasion I lost a whole day by taking a wrong channel, as when we arrived at the point where it joined the other channels higher up, we found there was only two feet of water in the rapid, and so had to go back and take the adjacent channel. Above Torbela these difficulties disappear, the main channel is clearly defined, and all you require is strong ropes and lots of men to pull on them.

There are eight rapids between Torbela and Darband; the one opposite Ashura is bad. Opposite Lalu Gali the river narrows and runs only in one channel, one of the banks being always a steep one. Between Darband and Kotkai there are five rapids; the one in front of Bela is dangerous. Above Amb the character of the river changes; it runs between rocky banks, and consists of long sluggish reaches with a current of from $1\frac{1}{2}$ to $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles an hour, and rapids with a large fall in them.

There are above Kotkai four rapids before you get to Kotlai. Of these, the only bad one is below Kanar; but it has two channels, and by emptying the boats you can, as a rule, take them up the smaller channel without much danger. I only saw the rapid at Kotlai from the top of the hill at Darbanai, and so have no personal knowledge of it. The Amb boatmen state that it is a bad one.

As regards coolies and boatmen, you require eight boatmen per boat; this gives you four men on the boat and four men with the towing party; these men keep the towing rope off boulders, and push the boat off when it goes aground; they get more pay, and expect to have to work in water. You should have 16 coolies at least per boat; and, if it can be managed, the boats should travel in squads of three; when you come to a rapid, this enables you to halt the two rear boats, and gives you 60 men to tow the leading boat; and this was as many as I ever found it necessary to use.

Materials.

The only materials I consider absolutely necessary are:—

Trussed beams,
Cross beams,
Chesses.

If you can take them,

Stiffening beams,
,, planks,
Railing ,,
Ribands,

Trussed beam, $8\frac{1}{2}$ maunds.
Cross beam, $3\frac{1}{4}$ maunds.
Chess, $1\frac{1}{2}$ maunds.

are, of course, a great assistance; but as you must take at least three trussed beams, five cross beams, and 40 chesses per boat and its bay, and as the weight of these is about 105

maunds, and as in addition each boat has to carry its share of the shore bay, cables, kits, and various other stores, except you are going to tow in rivers where you have a depth of over three feet of water, the stiffening beams, &c., must be left behind. Spare oars should also be taken, and at least 60 fathoms of 3" and 60 fathoms 2" manilla per boat; also a supply of $1\frac{1}{2}$ " and 1" manilla and tarred spun yarn for lashing down trussed beams, cross

beams, ribands, &c.; also a good supply of 12" nails for nailing the cross beams to the gunwale pieces, and the gunwale pieces to the gunwales. If a flying bridge is in prospect, you require a steel 3" wire cable for each bridge and a metal traveller, Roorkee pattern. I believe there are only two of these existent in India—one in table C and one in table I, Engineer Equipments for India. As they are made of iron and gun metal and do not deteriorate by keeping, it would seem advisable that this number should be increased; and one might be given for the temporary bridge equipment at Khairabad.

My thanks are due to the native officers, non-commissioned officers, and sappers of the pontoon section for the cheerful way in which they worked and the assistance they rendered, especially during the bad weather we met with in February coming up the Indus. Without their aid and example, I feel sure the coolies would never have pulled the boats up so as to arrive in time; and I especially desire to bring to the notice of the General Officer Commanding Subadar Mian Kutbud-din, "A" Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, and Company Sergeant-Major Crofton, Bengal Sappers and Miners, who both of them, by the ready assistance they rendered, made my task a much easier one than it would have otherwise been. Jemadar of boatmen, Malik Rozi, of the village of Jehangireh, by his influence among the boatmen and his knowledge of the river, also rendered me invaluable assistance, and I think it would have a good effect if his name could be brought to the notice of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.


Remarks of the General Officer Commanding Hazara Field Force, 1891.

The pontoon section of the Bengal Sappers and Miners did most excellent service. The bridging operations Major Buston had to carry out were of no ordinary nature. The boats were always up to time, and nothing but the continued exertions of all concerned could have effected this.


I have much pleasure in endorsing Major Buston's recommendation in favour of Subadar Mian Kutbud-din and Company Sergeant-Major Crofton, Bengal Sappers and Miners, and also in regard to Jemadar of boatmen, Malik Rozi of Jehangireh. I should be glad if His Excellency would recommend this old man for some reward or distinction with a view to encouraging the Indus boatmen to stick to their craft.

Fig. 1

PLAN.



SECTION.




These boats had square bows and sterns, and were flat bottomed. Both ends were decked.


ROUGH SKETCH OF COUNTRY BOAT USED FOR FLYING BRIDGE AT BAKRAI.

Fig. 2.

PLAN.




SECTION.



These boats had pointed bows and sterns, and were flat bottomed. Both ends were decked.

Fig. 3



387

APPENDIX XXIII.

Notes on the Coolie Corps by Captain H. E. S. Abbott, Field Engineer, Hazara Field Force, 1891.

For road-making a coolie corps of 200 strong was sanctioned.

The coolies got 4 annas per diem; increased to 5 annas when harvest time came on.

The mates, or "gangers," got 6 annas increased to 8 annas.

The mates selected were men accustomed to work as such in Public Works Department (Hazara district) on road works.

The coolies chosen were also men accustomed to this employment.

The gangs consisted of 1 mate and 20 coolies. Their tools were :—

- | | |
|--|--------------------|
| 9 picks (6½lbs. pattern). | |
| 2 crowbars (18lbs. pattern— not heavier). | |
| 7 shovels (round nose). | |
| 1 sledge hammer (14lbs.). | |
| 1 felling axe | } Alternate gangs. |
| 1 jumper (all steel) | |

(The above distribution was eventually found to be the best).

Two Public Works Department Sub-overseers were attached to the corps, and six European soldiers were borrowed from one of the British infantry regiments of the force. These prevented coolies idling. They got 8 annas *per diem* working pay.

Two *pakhali* mules were attached to the corps to supply drinking water. They were obtained from commissariat. Good strong mules they must be for work on unfinished roads.

The want of a *baniah* was much felt—a man who would draw the rations and be responsible for the proper distribution of them. The portioning of the food led to much quarrelling, as the allowance was scanty for men doing such hard work. The coolies got "followers' rations"—i.e., *ata* 1½lbs., *ghi* 1 oz., and *dal* 2 oz. If some *gur* were added to this, the allowance would be ample. For hard-working men *gur* is more necessary than *ghi* or *dal*, and the coolies as a rule had much harder work to do than the fighting men. In the 1888 expedition we only gave coolies *ata* and *gur*—very occasionally *dal* or *ghi*. They did not grumble or show signs of scant feeding like these men have done.

Mates got "fighting men's rations."

The weather was unusually severe, so a blanket (followers' pattern) was obtained from the commissariat for each man.

Remarks of the General Officer Commanding Hazara Field Force, 1891.

Captain Abbott's recommendations should be noted as regards the organisation of a coolie corps. Circumstances will vary in different parts, but some general rules might be laid down for a coolie corps which would prevent the experience gained being lost sight of. The coolies are hard worked, and should be well fed. There was a difficulty about their shelter, and they require a waterproof sheet as much as an ordinary follower does.

APPENDIX XXIV.

Report on the Signalling operations, Hazara Field Force, 1891, by Captain E. O. F. Hamilton, Superintendent of Army Signalling, dated 1st May 1891.

I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Major-General Commanding, a report on the signalling operations that have taken place during the Hazara expedition.

2. Before operations commenced, it was considered advisable to concentrate the signallers, British and Native, at convenient stations, so that some preliminary practice might be obtained, and those signallers found insufficiently trained and likely to interfere with the efficient working of stations in the field eliminated. This was found absolutely necessary as regards native signallers.

3. As only two British regiments were detailed to take part in the expedition, it was deemed advisable to supplement the number of British signallers by the addition of 30 trained men from other British corps. With the exception of 12 specially selected men, these extra signallers were drawn from corps in the Rawal Pindi district.

4. The signallers of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 4th Sikhs, Guides Infantry, 2-5th Gurkhas, and No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery were concentrated early in February at Darband under Lieutenant Burrowes, Royal Irish Fusiliers; those of the 2nd Seaforth Highlanders, 11th Bengal Infantry, 27th Punjab Infantry, 32nd Pioneers, and 37th Dogras being practised together at Rawal Pindi under Lieutenant Peters, 7th Dragoon Guards.

A large number of native signallers were found to be insufficiently trained, and more likely to hamper than assist the efficient men with whom they would have to work.

The numbers of British signallers available for all duties on departure of the expedition from Darband were as follows :—

River Column	30	} including the extra British signallers.
Tilli	„	...	31	

The numbers of reliable native signallers capable of assisting the British signallers were as under :—

River Column	20.
Tilli	„	...	15 (approximate).

Out of the total number of natives, the Guides Infantry produced eight good men, and the 11th Bengal Infantry about the same number. The other native regiments were able to furnish on an average four men each, except the 2-5th Gurkhas, who had only two men to be relied on.

5. All corps, except the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, left Darband in possession of the sanctioned signalling equipment in more or less good working order. The Royal Welsh Fusiliers were unaccountably deficient of flags and many other articles, which were received later on. Their heliographs were also shaky.

The signalling equipment required for the extra British signallers was indented for and received by me from Rawal Pindi arsenal. Much of this equipment was in a very unsatisfactory state when received. The Begbie lamps, which should have been reduced in size to a certain pattern, were all altered wrongly. They all bore the mark B* on them, but differed considerably from the approved B* lamp. This was a very serious defect, as the *yakdams* issued for the carriage of the equipment were designed to carry the largest sized lamp, *viz.*, the B* as altered at Kasauli, and adopted by the Ordnance Department as the pattern to govern future alterations. The altered lamps issued from Rawal Pindi arsenal were much too large to fit into the *yakdams*. Had they been altered according to pattern, they would have fitted in with their own boxes as well.

The lamps issued to me were all returned to the arsenal and reduced in size so as to pack in the *yakdams*, but without their boxes. Time did not admit of the lamps issued to regiments at out-stations being called in for alteration.

The burners in the lamps were of the most flimsy description, many of them fitting loosely. In some cases it was found impossible to turn up the wick.

The chimneys supplied were also very inferior, made of the thinnest glass, of uneven thickness, and consequently numbers were broken.

The tin chimneys, intended to fit on the top of the short glass ones to give the necessary length, were in nearly every case too large in diameter and slipped down over the glass, thus shutting out the light altogether. This defect was discovered in time, and other tin chimneys were procured before leaving Rawal Pindi. These defective tin chimneys were issued to all regiments equipped from Rawal Pindi arsenal.

The Begbie pattern telescope tripods, shutters, and stands issued for the use of the extra signallers were so badly made as to be practically useless. The telescopes had to be tied on to the stands with string to keep them in position. The shutters for use in front of shaky heliographs in several instances fell to pieces on first trial. Fortunately the heliographs for the most part were in good working order, and the shutters were not required. These last mentioned articles were supplied to me at the last moment from the arsenal, and could not be replaced or altered.

6. The attached map shows the several points occupied as permanent stations during the operations. On all occasions when columns were detached communication was maintained with one or more permanent stations.

7. The field telegraph was laid down between all important permanent posts with such rapidity that visual signalling was seldom the sole means of communication between detachments. There were, however, some stations entirely dependent on it—for instance, Pabal Gali, Panji Gali, Diliarai (for a considerable time), Kungar, Kan, Maira, China, and Lashora—and free communication was at all times maintained between these stations and head-quarters. Work was carried out smartly and accurately, and I heard no complaints of messages going astray or being received in a mutilated condition.

No difficulty whatever was experienced in working with the Telegraph Department although the message forms differed.

8. My assistants, Lieutenant Peters, 7th Dragoon Guards, and Lieutenant Burrowes, Royal Irish Fusiliers, have rendered me every assistance. Both are active and zealous officers.

Lieutenant Peters had charge of the signallers with the 2nd Brigade, and made all arrangements for signalling in that brigade. The signallers themselves have as a body worked well, and I wish specially to bring to notice :—

Sergeant Mulholland, Royal Scots Fusiliers.

Sergeant Gardiner, King's Dragoon Guards.

Sergeant Clark, Bedfordshire Regiment.

Corporal Marshall, No. 1 Mountain Battery.

The first named non-commissioned officer has been in charge of the head-quarter station throughout the operations, and has shown himself to be capable and very hard working.

Sergeant Gardiner was in charge of the 2nd Brigade head-quarter station, and is highly spoken of by Lieutenant Peters.

Sergeant Clark was in charge of a party of signallers of the Bedfordshire Regiment detached for duty at Oghi. His party was very useful in keeping up communication between Oghi and Pabal Gali and from Pabal Gali to Palosi and other stations. He proved himself to be a thoroughly reliable non-commissioned officer in charge of a detached signal station.

Corporal Marshall was in charge of the signallers of No. 1 Mountain Battery, who were employed at the head-quarter station, and is thoroughly competent to take charge of any party.

9. With regard to native signallers, I consider that these if properly trained will always prove of valuable assistance to British signallers, but the experience gained in this expedition certainly goes to show that the vast majority of native signallers cannot at present be trusted to work a station by themselves. Many native signallers who had passed a course of instruction were found to be quite unacquainted with the proper method of sending and receiving messages.

The Guides Infantry and 11th Bengal Infantry have each some well trained men, the signal station at Kunarai being for some time successfully worked by a party from the latter regiment.

10. In conclusion, I venture to suggest that in future any extra equipment required on expeditions should be issued from central schools, a supply of the different articles being kept in stock there. Nothing but equipment in good working order would then be issued, and there would no longer be any cause for the complaints now so frequently made of equipment received from arsenals in an unsatisfactory condition. Every instrument could be tested at the school before issue.

No occasion arose for using the red lights supplied to us, and I do not think they are ever likely to be of much use on service. Their light at distances over 5 miles is not sufficiently striking to attract attention.

I also think that one shutter and tripod for each regiment and battery will be found quite sufficient. At present a tripod and shutter is issued with *each* heliograph for use in case the instrument becomes shaky and unworkable as a heliograph. I think this proportion is unnecessary.

The *yakdans* supplied from Cawnpore for carriage of equipment were of the greatest use, but they can be improved upon, and will be specially reported on.

Remarks of the General Officer Commanding Hazara Field Force, 1891.

The want of efficient signallers amongst the native troops was much felt. There was no inconvenience on this occasion as there was a sufficient staff of British soldiers, but I cannot but think the want may be seriously felt some day. It may be required to establish a chain of stations where British soldiers cannot be posted, and it would be difficult to find a sufficient number in the whole of the native army. The native soldier is quite capable of being taught, and it would be a great economy to teach him. He may never be able to transmit or read as rapidly as a European, but this is not very material. British signallers when communicating with native parties should be instructed to signal slowly.

Captain Hamilton will, no doubt, bring to the notice of the Quarter Master General in India all points requiring attention, and I need not repeat them here.

I endorse his favourable mention of Lieutenant Peters and Burrowes and the non-commissioned staff.

O Mana ka dana

* Jal Pass.
5650

APPENDIX XXV.

Report on the Medical Department, Hazara Field Force, 1891, by Deputy Surgeon-General A. F. Bradshaw, M.S., Principal Medical Officer, dated 8th June 1891.

I have the honour to submit, for the information of the General Officer Commanding, the following brief and general report relating to the Medical Department of the Hazara Field Force.

2. Strength of the department, excluding those of the Reserve Brigade which formed part of the Hazara Field Force for only one week at the base at Darband, and including those of the troops halted at Oghi, the medical officers numbered 23, *viz.*, 1 administrative and 22 executive, 10 medical warrant officers, and 22 hospital assistants. Of these two medical officers left the expedition on account of illness and one medical warrant officer became supernumerary.

3. The field hospitals comprised two sections for British soldiers and nine for sepoys and followers, and they were distributed and redistributed as required in the field, on the line of communications, and at the base. The posts occupied by the troops having been numerous—at times so many as fifteen—and the intervening distances toilsome, it was frequently necessary to treat native soldiers in British sections and British soldiers in native sections, and to encourage to the extent safely practicable as regards mobility of corps the treatment regimentally of the less serious cases of injury and illness. In the detailed report to be submitted to the head of my department, I shall suggest that section field hospitals employed on frontier expeditions be equipped to accommodate both British and Native troops, also followers. Field hospitals thus adapted for general usefulness are already authorized for the lines of communication of an army corps.

I visited all the sectional hospitals as frequently as campaigning circumstances allowed, and always found them in efficient order and satisfactory as regards resources of stores, equipments, medicines, ambulance, and baggage transport. The three tents per section permitted to be taken into the field from the base proved to be sufficient for sheltering those of the sick and wounded who were in real need of some protection from the inclemency of the weather which the force experienced during March and April.

4. *Health of the troops.*—It was very good throughout the campaign, notwithstanding discomforts of prolonged bivouacking, of severe weather, and of duties made arduous by mountainous country and the requirements of military vigilance. It much contributed to the maintenance of the health of the force; that the spirit of the soldiers was so enduringly cheerful; that all were well fed, provided with waterproof sheets and jerseys, both invaluable in use, and unable to procure liquor. The number of cases of fever, dysentery, and pneumonia was never at all noteworthy.

Among officers sickness was quite small in extent. One died at Palosi from pneumonia, two were attacked with enteric fever, and five with dysentery; all seven patients did well or are doing well. Other cases, three of wounds excepted, need no remark. The wounded officers were sent to the base, and afterwards were disposed of by medical boards. Regarding the soldiers, British and Native, there is but little to record here. A young British gunner died of enteric fever and a Royal Welsh Fusilier from tetanus following a gunshot wound. Four sepoys succumbed to pneumonia, and one cut his throat and died. Among followers sickness was comparatively slight and deaths few, two being from pneumonia and nine from other diseases.

Appended to this letter is a tabular statement* showing the casualties of the campaign, including the killed and died of wounds, deaths from injuries, and deaths from disease and other causes.

Detached parties of the Hazara Field Force being many, and postal field communications being of necessity irregular, I had myself supplied daily with wire, sun, lamp, or

* This statement is not reproduced. Besides the killed (6) and wounded (47), 29 died of diseases and other causes and 14 were injured on service.

flag signalled sick reports from medical officers of field hospitals and corps units, and was thus enabled to watch over the health of the troops conveniently and without delays.

Sanitation was the one very important point to which special attention was always sedulously given. The bivouac areas being closely circumscribed and generally occupied for lengthened periods, and villages being within their limits or adjacent thereto, sanitary precautions became very obligatory. Fire was chiefly relied upon for disinfection and deodorisation, and burial, except of latrine collections, was discouraged. All dung heaps were burnt, village enclosure walls were thrown down to promote circulation of fresh air, animals were picketed outside the camps during the day, every ill-smelling or fly-haunted spot of ground was made harmless by lighting a small fire over it, and strict supervision was employed to prevent deposits elsewhere than in the authorized places. The active co-operation of all concerned was enlisted by their sense of the great local importance of sanitary measures, and I think it may be confidently asserted that the greatest advantage to the health of the troops was secured, particularly at Darband, Palosi, Darbanai, and at Seri, by this simple system of "sanitary fires."

5. The campaign has given further tests in appropriate ways to the organization for field service of military medical resources. It has been perceived that some improvements in *matériel* are still possible, stretchers and ambulance saddles need modifications, and interchange for field duties of Medical Staff and Indian Medical Service officers requires fuller recognition of necessity. All these and other points will be taken up in my departmental report.

6. During the campaign the officers and other members of the Medical Department have been continuously under my close observation, and I am glad to feel justified in reporting very favourably of all. I do not think it would be easy to assemble a more competent and useful body of military medical officers than that of the Hazara Field Force, 1891, and the medical warrant officers and hospital assistants have given them valuable assistance. Surgeon-Major McWatters, M. S., is an excellent officer, and is characterised by common sense, tact, and judgment. Surgeons-Major Stokes, M. S., and McGregor, I. M. S., have secured my full confidence. To Surgeon-Major Palmer, I. M. S., I entrusted the onerous and important duties of Senior Medical Officer of the base, and he has discharged them with ability and diligence, which have secured my fullest approbation.

Remarks by the General Officer Commanding Hazara Field Force, 1891.

The warrant officers and hospital assistants are deserving of reward. The Principal Medical Officer, Hazara Field Force, will bring forward through the Principal Medical Officer in India the most deserving.

I support the following measures advocated by Deputy Surgeon-General Bradshaw:—

- (1) That all field hospitals be organised for British and Native troops conjointly.
- (2) That there be greater interchangeability in the duties of the officers of the Medical Staff and of the Indian Medical Service.
- (3) That a light blanket stretcher be introduced for mountain warfare. The stretchers provided are far too heavy; they were supposed to be carried by an armed soldier; they were left behind and blanket stretchers improvised on the spot.

APPENDIX XXVI.

Report on the Commissariat Department, Hazara Field Force, 1891, by Captain H. F. Lyons-Montgomery, S.C., Chief Commissariat Officer, dated 15th May 1891.

I have the honour to submit the following report on the working of the Commissariat-Transport Department during the Hazara expedition for the information of the Major-General Commanding the force.

* * * * *

5. Rations for British and Native troops and followers for thirty days were ordered to be collected at Darband for Darband troops (Right and Left Columns) and at Oghi for Oghi and Abbottabad troops. Besides the above, ten days' supplies for the Rawal Pindi Reserve Brigade were ordered to be stored at Abbottabad.

The above supplies were ordered to be in position by the 1st March 1891.

Grain and fodder for animals, also firewood and fresh vegetables for rations, were arranged to be collected locally; the remainder of the supplies were collected at Rawal Pindi under orders of the Commissary-General, Western Circle, and despatched direct to Darband and Oghi.

The commissariat godown was established at Darband on 3rd February and at Oghi on the 22nd February.

The first thirty days' supplies with substitutes and extras were in position at both places by the 1st March as ordered.

Owing to the date of commencement of operations and the final concentration of troops having been altered from 1st March to the 10th of the same month, some additions became necessary in the estimates and requirements, and stores consumed by troops already in position at Darband and drawing rations had to be replaced. Eventually, when the force moved forward on the 12th March, thirty days' complete supplies were in hand, and a ten days' reserve at Haripur was also nearly completed.

In connection with the collecting of supplies at the base at Darband, I wish to bring to notice the extreme difficulties encountered by this department in the first instance by the bad state of the roads between Rawal Pindi and Darband. Their condition was, no doubt, accentuated by the inclemency of the weather at the time and by the long duration of the winter season in the Punjab this year; still I held that an important road such as that between Hasan Abdal and Abbottabad could and should be always kept in thorough repair, and rivers such as the Haru and Dor effectually bridged. The road for the greater part of the way between Haripur and Dehdar was frequently almost impassable for cart traffic for a considerable time apparently for want of being metalled. The road between Haripur and Darband was fairly good, but the Siran river at Barakot should undoubtedly be bridged. At the time when my first convoys were passing that river there was no road on the right bank connecting the ford with the road on that bank. The roads were, no doubt, repaired by the time the troops moved into position, but it is a most important point that they should be in good repair always to admit of supplies being rapidly concentrated on the frontier without loss to the State or undue strain at the very commencement of an expedition on the transport.

6. Four days' supplies for the River and Tilli Columns were pushed forward and stored at Bela and Phaldar respectively, as they could be guarded at those places by the left and right wings of the 32nd Pioneers, who were working on the road. These temporary advance depôts proved of great service on the advance for replenishing the brigade godown in the front.

On the River Column establishing itself at Palosi and the Tilli Column moving down to Darbanai, I established an advance depôt at Kotkai, abolishing Phaldar and Bela, and clearing them of stores. The River and Tilli Columns, now designated 1st and 2nd Brigades respectively, drew supplies regularly from Kotkai, which was as regularly filled up from the base at Darband. The advance depôt also supplied the detachments left at Tilli, Ril, and Makranai direct by the road made through Kanar, Kunarai, and Tilli.

When the 1st Brigade moved up to Ril and Seri, I moved the advance depôt from Kotkai to Tilli, the 2nd Brigade continuing to draw its supplies from the Tilli advance depôt, which it received by a road through Seri and Maira.

7. The Rawal Pindi Reserve Brigade, now designated 3rd Brigade, was moved up, and arrived at Darband on the 30th March. I at once ordered the 10 days' reserve supplies for that Brigade which were at Abbottabad, to be moved to Darband. The order was issued on the 28th, and the stores were at Darband on the 31st idem. In addition to this, I obtained 20 days' supplies from Rawal Pindi and by local purchase to complete the requirements of the 3rd Brigade to 30 days. These were not required, as on the evening of the 6th April intimation was received that the 3rd Brigade would move to Kohat; it left Darband on the 7th April completely equipped in every respect, and took in addition mule transport for five days' supplies.

8. The supply of fodder to the force was at the outset a very serious consideration, as owing to the long winter it was understood that the actual crops in the ground at that season, namely, *khasil*,* would be very backward and not fit for consumption. Arrangements were made for a large collection of grass at Darband to be obtained by the purchasing agent with the assistance of the Nawab of Amb, in whose country Darband is situated. At first there was a slight hitch, but by the assistance of the Deputy Commissioner of the Hazara district all difficulties were overcome, and I was able to collect a good stock of grass, which, supplemented eventually by *khasil* and *bhusa*, the latter both compressed and loose, obtained from Rawal Pindi and Peshawar, enabled me to meet the requirements of the whole force and the depôt at Darband until the base was finally moved from that place to Oghi.

As the troops advanced, it became evident that, for the present at all events, there would be no difficulty in supplying forage; *khasil* was in abundance; the plain at Towara, the first halting place, was thickly cultivated; the Palosi plain, where the next halt was made, was also well cultivated. In short, all the land that can possibly be brought under cultivation in the tract of country traversed by the Hazara Field Force of 1891 is well cultivated, and during the season when crops are on the ground—*i. e.*, in spring green wheat and barley and in the autumn Indian-corn—there is no difficulty in feeding the transport of a fairly large force. After the spring crop is finished, however, I anticipate considerable difficulty as regards forage. There appears to be no grass obtainable yet to any extent, and from information I gather that the grass on these hills does not spring up properly until August and September. For this reason I am of opinion that for any expedition undertaken in the spring to this country a large stock of compressed fodder should be laid in at the base in the event of operations being prolonged.

9. The rations supplied to the troops have been good; no complaints regarding their quality have been received.

The Officers Commanding Sappers and Miners and 32nd Pioneers represented that $\frac{3}{4}$ seer *ata* ration was not sufficient for their men when in hard work. As a special case they have received the extra $\frac{1}{4}$ seer. The other native troops have also occasionally received it as an extra.

The *amchur* ration is not taken to any extent by the troops; they do not care for it; I would recommend its being struck off the scale of rations, or at least reduced to an issue of $\frac{1}{4}$ of an ounce per man.

10. The transport during the expedition has worked well. I attach the report of the Divisional Transport Officer on the subject (see Appendix XXVII.)

The hired transport has again proved its efficiency in the field. I concur in the opinion of the Divisional Transport Officer, however, that such transport is more fitted for carriage of supplies than for baggage and equipment of troops.

11. As regards the general working of the transport during this expedition, it is satisfactory to have to report that no hitch whatever of any description occurred, and this

* Green wheat and barley.

I attribute entirely to the admirable arrangements, care, and forethought of Lieutenant J. W. G. Tulloch, Divisional Transport Officer. He is an officer of great judgment and tact, possessing untiring energy and considerable power of organization; he has been my right-hand throughout the expedition, and I am greatly indebted to him for the services he has rendered, and trust that they may be duly recognized.

Lieutenant Tulloch brings forward the names of several officers who have done good work, and I beg to endorse his opinion. The services rendered by Lieutenant F. F. Badcock, 1-5th Gurkha Regiment, in hiring and organizing over 1,000 mules at Abbottabad were very great, and marked him at once as an officer of ability: it requires a large amount of patience, firmness, and tact in hiring mules in any district, and more especially in the Hazara district. Lieutenant Badcock proved himself to be possessed of these attributes to no small extent, and by the care taken by him in equipping and organizing these Hazara mules their subsequent proved efficiency was ensured.

13. Lieutenant Hayes, of the Middlesex Regiment, and Lieutenant Low, of the 9th Bengal Lancers, have both done good work, and fully deserve the praise bestowed on them by the Divisional Transport Officer.

14. Of the departmental officers serving with the force all have done well, and no doubt the Brigadier-Generals will bring forward their names; but I wish to bring specially to notice the good work done by Lieutenant Ewart, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General, Brigade Commissariat Officer, 1st Brigade. He is an officer of sound judgment and tact, hardworking to a degree, and has helped me considerably.

Lieutenants Anderson and Beville have worked well, and have proved themselves capable of holding positions of responsibility and successfully meeting difficulties.

15. Of the three warrant officers with the force, Sub-Conductor Walters was only a short time in this country. He came from Miranzai with mules, and eventually returned to that expedition. During the time he was here, he did good work. He is a warrant officer of proved ability in the field.

Conductor Litchfield, who was in charge of the divisional godown from the very first, is a warrant officer of exceptional merit, great practical experience, and untiring energy. This warrant officer took out the first convoy from Rawal Pindi to Darband, consisting of 400 camels, and notwithstanding the tremendous rain, the bad state of the roads, and the swollen state of the rivers he arrived at Darband with all his stores complete, with the exception of only one camel-load, which was swept away in the Siran. I consider Conductor Litchfield one of the best warrant officers in the department, and trust he may be recommended for promotion.

I concur in the remarks of the Divisional Transport Officer concerning Conductor Harrington. He is a most reliable, hardworking, and painstaking warrant officer.

16. The non-commissioned officers with the force have all worked well, but I would beg to bring specially to notice the following:—

Sergeant Tacchi, 1st Brigade Godown. This non-commissioned officer has done exceptionally good work. His services have been brought to my notice by the Brigade Commissariat Officer, and I know Sergeant Tacchi to be a non-commissioned officer on whom one can thoroughly rely. He also possesses great tact in his dealings with natives.

Sergeant Foley, in victualling charge, head-quarters camp.

Sergeant North, with the Oghi troops.

Sergeant Josling, 2nd Brigade Godown.

17. Of the non-commissioned officers with the transport, I beg to endorse the opinion of the Divisional Transport Officer regarding Sergeants White, Tyler, and Graveson, and I would beg to add the name of Sergeant Whiteaway, who was attached to the Transport Department for duty. This latter sergeant proved a most willing and useful worker. He was of great assistance in working convoys from the advanced depôts to the troops.

18. In conclusion, I would beg to bring before the Major-General Commanding the great services rendered by Rai Bahadur Lala Lurinda Mal of Peshawar, my purchasing agent. His work has been invaluable, and he has spared neither money nor trouble to

ensure success in all the arrangements. His son, Lala Bhya Mal, was nominated purchasing agent; but as he was then employed with the Miranzai expedition, the *Rai Bahadur* himself undertook the work for me; no distance was too great for him to travel, and from the first he devoted himself to the work with the greatest energy. Lala Lurinda Mal is a man of very great influence, and never hesitates to devote it entirely to the service of Government. It is to men such as this that Government owes to a great extent its power of rapidly collecting at any base large quantities of country produce, such as forage and firewood; and in this instance the work has been well and satisfactorily carried out. I trust the Major-General may see fit to bring this native gentleman's name prominently to the notice of Government in order that some suitable reward may be bestowed on him.

19. All the native establishment under me have worked well, and I purpose bringing forward the names of several of them in my departmental report to the Commissary-General, Western Circle.

Remarks by the General Officer Commanding Hazara Field Force, 1891.

I would ask that the Commissary-General be requested to bring forward the most deserving among the subordinate staff mentioned by Captain Montgomery and Lieutenant Tulloch for promotion and reward. He is better able to make a selection than I am.

Elsewhere I have remarked fully on the excellence of the Commissariat-Transport Department. I have much pleasure in supporting Captain Montgomery's recommendation in favour of Lala Lurinda Mal, Rai Bahadur. I hope that it may be possible to confer some suitable distinction on him.

As regards European rations, the only complaint that came to my notice was in regard to the cocoa. The article supplied was "Fry's," and the Principal Medical Officer represented that this preparation is deficient in nourishment, being largely composed of starch. A purer cocoa, ship's cocoa for choice, would be better.

Amchur is not readily taken by native troops, but it was only objected to in some corps; others took it freely. All sorts of absurd objections were raised against it. The truth probably is that the native troops wanted to get lime-juice, and their officers wanted to get it for them; but the cost and difficulty of carriage are probably prohibitive. It might be possible, when stocks admit, to let native troops have it on payment. There is no doubt of the benefit of its use when vegetables are not procurable.

The amount of the vegetable issue admissible for native troops requires revision. It is by far too small.

There was a very general opinion among commanding officers that the $\frac{3}{4}$ seer ration of *ata* was insufficient for men in hard work. I allowed the full seer to all men in constant work, such as Pioneers and Sappers, to all working parties, and to all men of posts in the snow, and all troops got the extra quarter seer *at least* twice a week. I heard no complaint after the above rule was laid down, and I think the knowledge that there was something in store for those working harder than the rest had a good effect. I think it right at the same time to state that there is a very general opinion among commanding officers that for up-country soldiers $\frac{3}{4}$ of a seer is insufficient at any time.

APPENDIX XXVII.

Report on the Transport Department, Hazara Field Force, 1891, by Lieutenant J.W.G. Tulloch, Divisional Transport Officer, dated the 9th May 1891.

I have the honour to submit the following report on the working of the transport with the Hazara expedition, 1891.

* * * * *

3. The transport of the force consisted of 6,234 mules and nominally 1,500 camels.

Of the mules, 4,134 were Government and 2,100 specially hired for the expedition.

This transport was distributed as follows:—

					Government mules.	Hired mules.	Camels.
With 1st Brigade	1,209	486	...
„ 2nd „	921	490	...
„ Oghi Column	230	250	...
„ 3rd Brigade	697	291	264
„ troops holding Abbottabad	120	...	114
At base and on lines of communication	957	583	1,122
Total					4,134	2,100	1,500

4. Government mules were provided throughout for the transport of baggage and equipment and hired mules for supplies.

5. All corps taking part in the expedition arrived at the base fully equipped with Government mule transport for their baggage and equipment to the extent allowed for movements beyond the base. The balance of their baggage and equipment was brought up to the base on camels.

This was an excellent plan, as it lessened the equipping work to be done at the base in no small degree.

6. On arrival at the base this camel transport was taken over from corps, and they were all equipped with hired mule transport for five days' rations for men and two days' grain for animals, and a third day's grain was distributed to transport animals, and carried by them in addition to their loads.

7. The 3rd Brigade was mobilised at Darband on the 4th April, and was equipped on arrival with transport for supplies similarly to the 1st and 2nd Brigades. The transport which arrived with this brigade was not equal to that provided for the first two; but on its arrival all unsatisfactory animals were exchanged, and it ultimately marched to Kohat as thoroughly equipped as could be desired. By the despatch of this brigade and the 1st Battalion, 5th Gurkhas, from Abbottabad, the transport of the force was reduced to 5,086 mules and nominally 1,122 camels.

GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT.

Mules.

8. These all arrived at the base in very excellent order, the only fault being that their saddles showed signs of having been recently and hurriedly stuffed. This is a serious fault, and is one that can only be remedied by animals being more regularly exercised in cantonments with loads on. Were this done, defects in saddlery would be detected daily instead of at the commencement of an expedition, when it is difficult to remedy them.

A large number were fitted with loin straps and breechings without cruppers, which proved perfectly useless for hill work, as the breechings worked up and allowed the saddles to slip forward on to the withers. Some very nasty sores were caused by this.

HIRED TRANSPORT.

Mules.

9. Two thousand one hundred mules were specially hired for the expedition. Of these, 120 were riding mules and ponies for field hospitals; the remainder were all pack animals.

The riding mules were paid for at the rate of Rs. 15 per month and free rations. The pack mules were paid for at the same rate; but a monthly deduction of Rs. 5-8 per mule was made for rations supplied.

The difference between the two classes of animals was not sufficient to justify this distinction, and the pack mules had by far the harder work to do.

This caused jealousy and dissatisfaction.

The hired mules were collected in the following districts :—

	Pack.	Riding.
In the Hazara district by Lieutenant Badcock, under arrangements made by Lala Lurinda Mal, Rai Bahadur	1,242	...
In the Rawal Pindi district by Sardar Sujan Singh, Rai Bahadur	50	120
In the Jullundur and Amritsar districts by Captain Corfield and Lieutenant Low ...	688	...
Total	2,100	

The whole of this transport worked remarkably well, especially that collected in the Hazara district. Their gear was, to say the least, rough and ready; but it answered the purpose and worked well. The owners kept it in repair themselves. Excepting a small outbreak of mange, there was less sickness among the hired than the Government mule transport.

The owners and drivers worked most willingly and well, and it would be difficult to find better transport for supplies in the hills. It would not answer for regimental baggage, as the men get so easily dissatisfied if subjected to discipline, and not allowed to work in their own way.

On this expedition they have been particularly satisfied owing to the excellent selection of *chaudris* supplied by Lala Lurinda Mal, Rai Bahadur, and to the extreme patience he himself has always exercised in listening to their many little complaints and explaining to them their accounts.

The importance of keeping them so satisfied that they would come forward for similar work at any time they are wanted cannot be exaggerated, and Lurinda Mal deserves the greatest credit for the way he has worked and the pains he has taken.

Camel Transport.

10. The camel transport has not worked so well. The collection of the 1,500 animals required for the expedition was entrusted to Sardar Gurmukh Singh, an excellent man in his way, but one with no idea of business. He never managed to collect more than 1,324, and by the middle of April this number was reduced by desertions and a few deaths to 819. For this I blame his want of tact and business capabilities entirely. Seeing that he was incapable of watching his own interests, I at that time ignored him entirely, and placed Lieutenant Hayes, my assistant, in charge of all the camels with the force, with special instructions to ascertain what the owners' grievances were and to keep them as happy as possible. From that time there were no more desertions, though their work was by no means lessened. The men seemed to understand that their interests were being watched. Lieutenant Hayes had by no means an easy task to perform, and it was only by his patience, tact, and firmness that he carried it out successfully.

Were the collection of camel transport for expeditions entrusted to officers specially selected for the work, I am certain that the trouble which so often is met with would be avoided.

General.

11. The work done by the transport throughout has been very heavy. The base, though nominally at Darband, was for all transport purposes at Haripur, as more than

half the stores required for the force were delivered there, and had to be brought to Darband by the transport of the force.

The daily amount that had to be brought from Haripur to Darband was 500 maunds, and from Darband to the advance depôts 1,000 maunds.

This work kept the transport at the base and on the lines of communication fully employed; so much so, that I was compelled to ask sanction to withdrawing half the transport for supplies with troops at the front to assist in keeping the advanced depôts filled up.

By this means the transport at the base was increased by 489 mules.

This increase was very necessary, as shortly afterwards orders were received to break up the advanced godown at Kotkai, place ten days' supplies for the force in Tilli, and transfer the base from Darband to Oghi.

As only ten days' supplies were ordered to be placed at Tilli, it became very necessary to transfer the base and get transport in working order on the Oghi side within a week, so as to replenish the godown at Tilli in time to allow of supplies being delivered at Darband before the ten days were up, and at the same time to divert without checking the flow of supplies coming from India from the Haripur-Darband road to the Haripur-Oghi one.

As there were upwards of twenty thousand maunds of regimental baggage and stores at Darband and only 1,500 mules and 400 camels available for the work, the task was not an easy one.

It was completed, and supplies delivered in Tilli simultaneously on the 8th day.

During the transfer of advance godown from Kotkai to Tilli, one of the largest convoys in the expedition was formed. It consisted of seventeen hundred mules. The distance from Kotkai to Tilli is only seven miles, but the rise is 3,000 feet. The convoy started at 6 A.M., the mules being loaded only as the road was clear. The first left Kotkai at 6 A.M., and arrived at Tilli at 10 A.M.; the last left at 9 A.M., and arrived at 3 P.M. One mule was killed by falling over the *khad*.

The above is a brief summary of the work done by the transport of the force. Throughout all officers, non-commissioned officers, and men worked very satisfactorily.

* * * * *

Remarks of the General Officer Commanding Hazara Field Force, 1891.

I would refer to my remarks on Captain Montgomery's report in regard to the commendation of the officers and subordinates of the Transport Department. I beg specially to recommend Conductor Harrington for promotion.

Before leaving Rawal Pindi complaints were made of the stuffing of the pack saddles, and they had to be hurriedly overhauled and restuffed after issue from store. I heard of all sorts of rubbish being found in the pads. The form of tree appears still to require some modification. Provision must be made for imperfect loading, so that the weight may still be kept from pressing on the animal's ribs.

High loading is theoretically perfect, but when the loading is imperfect, the saddle must wobble and rub the animal's back. I would refer to 1st Class Veterinary Surgeon Hagger's report on the form of saddle, and also to the fact that with the rough "sunkah" saddle of the hired transport there was a smaller percentage of sore-backs than in the Government transport.

I have elsewhere noticed the excellent work done by Lieutenant Tulloch and the whole department (*vide* Appendix XXVI).

APPENDIX XXVIII.

Statement showing the number of animals attached to the Hasara Field Force, 1891.

Corps and Department	HORSES.		MULES.			Hired camels.	REMARKS.
	Chargers.	Troop.	Ordnance.	Government.	Hired.		
No. 1 Mountain Battery, R. A.	7	6	138	76	
" 9 " "	9	6	138	76	
" 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery	5	5	110	70	
Detachment, 11th Bengal Lancers	6	178	
Commissariat-Transport	4,134	2,100	1,500	
Head-quarter Staff	50	
1st Brigade	45	
2nd Brigade	45	
Total	167	195	386	4,356	2,100	1,500	
GRAND TOTAL	...	Horses, 362; mules, 6,842; camels, 1,500.					

NOTE.—The casualties among the Government mules numbered 73, of which 50 were caused by drowning or falling over *khadi*. The loss among the hired animals was 13, of which 11 were due to the same causes.

PENDIX XXIX.

Report on the Survey operations, Hazara Field Force, 1891, by Captain R. A. Wahab, R.E., Survey Officer, dated 1st June 1891.

I have the honour to report as follows on the work done by the survey party with the Hazara Field Force.

The party consisting of one British officer and two native surveyors, Abdul Ghafar, Survey Department, and Duffadar Jowala Singh, Guides Cavalry, with 15 *khalasis*, left Rawal Pindi on the 3rd March, arriving at Darband, where it joined the force, on the 6th.

Surveyor Abdul Ghafar with 4 men was attached to the 2nd Brigade, while I myself with the remainder of the party accompanied the head-quarters and 1st Brigade.

On the 11th March the force advanced across the frontier; but little work could be done for several days, the detachment with the Tilli Column being hindered by wet and cloudy weather, while the River Column was still on ground previously surveyed.

On the 21st we reached Palosi, where the head-quarters remained until the 8th April. Soon after arriving there it seemed desirable to attempt working on a larger scale than was at first thought feasible, as the operations of the force would probably be confined to the limits of the Hasanzai and Akazai country instead of extending over a large area; and on the 24th I commenced a survey on the scale of two inches to a mile, on which scale the whole area covered by the expedition has now been surveyed.

On the 28th I accompanied a reconnaissance towards Baio, where a large tribal gathering had taken place, and on that and subsequent days succeeded in sketching all the eastern slopes of the Baio range and the approaches to Baio itself. Unfortunately no opportunity occurred of reaching the crest of the ridge which commands an extensive view to the westward over the Chamla and Buner valleys.

On the 8th April the 1st Brigade left Palosi, marching by Tilli and Ril to Seri. During the halt at Tilli, theodolite observations were taken there and at a point near Pabal Gali to connect the triangulation already done in the Indus valley with the great Indian Triangulation, and to fix additional points for the extension of detail survey further up the Indus.

On the 11th April the party marched from Tilli to Ril, and on the 13th to Seri, sketching the country passed over *en route*. While at Seri the survey of the Hasanzai and upper part of the Akazai country was completed by the 1st Brigade party, the surveyor with the 2nd Brigade working in the mean time in the lower Akazai country around Darbanai, and sketching in all that could be seen of the Chagarzai country. After completing all the survey practicable from Darbanai, Abdul Ghafar was sent to Pabal Gali to survey the eastern slopes of the Black Mountain towards Tanawal, and to complete the survey of the Indus valley between the frontier and Towara.

On the 31st May I moved to Nimal, taking with me Duffadar Jowala Singh to survey the crest of the Black Mountain and the slopes towards Agror. I was also anxious to visit Machai and improve the triangulation by theodolite observations at that point.

The general results of the survey are as follows:—An area of 160 square miles has been surveyed on the scale of two inches to a mile—a scale large enough to show every hamlet and every feature of importance. Theodolite observations have been taken at eight stations, from which their positions and those of 30 intersected points have been trigonometrically fixed and their heights accurately determined, and from these the heights of a large number of points, such as villages, river junctions, spurs, &c., have been deduced. The 2" survey includes the whole of the Hasanzai and Akazai countries, and as much of the Mada Khel and Chagarzai countries as could be overlooked; also the eastern slopes of the Black Mountain from Chitabat and Mana-ka-dana on the north to the Unhar river on the south. An outline map (omitting hill shading) of the country west of the Black Mountain, including all surveyed up to the 20th May, has been sent in to the Survey of India offices for reproduction, and copies should be received for distribution to the staff officers of the force in a day or two.

The site of the hut cantonment at Seri and its vicinity has been surveyed on the scale of 400 feet to an inch. The area so surveyed is 730 acres or 1.14 square miles.

In addition to the above, over 300 square miles have been sketched on the $\frac{1}{2}$ " scale, chiefly in the Chamla valley and the Itai or Puran valley. This area would have been largely increased if it had been possible to visit any high points on the range west of the Indus or the Gantar peak, the highest point of the Black Mountain. Possibly, before the occupation of the country is ended, an opportunity may be found of visiting the latter, from which a view of Kabalgram and the course of the Indus above would almost certainly be obtained.

Lists of all villages of the Hasanzai and Akazai have been made out in communication with the Chief Political Officer and the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence. Some details regarding passes, &c., have also been communicated to the latter officer, and with the village lists and the information contained therein will be included in his report.

A description of the country traversed by the expedition of 1888 need not be repeated here. The Chagarzai country adjoining it is in most respects similar. The larger villages are generally in the low plains on the banks of the Indus, surrounded by wheat fields which extend in terraces far up the hill sides wherever the slopes are practicable up to an altitude of nearly 7,000 feet. The higher plateaux and spurs seem to be more adapted to the *makkai* crop, for which a very large area has been prepared this present season. There is a smaller proportion of forest and a larger proportion of cultivated land in the Chagarzai country than in that of their Hasanzai and Akazai neighbours. One important stream, the Itai or Puran, joins the Indus between Kabalgram and Biyar; a road leads along it to the Ghorband pass, and thence to Manglaor in Swat, altogether five marches from Kabalgram. An easy pass also leads from Puran into Chakesar, the next valley to the north which joins the Indus some 10 miles below Thakot: it was by these roads that the contingents of Kohistanis, Swatis, and others came to join the Chagarzais during March last.

In conclusion, I have the honour to bring to the notice of the Major-General Commanding the excellent work done by both the native assistants. Sub-Surveyor Abdul Ghafar has done much good work during his long service in the department, a great part of it spent on the frontier in military survey. Duffadar Jowala Singh has proved himself both in Baluchistan and Burma as well as in the present expedition a first rate military surveyor, and thoroughly worthy of advancement as a soldier.

Remarks of the General Officer Commanding Hazara Field Force, 1891.

I fully endorse Captain Wahab's recommendation of Sub-Surveyor Abdul Ghafar and Duffadar Jowala Singh, and shall be glad if it is possible to reward them for their services.

APPENDIX XXX.

Report on the Veterinary Department, Hazara Field Force, 1891, by Inspecting Veterinary Surgeon W. R. Hagger, A. V. D., dated 1st May 1891.

I have the honour to submit the following report on the working of the Veterinary Department with the Hazara Field Force from the 1st March to the 30th April 1891.

The animals (horses and ordnance mules) belonging to the two mountain batteries, Royal Artillery, and two squadrons, 11th Bengal Lancers, were maintained in excellent health and condition throughout the operations, admissions to hospital from all causes being less than 4 per cent. of the total number.

The number of animals employed on transport duty varied from time to time, but the average may be taken at 5,500 mules and ponies and 1,000 camels. All the camels and 2,000 of the mules and ponies were hired expressly for the expedition.

As regards the condition of the above at the commencement of the campaign, that of the Government mules was satisfactory, although about 15 per cent. of this number were light. The hired mules and ponies were uniformly light and weakly, and in many instances much too young for the work expected of them, some being only one year old, while many ranged between the ages of one and three years.

Notwithstanding the difficult and precipitous roads over which they had to pass, the work performed by the transport was comparatively light, inasmuch as four hours per day was about the average working time.

Government mules received the usual grain ration, viz., 5 lbs. and 4 lbs. for 1st and 2nd class animals respectively. Hired mules and ponies were given 4 lbs. grain daily for the first month or six weeks and 2 lbs. daily since then. I was not consulted before this reduction was made, so cannot, therefore, give reasons why it was considered desirable or necessary, but I am of opinion that 2 lbs. of grain is not sufficient for working mules. All animals got *khasil*, which proved to be a valuable article of diet.

The quality of the *gram* was good; that of the barley was decidedly inferior.

The Government mules and hired ponies have to some extent lost flesh. The hired mules, however, have somewhat gained in condition since the commencement of the expedition.

The number of animals admitted to hospital during the time to which this report relates was as follows:—

Sick.

Government mules 461, or about 13 per cent.

Hired mules and ponies 367, or about 18 per cent.

The number of losses among all mules and ponies was as below:—

Died	7
Destroyed for incurable accidents or diseases	6
Killed by falling over <i>khads</i>	34
Drowned while attempting to swim the Indus	7
Missing	5
Total								59

The casualties from animals falling over *khads* seems somewhat heavy.

A very large majority (about 75 per cent.) of the cases among Government mules were sorebacks, the causes of which may, in my opinion, be attributed to (1) faulty loading, and (2) imperfectly constructed and badly fitting saddles. The chief defect in the commissariat pack saddle seems to be that the side-boards are too much curved, thereby bringing the

weight of the load too directly on one point of the animal's back instead of distributing it evenly over the full surface, as would be the case if the side-boards were almost straight from behind the shoulder blades backwards. The latest pattern breeching attached to the saddle I also consider needs much alteration to make it of any use for the purpose for which it is intended.

Amongst the hired mules and ponies about 60 per cent. of the cases treated were mange, nearly all of which were admitted at Darband before the advance was made. These animals were, no doubt, either affected with mange or contaminated with it at the time they were entertained. It is, however, satisfactory to remark that owing to the strict enforcement of precautionary measures, with a view to prevent contagion, the disease did not spread to the Government animals. With regard to sore-backs, it is a noticeable fact that there were proportionally fewer among hired animals than among the Government transport.

A base hospital was established at Darband for the reception of all such animals from the lines of communications and from the two brigades as were incapacitated for duty for ten days or more.

Sick lines were set apart in each brigade, where all cases of a temporary nature were treated.

Conformably with instructions, I have held charge of the River or Left Column, and from time to time have visited the base and other brigades.

Veterinary Department. On my recommendation Veterinary-Surgeon H. M. Maxwell was placed in charge of the Tilli or Right Column, and remained with it up to the 25th April, when he was transferred to Oghi owing to the base having been moved to that place and the largest number of sick animals being there collected. Veterinary-Surgeon Maxwell has performed his duties most satisfactorily.

The eight *salutris* attached to the transport were detailed for duty as circumstances required; they have proved themselves to be useful assistants. While mentioning these men, I would beg to bring to notice what appears to be an anomaly, *vis.*, that *salutris*, who are men of some education, who must have passed an examination in veterinary science, and who receive a salary of Rs. 30 *per mensem*, are treated as common followers in the field. I would therefore beg to suggest for consideration that they should be treated as men of their standing in other departments as regards field *batta* and rations.

Remarks of the General Officer Commanding Hazara Field Force, 1891.

I endorse Mr. Hagger's approval of Veterinary-Surgeon Maxwell and the subordinate staff.

The position of *salutris* in the field should certainly be improved.

Brigadier-General Williamson has brought to notice the want of catheters and trocars, to which the attention of the Principal Veterinary Surgeon might be invited. Mr. Hagger has not noticed this, and I cannot now refer to him.

I have elsewhere remarked on the good work of the department.

APPENDIX XXXI.

*Report on the Telegraph operations, Hazara Field Force, 1891, by Mr. R. C. Barker,
C.I.E., dated 21st May 1891.*

I.—Lines.

The following lines were constructed and wire erected in India for the field force south of the bases of Darband and Oghi prior to the advance across the frontier :—

1. A wire on the existing line from Serai-Kala Railway station to Abbottabad, 43 miles.
2. A line with one wire from Hasan Abdal Railway station to Haripur, 21 miles.
3. A line with two wires from Haripur to Darband camp, 27 miles.
4. A line with two wires from Abbottabad to Oghi, 32 miles.
5. Half a mile of line and two and a quarter of wire in Rawal Pindi cantonment.

Thus a total of 80½ miles of posts and 184½ miles of wire were supplied by this department to connect with the main system of telegraphs in India.

Before the advance on the 12th March, the following lines had been constructed in anticipation of their being required, and all have been used except that from Oghi to Jal Gali :—

1. A line with two wires from Darband to Phalidar, 5½ miles.
2. A line with two wires from Darband to Bela, 6 miles.
3. A line with two wires from Oghi to Rahimkot, 7 miles.
4. A line with two wires from Oghi to Jal Gali, 6½ miles.

Thus a total of 25 miles of posts and 50 miles of wire were supplied in the interval between the completion of the above-mentioned system and the advance.

Since the advance on the 12th March, 83 miles of posts and 148¾ miles of wire have been constructed and erected, making a total length of 188½ miles of posts and 383 miles of wire supplied for the use of the field force.

* * * * * * *

II.—Offices.

The following offices were opened in India under departmental management in place of existing postal telegraph offices which were not considered adequate to cope with the increase of traffic :—Haripur and Abbottabad.

A departmental telegraph office was opened at Hasan Abdal in addition to the North-Western Railway telegraph office already existing there.

A statement is attached shewing the offices which have been opened for the use of the field force, with the dates of opening and closing, and the staff employed at each.

III.—Establishment.

For working the above the following establishment was employed :—

Departmental officers	2
Royal Engineer officer	1
Sub-Assistant Superintendents	3
Civil Telegraph Masters	4
Sub-Conductors and non-commissioned officers on the unattached list	20
Military signallers	42
Royal Engineer non-commissioned officer	1
Queen's Own (Madras) Sappers and Miners	8
Departmental Sub-Inspectors	5
Departmental linemen and trained coolies	22
Local labour-coolies	162
Total	270

From the date of the outbreak of the disturbances on the Miranzai border the establishment has been gradually reduced, and the limit now sanctioned by the Director-General was reported to you in my No. 218, dated 14th May 1891.

The chief points of interest and experience gained on this expedition have been :—

1. A thorough trial of the new galvanised iron field telegraph posts, which have proved completely successful. Four of these make up a mule load.
2. The use of the vibrating sounder in connection with two ordinary telephones—the first for use as a means for attracting attention instead of a bell or Morse sounder; the latter for talking and hearing. As a means of communication between two points short distances apart up to five miles, it has been found excellent, and the weight is much less than the telephone equipment for longer distances.
3. Other minor improvements have suggested themselves, and these have been reported *in extenso* to the Director-General of Telegraphs.

* * * * *

There is a wonderful improvement in the capabilities of the military signallers since the last expedition.

They are now as good a set of men as one could possibly wish to have.

The relations with the Army Signalling Department have been most harmonious, and the two branches have worked together as if they had been one.

The amount of traffic has been large, as many as 300 messages a day having been disposed of at Darband, and some very long ones.

At Palosi 240 a day were being sent and received at one time. Since then the traffic has decreased gradually.

There was one casualty, a coolie having been shot and cut up a mile from Ril on the afternoon of the 9th of April; two coolies were sent back to India sick; the health generally was excellent.

Remarks of General Officer Commanding Hazara Field Force, 1891.

The whole department worked so admirably that it is almost invidious to make a distinction among its members. The relative merits of individuals are better known to the Director-General of Telegraphs, and I would suggest that he be invited to select for rewards those who may appear the most deserving. Mr. Thomas and Lieutenant Close have both done very good service, and the Madras Sappers have worked well.

Statement showing the dates of opening and closing of field telegraph offices and the staff employed at each.

Field Office.				STAFF EMPLOYED.			DATE.		REMARKS.
				Civil Telegraph Masters.	Unattached List signallers.	Military signallers.	Opened on 1891.	Closed on 1891.	
Barakot	1	1	21st February.	9th March.	
Darband	1	1	8	23rd February.	23rd April.	
Phaldar	1	1	3rd March	21st March.	
Oghi	1	1	5	4th „	...	
Bela	1	1	9th „	15th April.	
Towara	1	5	12th „	20th March.	

Statement showing the dates of opening and closing of field telegraph offices and the staff employed at each—contd.

Field Office.	STAFF EMPLOYED.			DATE.		REMARKS.
	Civil telegraph masters.	Unattached list signallers.	Military signallers.	Opened on 1891.	Closed on 1891.	
Pabal Gali	1	1	13th March	14th March.	
Pailam	1	1	13th „ ...	14th „	
Tilli from 14th March to 23rd April 1891	...	1	2	14th „	
and						
from 24th April to date of closing ...	1	...	6	...	5th May.	
Kanar	1	2	15th March	27th March.	
Kotkai	1	2	18th „ ...	14th April.	
Pirzada Bela	2	4	20th „ ...	21st March.	
Palosi	2	5	21st „ ...	8th April.	
Bakrai	1	1	24th „ ...	20th „	
Darbanai	1	2	25th „	
Lashora	1	2	4th April ...	18th April.	
Ril	1	1	6th „ ...	30th „	
Seri	1	4	11th „	
Kirplian	17th „	1 native signaller lent by Postal Department.
Maira	1	1	19th „ ...	22nd April.	
Diliarai	1	1	20th „	
Phagora	1	1	20th „ ...	24th April.	
Bandi	1	1	25th „	
Panji Gali	1	1	1st May	
Surmal	2	7th „	

APPENDIX XXXII.

Report on the Postal operations, Hazara Field Force, 1891, by Mr. W. T. Van Someren, Superintendent, Postal Department, dated 11th May 1891.

I have the honour to submit a report on the Postal operations with the Black Mountain expedition which, as far as this department is concerned, started on the 15th of February, on which date the staff appointed was directed to concentrate at Haripur.

To meet the convenience of the Commissariat Department and others, arrangements were made to open out Field Post Office No. 1 at Darband on the 18th February, and Field Post Office No. 2 was located at Barakot from the 19th *idem* to meet convenience of troops passing to the front; this latter office remained there till the last regiment had passed through, and then moved up to Darband.

As soon as troops moved out in any force to Phaldar, Field Post Office No. 2 was sent out there, and it moved on with the 2nd Brigade, when it advanced on the Black Mountain, and has been attached to it throughout.

Field Post Office No. 1 has similarly been attached to the 1st Brigade, and has also served the head-quarters staff of the division. When these two offices moved out of Darband, Field Post Office No. 3 took up the duties at that place, and remained open till its abandonment on the morning of the 24th April.

Prior to the arrival of troops at Oghi, Field Post Office No. 4 was opened there, and remains there up to date.

On intimation of concentration of the 3rd Brigade, the staff for Field Post Office No. 5 was also concentrated at Darband, which has accompanied that brigade on its transfer to the Miranzai Field Force.

In regard to the conveyance of mails from Hasan Abdal, it was arranged to double the existing *tonga* line between that place and Haripur, which latter was selected as most suitable for a general sorting office for all mails. From Haripur to Darband was established a horse line of 16 horses, which worked up to the date the mails were diverted *via* Abbottabad and Oghi, *viz.*, the 15th April, when a *tonga* service was established for the mails from Abbottabad to Khaki, 23 miles, and a horse line from that point to Oghi 12 miles on.

I would point out this change of route was effected without any hitch whatsoever, and at a notice of only three days.

Oghi had hitherto been served through Darband by a horse line which I arranged with the Nawab of Amb.

When the mail route was changed *via* Abbottabad and Oghi, Darband was served by this same horse line till that place was evacuated, when, ceasing to be of any further service, this line was closed.

The *tonga* and horse line between Abbottabad and Oghi still continues to work, and the double despatch from Hasan Abdal to Haripur is still maintained, as it enables the mails due by one set of trains to be brought up to Haripur and sorted before those of the second set of trains arrives for sorting, thus enabling the mail to leave Haripur by 6 A.M. daily for the front. A single *tonga* service only exists between Haripur and Abbottabad. While on this subject of *tonga* and horse lines, I desire to place on record the services of Abdul Rahman Khan, the contractor who has worked these lines. Both while on the Darband route and by that still in force, there has been the greatest regularity throughout, and this not without many difficulties to overcome due to inclement weather and consequent injury to roads and the flooded state of unbridged rivers; they have all been faced with determination and foresight, resulting in a most efficient service. I have already spoken to Mr. Cunningham, the Chief Political Officer, on this subject, and he is prepared to recommend Abdul Rahman Khan being granted a *khillat* and the title of "Khan Bahadur" being bestowed on him. I trust the Major-General Commanding may see his way to pressing his claims on Government.

Beyond Darband and Oghi the arrangements for conveyance of the mails according to the ruling of the "Field Service Manual (Post Office)" has been under the political department—that is to say, I have advised the political officer when men were wanted, and he has made all necessary arrangements. I feel I should point out that in the instances where changes of the routes for transit of mails were necessary owing to changes in the disposition of the troops, the very satisfactory manner in which this was done, never in a single instance failing. Throughout the campaign no mail has ever failed to arrive for want of mail runners.

This, however, has been effected in the face of very great difficulties, and I may state that the system of obtaining men as mail runners through the Political Department I believe to be not in every way satisfactory.

It has its advantages doubtless, but it involves much additional trouble and responsibility on the Political Department, and work of a nature to which it is unaccustomed. Where it is practicable to provide military escorts for the mail runners, and this has been the case throughout this expedition, no actual necessity exists for raising men locally.

The idea apparently was that men raised locally could travel more safely than were men from India used, but it was necessary to send escorts with the men employed locally; and these men were certainly not the best men for the purpose. They do not take willingly to the service—in fact, in many cases much against their own preference were employed for our purposes, and it will be seen at once their management is not rendered easy by such difficulties. Men from India, who know our ways and customs, and that we look upon a certain speed as necessary for conveyance of the mails, are the men required. In my opinion, therefore, men as mail runners should in all future campaigns be taken up. I believe the Chief Political Officer himself holds the views I have here laid down. I know how much difficulty existed in his procuring men where needed and in his general administration of this service—a service which, I am of opinion, ought to be managed by the post office, and could be so managed where military escorts can be provided. I do not overlook the feature of expense in the proposal made; I know the system would be more expensive, as men would be drawing pay at some period of the expedition with practically no return to the Government in labour. This is a necessity in the case I fear, but one, I am sure, the advantages of which will warrant the procedure recommended. It might be practicable if the Mobilisation Committee see their way to recommending the dealing with parcels by the post office, instead of by the Transport Department as at present, to find employment for some of these men as postmen for delivery work or caretakers of a mule train for parcels that might be organised.

The Major-General Commanding may see his way possibly to urging attention to this subject, pointing out the difficulties that have existed in the management of parcel work by the Transport Department during the present campaign. I do not doubt the task could be managed by the post office, and would be so if the Mobilisation Committee was prepared to show grounds why the Transport Department is not in a position to manage it.

I do not know whether it is necessary for me to advert to the actual work done by the post offices. As already reported, four field offices and a sorting office for the whole mails of the force have been at work, and wherever troops have been stationed where post offices did not exist, separate bags were made up addressed to officers commanding, and the mail runners taking these brought all mails for despatch back. As to how the work has been done, I do not venture to remark. I can but express the hope that the arrangements made and the manner of performance of all work have met with the approval of the Major-General Commanding.

* * * * *

Remarks of the General Officer Commanding Hazara Field Force, 1891.

I have elsewhere referred to the good working of the department. I entirely support the recommendation that the Postal Department be allowed to make all arrangements for the entertainment of runners. The Political Officer has expressed his concurrence in this arrangement, and has stated that he would have preferred that the Postal Department

should have arranged for the carriage of the mails. He remarks that it could have been done at less cost by the department. The civil officers would give any assistance required.

The Postal Department should also undertake the charge and delivery of parcels, the Transport Department giving such assistance, under Field Force Orders as may be required. Parcels were constantly going astray simply because the business was strange to those charged with the duty.

Mr. Van Someren deserves every credit, and I hope it may be possible to reward his good services.

APPENDIX XXXIII.

Report submitted to the Quarter Master General in India by Brigadier-General A. G. Hammond, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., Commanding the Hazara Field Force, dated Oghi, 1st December 1891.

I have the honour to report, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that the 1st Battalion, 1st Gurkhas, have marched to-day from Oghi *en route* to Dharmsala, and that I give up command of the Hazara Field Force to-morrow, the 2nd, and start to rejoin the Queen's Own Corps of Guides. The 4th Sikhs will remain at Oghi until the 15th, on which date the regiment will be relieved by a detachment from the Abbottabad garrison.

2. From the 17th June, on which date I took over command from Major-General Elles, there has been nothing of any military importance to record; the tribes of the Black Mountain have not shown any hostility, even when I visited the Machai peak and some of their villages; two of these occasions were for the purpose of recovering fines imposed—one by Major-General Elles, and the other by the Political Officer.

General review.

3. From Nimal two mules and a few sheep were stolen, but such cases might have occurred anywhere on the border.

Thefts.

4. A servant of a road contractor was murdered in Agror near Sambalbut, on the road between Oghi and Nimal. He was travelling at night contrary to orders. This offence was traced to a gang of Tanawalis from the Nawab of Amb's territory.

Murder in Agror.

5. The road along the crest of the Black Mountain from Pabal Gali to Chitabat and down to the Jal pass, and those between Oghi, Pabal Gali, Panji Gali, Seri, and Nimal, are in good order, but will certainly suffer much during the winter and spring; the tracks to Tilli, Maira, Kan, and Kungar have been kept open, but will without doubt disappear by next spring wherever they pass through cultivable land, as the owners will build up the terraces again.

Roads.

6. The Black Mountain militia has been enrolled, and the posts at Karun (Seri) and Panji Gali handed over to them. The Jal pass and Sambalbut posts are held by the Border Militia.

Black Mountain militia and posts.

7. The iron sheeting of the barracks at Seri has been disposed of by Captain Abbott, C.R.E., and taken away from Seri.

Barracks.

8. There were some cases of enteric fever amongst the British troops at Nimal, mostly traceable to the time when they were encamped at the village of Seri; and an outbreak of influenza amongst the native battery drivers at Nimal and the native troops at Seri. With these exceptions, the health has been remarkably good; the 28th Punjab Infantry at Oghi had much less sickness than any other regiment; the 1st Battalion, 1st Gurkhas, arrived in a very weakly state, as they always suffer terribly from fever at Dharmsala, where they occupy the lower barracks, and last year went through a very severe bout of cholera, but they are now in an excellent state of health.

Health of troops.

9. At one time before the rains it was feared that the water-supply at Nimal would not be sufficient for No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery (which kept its ordnance mules only), and the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, but it just held out, the men being restricted as to water for washing purposes. After the rains, which were late and of short duration, the water again decreased, but not to such an extent as before. A system of good tanks would decrease this difficulty, if not obviate it altogether. At Seri there was always a good supply for the garrison. The transport animals were never kept at Nimal or Seri, but distributed on the staging system at Oghi, Bandi, the Susal pass, and Khaki, at which places there was

Water-supply

always plenty of water ; convoys going to Nimal and Seri returned the same day, and therefore, besides avoiding the water difficulty, forage had not to be conveyed to the two furthest points.

10. Lieutenant A. L. Phillips has managed the commissariat and transport very well. He started the staging system, which saved the animals a great deal. At one time there was a great difficulty about forage, as there was little *bhusa* to be obtained locally, the spring crops having to a great extent been cut green, and the grass did not come in until towards the end of August in any quantity. Lieutenant Phillips had practically the whole strain of both departments, for Lieutenant Munn, Transport Officer, was relieved by Lieutenant Basevi, who, though willing, was quite inexperienced ; there were over 1,000 mules at the different stages, and I consider that an experienced transport officer and a veterinary surgeon should have been attached to the force to relieve the commissariat officer. This I recommended on taking command.

11. Surgeon-Major MacGregor and Surgeon Lane with the native field hospital took much trouble with their sections for the comfort of the men ; the latter especially planned and built excellent huts for their shelter at Oghi.

12. I would beg that you would bring before His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the question of *batta*, as given in Sikkim, for regiments which have been more than six months with the Hazara Field Force.

13. A report on the building and dismantling of the barracks at Seri by Captain Abbott, C.R.E., Hazara Field Force, will follow.* He has done his work throughout most satisfactorily.

* Not considered necessary to reprint.

FOR CONSULTATION
ONLY

USI - Library



041475

475

[G. C. F.]